Interaction between information systems and organizational change: Case study of Petroleos Mexicanos. by Volkow, Natalia
INTERACTION BETWEEN INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: 
CASE STUDY OF PETROLEOS MEXICANOS
Natalia VOLKOW
London School of Economics and Political Science
2003
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award o f the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the 
University of London
UMI Number: U 185870
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, th ese  will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U185870
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
THtSfcS
f
■517
To Patricia Kazolides for her friendship and 
unwavering support in difficult times and 
to my sons, Jeronimo and Santiago, for their 
love and companionship.
2
“If you understand, tilings are just as they are; if you do not 
understand, things are just as they are:”
Zen proverb
3
Abstract
This research investigates the impact of local conditions on the use of information technology 
in a public organization, and how the use of that technology affects the organization. It 
focuses on a case study of the state-owned oil corporation of Mexico, Petroleos Mexicanos 
(Pemex). Since its foundation in 1940 as an integrated national oil company, Pemex has been 
in a continuing process of modernization. In recent years, this process has involved 
substantial use of information technology and organizational restructuring, based on models 
imported from industrialized countries. This has been done without always explicitly 
considering local conditions, although information systems research has widely emphasized 
the need to consider the social aspects when implementing information technology. Such 
research has argued the need to explore how the local conditions shape information systems, 
as they are constructed and enacted by actors when making sense of their use of systems in 
their daily work environment. The research uses institutional theory and a contextualist 
framework to examine both how local social values and historical conditions shape the use of 
information technology and what impact its use has on the social environment and the 
organization changes that take place. Although the research highlights the local context, it 
deals more broadly with processes that are occurring in many organizations in various 
developing countries because of the global transformations linked to the widely pervasive 
diffusion of information technology. It therefore also provides an understanding of the 
generic process of information technology utilization in developing countries, with the aim of 
guiding practice.
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1 In t r o d u c t io n
1.1 B a c k g r o u n d  t o  th e  Issue  R esea r c h ed
The early experiences of the use of computers in organizations were generally understood 
from an engineering perspective. However, the need soon became evident to address the 
systems’ ‘soft’ aspects -  understood as the social, cultural, and political factors that shape the 
use of information technology in a social environment. Consequently, ‘information systems’ 
has developed as a specialized discipline of study over the last two-three decades. Although 
research into information systems has recognized the need to address indigenous local 
conditions in terms of social aspects, generally it is limited in the identification of how the 
social conditions and cultural aspects actually affect the use of this technology. To do this, 
the impact of the use of information technology in the environment must be studied in the 
context where it is implemented. This research aims to guide practice and theory by 
uncovering, through a qualitative analysis in a specific case, the impact of local conditions on 
information systems and the impact of the use of information technology in its environment.
A starting point for this work was the Oxford English Dictionary's (Simpson and E. 1989) 
definition of three concepts that provide the foundation of this dissertation:
“Rationale - A reasoned exposition of principles; an explanation or statement of reason, the 
logic of anything.
Rational - Of, pertaining or relating to reason... Descriptive of methods of analysis and 
planning that make use of calculation to bring about a project result, especially in 
economics...
Rationalism - The view that reason is the only guide leading to the improvement and progress 
of human race and that adherence to religious or other ‘non-rational’ belief is outdated.”
1.2 S ig n ific a n c e  o f  th e  R esea r c h
The research presented in this thesis is a case study of Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), the 
stated-owned company that has, since its founding in 1940, monopolized activities in 
Mexico’s oil sector. Although the case study has many unique aspects, the processes 
undertaken by Pemex might be recognized as familiar by many organizations, in many 
countries, which find themselves in similar circumstances. In the 1990s, enterprises
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throughout the world embarked on such efforts, in order to explore the potential offered by 
information technology to modernize their structure and operations. They tended to follow 
an ‘ideal’ organizational model and tried to take advantage of the enabling power of 
information technology to drive the processes of change, mirroring the model of 
organizations in industrialized countries.
This research is a situated study that does not aim to derive generalizations from the specific 
analysis of Pemex within its Mexican context. Instead, it seeks to build understanding of the 
dialectical relation between local conditions and the use of information systems, which have 
implications beyond this specific situation. The local conditions studied refer to both the 
national context and Pemex’s social setting. The case study therefore includes a rich 
description of the historical development of the country and the vital role of Pemex to the 
Mexican economy because of its control of a strategic economic sector. The intention of this 
description is to provide an insight into the characteristics of the social setting in which the 
process of changing of the organization took place.
Oil is the main source of income for the Mexican government, so the national economy as a 
whole is highly dependent on Pemex’s export revenues. It is the biggest company in Mexico 
and has had a leading role in the promotion of the use of information technology. It is also 
one of the biggest companies in the world, exporting oil to the United States, Israel, and some 
European countries. It is an important participant in the highly competitive international oil 
market and has become a virtual strategic oil reserve for the United States.
International oil pricing is very complex, but Pemex’s productivity level is an important 
factor in determining its revenues. From the 1970s, Pemex has had the good fortune to 
possess extraordinarily productive offshore wells. This productivity derives from the 
geophysical characteristics of the oil deposits, which allowed the company to operate without 
any pressure to strive for productivity improvements. It is a state-owned company, and its 
management style has been tightly linked to the public administration’s political line and 
government financial needs.
The company’s origins caused it to be structured to enable its operations to be carried out in 
an ad hoc way, without regard to productivity considerations; it did not even have registers of 
data for costing products. Pemex’s raison d ’etre was to produce oil to keep the economy
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miming, not to generate profits. Nevertheless, during the 1970s general public concern about 
Pemex’s inefficiencies grew to a point where there was a strong public demand for the 
modernization of its operations -  or else its privatization. This pressure derived mainly from 
external factors. The introduction of information technology was identified as the key 
strategy the company should undertake in order to modernize its operations and achieve 
global standards.
Since its creation, Pemex has undergone several major organizational restructuring exercises. 
In most cases, these can be explained as responses to the growth of the organization and to 
external environmental influences, among them fads and fashions. During the oil boom of 
the 1970s, the company made enormous achievements in terms of increasing production 
capabilities. However, this was accomplished at unacceptable levels of costs, a situation that 
was publicly known. By the beginning of the 1980s, several factors had come together to 
trigger a major organizational change. This was initiated to transform Pemex’s mission and 
values with the goal of introducing an economic rationale to its operations. By that time, the 
company’s poor public reputation for efficiency had become incompatible with the 
Government’s policy of striving to modernize the country. There was public demand to stop 
the excessive abuse of discretionary powers by the company’s managers. During the same 
period, Mexico’s trade partners were demanding the liberalization of the oil sector as a part of 
negotiations to relax trade barriers.
In response to these internal and external pressures, Pemex undertook the process of 
modernizing its administration with extensive use of information technology and advice from 
foreign consultants. It had been a major user of information technology since the 1960s, but 
with systems developed from an engineering perspective to solve specific problems of 
administration rather than the overall business transformation now being sought. The key 
element of this transformation was the introduction of evaluation and analysis techniques to 
adjust the company’s operation to market standards. The process of change was undertaken 
by imitating the latest global models of business administration and best international 
business practices, but with scant regard to local features.
The case on which this research is based is a longitudinal study. This provides the 
opportunity to examine over time how local conditions affect processes of using information
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technology and organizational change efforts, as well as the impact of information 
technology on the organizational change process over time.
1.3 Pr o je c t  and  T hesis  O u tlin e
The review of the literature on the study of information technology in organizations provided 
in chapter 2 focuses on how research has tried to disentangle the complex phenomenon of 
implementing information technology in organizations from the characteristics of the social 
context in which it is implemented. It examines the different trends developed in the 
understanding of information technology implementation in organizations, from approaches 
with an exclusive technical perspective to those that attempt to understand the non-rational 
behaviour of organizations by addressing the complexity of the human, social, and cultural 
aspects. Some of the most recent studies, in particular, examine the introduction of 
information systems into organizations from developing countries with very different cultural 
conditions to those where information technology was originally developed. This review 
presents institutional theory as the theoretical base for the analysis of the case study, in 
particular Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner's work (1973) that identifies 
the predominant institutional orders of modem society.
Chapter 3 discusses the main methodological options for investigating and understanding 
information systems in organizations. It argues that the selection of a qualitative theoretical 
perspective for the analysis of this case study is justified because it provides an effective 
means of describing and structuring the understanding of how local conditions affect the use 
of information technology, and with it the environment in which it is used.
Modernization has been the rhetoric used by authorities to support information technology 
use in organizations, and all Mexican governments since the beginning of the twentieth 
century have had the modernization of the country as a key objective. As understanding the 
social framework in which the historical transformation of Pemex took place is essential for 
the research, the description of the case study’s context starts in chapter 4 by analysing the 
ideological framework of modernization to give a general background to the historical 
development of Mexico as a nation that is part of Western society. The concepts of 
modernity, modernization, and globalization need clarification because they are part of the 
central political scenario of Mexico and of the political discourse of the party that remained
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in power for a very long period; it was also the ideological foundation of all Pemex’s 
organizational restructuring efforts during the period studied. There is also a need to 
disentangle the role of information technology in the process of social change. After 
explaining the ideological framework, chapter 4 describes the national and organizational 
contexts of the case study.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the process of change undergone by Pemex and its information 
systems developments. These two chapters refer to two historical periods, the first from the 
beginning of the twentieth century to the early 1980s and the second moving on to the middle 
of the 1990s. The research points out that the process of changing an organization is not 
suspended somewhere outside a specific time and place, but is influenced by the social and 
political conditions in which it has occurred. It also recognizes that the description of what 
took place is the researcher’s social reconstruction of those events. The longitudinal nature 
of the case study reflects the importance of long-term processes of continuity and change of 
the organization. Chapter 7 describes the company’s development of information systems 
other than the mainstream ones discussed in chapters 5 and which are relevant to the analysis 
of the case study. Chapter 8 addresses the content of the processes described in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7 in relation to the impact information systems had on the organizational outcome; these 
are categorized into three types of change concerned with the way the organization harnessed 
potential offered by information technology in transforming how its operations are carried 
out.
Chapter 9 is an analysis of these processes. It aims to show the interaction between social 
context, organizational change, and the use of information technology, as well as how the use 
of information technology has affected the process of organizational change. Institutionalism 
forms the theoretical basis of this analysis (Pettigrew 1983), (Westney 1987) (Zucker 1983) 
(Zucker 1987). This theory provides the means to structure the complexity of social reality in 
a way that allows the interaction between the social context and the process of changing the 
organization and its information systems to be analysed effectively. The analysis also uses 
Berger’s specific framework of the prevailing institutional orders of modernity to identify the 
features of local conditions that have affected the use of information technology and the 
process of change of the organization within the ideological perspective of modernization. 
Overall conclusions of the research and proposals for further research are given in Chapter 
10.
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The presentation of the case follows Pettigrew’s (1983) framework by providing rich 
descriptions of the context, process, and content of change. The context refers to the general 
process of modernization, in particular to the national economic, political, and social 
environment of Mexico; the process involves both the organizational change and the 
introduction and use of information technology; and the content of change refers to the type 
of change introduced by the use of information technology in relation to the impact of the 
information systems in the organization. The rich description of the case is a hermeneutic 
exercise to help interpret the complexity of the conditions of the organization studied, by 
immersing the reader in the specific social setting in order to help understand how local 
conditions influenced the organizational change process. This rich description is needed to 
identify the prevailing institutions in the organization during the different historical periods 
that comprise the longitudinal research, as well as the institutional values that determine how 
people act in their specific time and place. In this sense, information technology is seen not 
as a neutral tool, but as one that carries specific values.
1.4 A im  o f  th e  T h esis
The aim of the research reported on in this dissertation is to:
1. Uncover the ideological forces that affect the processes of changing an organization 
and its adoption and use of information systems within its context; and
2. Determine what influence the technology has on the environment where it is used.
The interpretivist method employed allows the analysis of the complexity and specific 
features of the social conditions in which the organization has developed; the process by 
which the use of information technology was influenced by its context; and the outcomes of 
changes of the organization induced by the use of information technology.
1.5 C o n t r ib u t io n  o f  T his  R e sea r c h
This research develops understanding of the complexity of the links between local conditions, 
information systems, and organizational change and the impact of information technology in 
the environment where it is used. This situated case study illuminates how the different 
aspects that comprise these phenomena are constructed. For example, it shows how the 
change process is shaped by the different aspects that surround it, such as by people holding
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beliefs, values, and political positions when acting in their daily work life, and trying to make 
sense of the information systems by using them. The way in which decisions about use are 
based on discourses of power, underpinned by specific political or technical rationales, is 
another factor shaping the events studied, as are economic and political aspects of the 
relevant national and international contexts. Investigation of each of these aspects provides 
understanding of the complexity and significance of the here and now of the use of 
information technology in a social context, specifically of projects aiming to introduce 
information technology in social contexts in which rationality is not the prevailing rationale. 
It can also guide practice and shed light on assessing the risk involved in the type of project 
that confronts the institutional values of an organization.
The research contribution does not aim at generalizations: but seeks to develop an 
understanding of the relevance of considering local conditions in practice through an 
interpretive perspective. Therefore, it aims to show that social aspects cannot be considered 
only as one of the variables of the system, like ‘human factors’ as one among other abstract 
variables. Practitioners have to consider the role of actors whose behaviour is influenced by 
specific mental frameworks, and how these change -  or need to change -  to obtain the 
desired benefits from the introduction of information systems. Practitioners should also be 
able to assess the feasibility of certain projects in which the introduction of a system implying 
a clash with the institutional values of the organization.
The research contributes to theory building through the identification of the two types of 
rationales that are commonly present in any implementation of information technology in 
modem society: the political rationale that follows the social order of local conditions, and 
the economic rationale whose foundation rests in scientific knowledge. These two forces act 
in a dialectic process to build the social constmction of any organization and its use of 
information systems. It is not one or the other, but the coexistence of both ideological forces 
in tension that has to be recognized and managed. The identification and management of 
both these forces will allow a use of information systems appropriate to the indigenous 
conditions of each case, and bring about the desired benefits of the use of information 
technology. Such recognition discards the possibility of defining a universal recipe for the 
use of information systems. Instead, it urges practitioners to address each situation in its 
specificity when considering the enabling potential of information technology. By 
identifying the impact of local conditions on information systems, the research intends to
16
create a better understanding of the limitations of technologically-deterministic approaches 
that take little account of local conditions and the high risk of the strategies involved.
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2 L it e r a t u r e  R e v ie w
This chapter is a review of the literature dealing with research efforts in information systems 
that recognize the hybrid nature of these systems as a social process (OECD 1988) with both 
technical and social components (Land, Mumford, and Hawgood. 1980) (Land and 
Hirshheim 1983) (Mumford 1983a) (Westrup 1998). Such research has emphasized the 
social dimensions of information systems, which include leadership, political structures, 
people, and motivation. It has also recognized the use of information technology as an 
intervention in organizations to transform their processes and work practices (Avgerou 2002). 
Although the social nature of an information system prevails in any situation where 
information technology is implemented, the specificity of the social setting in developing 
countries represents a major challenge. As this thesis focuses on a case study in a developing 
country, the review begins with this issue.
2.1 In fo r m a t io n  T e c h n o lo g y  U se  in  D e v elo pin g  C o u n tr ie s
In order to create appropriate information systems, there is a need to understand how the 
social context influences the use of information technology and how organizations use 
information technology within their own circumstances (Avgerou 2002). This is especially 
relevant for developing countries (Korpela 1996) (Ojo 1992) (Van Ryckeghem 1992) 
because: “While there is not a universal ‘culture of developing countries’, local practitioners 
in developing countries need to devise appropriate ways of coping with the features of the 
local cultures” (Ojo 1992: p. 108)
For most developing countries, hard currency is not easily available and unfulfilled social 
needs compete for resources. This highlights the particular importance in these countries of 
trying to ensure that investments in information technology deliver tangible benefits (Korpela 
1996) (Sahay 1995) (Van Ryckeghem 1992). However, the majority of information systems 
research has been carried out in industrialized countries with different social settings and 
rationales to those that prevail in developing countries (Avgerou 2000).
Research carried out in various African nations shows that traditional social arrangements 
prevail in the way organizations operate (Ojo 1992) (Van Ryckeghem 1992). This kind of 
adaptive feature of any human society has led many researchers to identify the need for 
flexibility in information systems. Such flexibility is vital if benefits from using information
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technology are to be achieved in the socio-cultural contexts of organizations in developing 
countries (Bada 2000) (Calitz 2000) (Ojo 1992) (Robey 1988) (Walsham 1992). Information 
systems research carried out in developing countries has reinforced the finding that 
information technology is not value free (Lind 1991) (Woherem 1992) because it 
incorporates models of reality derived from the contexts in which information systems are 
developed. These models are generally imbued with Western values, which are not 
necessarily universal (Lind 1991) (Lind 2000) (Walsham 1988).
Research has also acknowledged information technology’s potential for helping to promote 
economic growth in developing countries, but its realization depends largely on acquiring the 
ability to appreciate local conditions and develop applications to address them. Local 
conditions consist of a variety of dimensions, including specific social and economic settings, 
cultural values, and technical issues such as the availability of equipment, lack of trained and 
experienced personnel, the reliability of power supplies, and telecommunications 
infrastructures. Insufficient financial resources and different national and organizational 
rationales can also be significant local influences (Bada 2000) (Korpela 1996) (Lind 1991) 
(Madon 1994) (Walsham 1988). Lind (1991) recognizes that computer-based solutions 
which work in one organization in a specific country will not be applicable in another 
organization or country if a different rationale prevails, he introduces the concept of 
‘computer model fit’, to reflect the applicability of a system within a specific context. An 
evaluation of the applicability of any information system should therefore consider the 
cultural characteristics and social values of the environment (Galliers, Madon, and Rashid 
1998) (Robey 1988), which can reveal the level of risk when a system created in the West is 
implemented in a developing country.
To understand the use of information technology in developing countries, there is a need to 
review the research undertaken in information systems that has followed one of two main 
perspectives:
1. The ‘technical-rational’ research stream. This has an analytical approach and 
addresses organizations in terms of variables in interaction with their environment, 
with the aim of constructing a comprehensive model. It developed from the positivist 
tradition of cause-effect explanations, with a technically-deterministic perspective that 
seeks to build universal prescriptive guidelines driven by the business and managerial
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concerns which have prevailed in the research agenda of this perspective (Avgerou 
2002).
2. The socio-technical viewpoint. This research approach takes a systemic perspective 
that recognizes knowledge as a social construction, with the objective of gaining 
understanding and insight into the complexity of information systems within their 
specific contexts. It also seeks to guide practice on the premise that each case has to 
be addressed in its own specificity to be able to obtain the expected benefits from 
information technology investments.
2.2 T h e  T e c h n ic a l -R a tio n a l  Perspectiv e
The technical-rational perspective on the impact of information technology in organizations 
has been influenced mainly by contingency theory from organizational studies (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967). It has focused primarily on the normative goal of achieving an ideal model of 
an organization, defined as a set of variables that can fit the conditions of its environment. 
This research approach has been dominated by academics from business schools and has 
been developed through the use of a rational model of organization, which treats information 
technology as a strategic resource that enables organizational change. It argues that 
organizations must undergo a process of transformation in order to survive in the changing 
global environment (Economist. 1990) (Hammer and Champy 1993).
2.2.1 Technological Determinism
The idea of ‘technological determinism’ emerged from technical-rational research. This sees 
the introduction of technology in organizations as inducing predictable changes in job 
redesign, procedures, communication among areas, flows of information, structures, cultural 
values, power relations, etc. Its key concern is the ‘correct’ management of information 
system activities, a task implying the need to manage the various aspects that have to be 
addressed in order to obtain benefits from investments in information technology. These 
aspects do not relate to any specific condition, but are addressed as if they are context free 
and have universal validity. The approach refers generally to the different technical 
platforms that have to be considered or the activities that need to be undertaken, such as end- 
user computing, networking, the organizational structure of the information technology unit, 
data management, planning, and training (Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002) (Awad 1988) 
(Laudon and Laudon 1998). Over time, this kind of research has incorporated additional
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topics to address the new needs created by the development of technology and its impact on 
organizations. In providing guidance on how information technology has to be used in an 
organization to obtain benefits from the investment in it (Coe 2001), this perspective tends to 
divide up relevant factors for analytical purposes although all these aspects are intrinsically 
linked in real life (Walsham 2001).
As this line of research is focused on the elements that have to be addressed in the process of 
harnessing information technology potential, it also covers the social dimension -  but 
considered as just one variable among others (Keen 1987) (Lucas 1989) (Sprague and 
McNurlin 1993). Nevertheless, it has illuminated important aspects of the process of 
implementing information systems, for instance by recognizing the need to consider 
information technology not as an end in itself but as a resource that provides a service to 
support the other activities of the organization (Long 1989) (Lucas 1989). Some authors 
from this viewpoint have provided frameworks that try to help understand the use of 
information technology in organizations over a period of time. They usually describe the 
process as linear and defined by the different phases that all organizations have to go through 
in harnessing the potential of information technology. This research trend is based on a 
retrospective analysis of organizational cases that seeks to infer general practical guidelines 
based on actual experiences (Galliers and Sutherland 1991) (Kovacevic and Majluf 1993) 
(Nolan 1979).
The technical-rational research stream recognizes that obtaining benefits from information 
technology investments requires the restructuring of organizations in order to prevent them 
ending up with systems which, like ‘electronic pens’, focus only on the automation of manual 
procedures. It has also emphasized the subversive character of information technology, 
because of its potential to challenge the status quo and create new standards for 
organizational operations. This forces organizations wishing to survive in the new 
competitive environment to question what they are doing, and how and why they do it, and to 
consider alternatives approaches using information technology as an enabler.
2.2.2 Business Process Reengineering
Information technology’s potential for enabling the redefinition of business processes is 
exemplified by the concept of ‘business process reengineering’. This has deep roots in, and
21
was widely developed by, management consultancy companies in the 1990s. Its ultimate 
expression was encapsulated in the idea of using information technology to totally restructure 
or ‘obliterate’ traditional business processes (Hammer 1990). Here, information technology 
is seen as an autonomous driver of organizational change (Davenport and Short 1990) 
(Kovacevic and Majluf 1993) and the core aspect studied has been the enabling character of 
information technology to structure organization operations in new ways. However, this 
view of information technology as a driver of organizational change (Chandler and Holzer 
1988) (Drucker 1988) (Peters and Waterman 1982) has paid little regard to the specificity of 
the social context.
The term ‘business process reengineering’ encompasses various meanings, but is usually 
packaged in a way that is easy to explain because it avoids the complexity of the social 
dimension implicit in both developing information systems and in organizational change. 
Business process reengineering also encompasses the idea that organizations can be shaped 
through practices of managing organizational culture, which also tend to ignore the 
complexity of social and cultural phenomena (Anthony 1994).
Critics of business process reengineering argue that it is: more rhetoric than actual 
achievement (Jones 1994); a process that is not cost or risk free (Kirk, Grover, and Teng 
1994); and an approach that fails to consider social factors such as the political nature of 
organizations (Angell and Smithson 1991) (Grint, Case, and Willcocks 1996) (Keen 1981), 
culture, power, and motivation (Bjom-Andersen, Turner, and Turner 1994). It also does not 
take account of social inertia, as it assumes that processes and the behaviour of workers can 
be defined from scratch in any organization. The capacity of business process engineering 
for transforming an organization has been challenged by showing that a more integrated 
perspective is required in the redefinition of a business. This recommends first formulating a 
clear vision of the type of organization that should be built, then using information 
technology as a driving force, not as enabler of change, to achieve that vision (Bjom- 
Andersen, Turner, and Turner 1994). An argument has also been raised about the constraints 
that information technology can impose on organizational restructuring, for example because 
enormous investments in infrastructure ‘legacy systems’ are forcing compromises in the way 
business processes adapt to new systems (Broadbent, Weill, and St Clair 1999) (Henderson 
2000).
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2.2.3 The Ideal Model of a Global Company
Another important area that has been researched within the rational perspective is the way a 
global company should operate (Bradley, Hausman, and Nolan 1993) (Ives, Jarvenpaa, and 
Mason 1993) (Ramarapu 1995). The enabling potential of information technology has been 
identified as the answer to the challenge that organizations face in terms of new competitive 
threats and uncertainties on a global scale. This research has provided guidance on the use of 
information technology to help face those challenges, which has been expressed in terms of 
developing a unique and universal solution. This ideal model requires organizations to 
‘downsize’ in order to adapt and respond quickly and effectively to new threats in the market. 
The approach aims to maximize performance within the whole organization, across all 
activities and functions, in order to create a chain of value. It does this by co-ordinating the 
different entities of an organization with the enabling capabilities of information technology 
(Davenport and Short 1990).
Most of the research that deals with the transformation of organizations enabled by 
information technology is centred in the idea that sharing knowledge can empower workers 
(Rockart 1991b) and transform organizations into information-based enterprises (Drucker 
1988). Critics of this view claim that the impacts of information technology in organizations 
are just refinements of past management practices of control, not the empowerment of 
employees (Kraft and Truex 1994).
Porter (1980; 1985) outlines a model to direct the transformation of the organization to 
achieve superior performance in relation to its environment. His core concept is the idea of 
‘value chain’, which describes the sequence of activities that contribute to value creation 
within an organization. These come from both the organization’s providers (upstream) and 
its clients (downstream). A drawback of this model is that its prescription for the 
optimization of value chains expects these to be done independently from each other, which 
ignores the adverse effects they can produce when they work in conjunction with each other. 
Nevertheless, the model recognizes that the enabling potential of information technology to 
transform organization needs to consider the environment within which it is implemented. It 
also challenges the status quo by inviting creative thinking in restructuring organizational 
efforts that take account of the specific conditions of each organization, not according to a 
predefined model.
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Within this perspective, the concept of the global enterprise as the new form of organization 
is addressed as the outcome of the enabling potentiality of information technology (Bradley, 
Hausman, and Nolan 1993) (Leavitt and Whisler 1958) (Leavitt 1983). In organization 
theory, the global model strives for: a flatter structure than traditionally used; management by 
business line and products; cost-centre orientation; and flexibility in taking decisions with the 
assistance of an intensive use of information. This model of an ‘organic’ organization with 
few rules, undefined responsibilities and authorities, and communication in all directions is 
presented as the alternative to the ‘mechanistic’ or ‘bureaucratic’ model, which has well- 
defined responsibilities, a well-defined hierarchy of authority, and many rules and procedures 
(Galbraith 1972). The bureaucratic model has an implicit pejorative connotation of being 
outdated and struggling for survival in an ‘information society’, where flexibility and the 
capacity to respond are the key characteristics needed to operate successfully in the new 
environment (Drucker 1988) (Scott Morton 1991).
2.2.4 Moving Towards More Flexible Organic Organizational Structures
The global company is identified as having certain typical organizational features, including 
the ‘horizontal’, the ‘network’, and the ‘platform’ (Ciborra 1994) (Daft 1995). The common 
characteristic of these new forms is the central definition of strategy as being carried out 
through projects operated by self-managed teams, which are empowered with access to 
information and decision-making authority and with autonomy at an operational level. This 
type of organization is managed by professionals who are integrated into multidisciplinary 
teams, usually working by projects. Heavy use of information technology supports the 
structure of the organization by offering access to data (Madnick 1991). The organization 
structure is based on a process perspective that promotes cross-functional boundaries, 
downsizing, and eliminating ‘unnecessary activities’ that do not make a value-added 
contribution (Hammer 1990) (Rockart 1991a).
The literature about this aspect of the rational perspective promotes the ideal of an 
organically structured model that can sustain the survival of organizations in the changing 
environment enabled through the widespread diffusion of information technology. The 
concept of an organic organization carries the idea of flexibility, and the related research 
defines ‘best practices’ in using information technology as a link to achieving improved
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competitive advantage (Ives, Jarvenpaa, and Mason 1993) (Ramarapu 1995). The notion of 
best practices has been backed by vendors of software packages, for example ‘Enterprise 
Resource Planning’ packages that are supposed to include the best international business 
practices. This research stream considers technology as a driver of organizational change. 
The hermeneutic-free ideal model embedded in these packages is seen as the summary of best 
practices and standards of operations, but pays no attention to how local contexts affect the 
process of implementation, the actual operation and use of the systems, and whether a 
package is compatible with the organization’s values and way of doing things.
In organizational theory, the efforts to transform organizations have been evaluated in 
accordance with the goals being sought. The general aim has been to transform organizations 
by building flatter organizational structures and becoming task driven instead of bureaucratic 
(Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector 1990), as well as by reducing reliance on managerial authority, 
formal rules, and procedures. These changes attempt to promote work teams, the sharing of 
information, and delegation of responsibility and accountability to lower levels of the 
hierarchy. Although most such projects have not achieved their goals, research has not been 
able to find out whether this is caused by the model used, the way the process of change has 
been carried out, or both (Kanter, Stein, and Jick 1992); little regard has been given to the 
specific social conditions of the organizations involved, particularly if they are not entirely 
driven by market imperatives (Avgerou 2002).
2.2.5 Strategic Planning to Align Business and Information System Objectives
Another important aspect of the rational perspective has been the idea that information 
technology needs to be planned and masterminded by managers, based on an ideal vision of 
the goal to be achieved. This concept has been linked to organizational strategic planning, 
where the information technology function is aligned to the strategic objectives of the 
organization from a managerial perspective (Cash, McFlarlan, and McKenney 1988) 
(Kanungo and Chouthoy 1998) (Lederer and Sethi 1991) (Thome 1988).
The theoretical underpinnings of this line of research lie in the assumption that successful 
organizations have a fit among different variables, such as strategy, structure, environment, 
management process, and technology (Chandler 1962) (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) (Miles 
and Snow 1978) (Rumelt 1974). A number of ‘success cases’ of strategic information
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systems that have given a competitive advantage to organizations have been cited, including 
the one at the American Hospital Supply Co. (Venkatraman and Short 1990) and the 
American Airlines reservation system called SABRE (Copeland 1988).
This perspective proposes an alignment between information technology and business 
objectives which acknowledges that the business aims can be redefined by the technology’s 
ability to enable new ways of carrying out the operations of an organization and its relations 
with business partners. Its main value has been in explaining why the development of an 
information system has to be aligned to the business strategy -  and not be seen as an end in 
itself -  if the enterprise is to benefit from its use (Henderson and Venkatraman 1989) 
(Kanungo and Chouthoy 1998) (Kovacevic and Majluf 1993). The recognition of the 
strategic nature of information technology has also brought an understanding that this 
alignment implies an awareness of the transforming potentialities of the technology in 
relation to both the internal structures and processes of the organization, and its ‘functional 
integration’, the company’s position in the market with regard to relations with both clients 
and providers (Bradley, Hausman, and Nolan 1993) (Henderson and Venkatraman 1993).
Research taking this view has been oriented towards prescriptive solutions about the type of 
arrangements organizations must make in order to use information technology effectively as a 
strategic resource, and has been supported by the work of practitioners and consultants in 
developing countries. It has allowed identification of the main trends that have ended as 
market standards in the use of information technology in different economic sectors, 
including prescriptions for rearranging operations and the kinds of investments organizations 
have to undertake to remain in the market, such as ‘just in time’ in manufacturing operations 
or effective customer-response techniques for supermarkets (Bradley, Hausman, and Nolan
1993) (Rotemberg 1991).
Such research has also enlightened practitioners about information technology’s potential for 
permitting organizations to operate in new ways that could not have been possible without it, 
as well as the need to recognize the technology’s strategic character in allowing the 
manipulation and transmission of enormous volumes of data to support decision making. 
These studies have revealed the perverse character of information technology in challenging 
the status quo. The problem with them is that, again, they are context-free and do not explain 
the difference between the successful use of information technology and those projects that
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failed to produce expected outcomes (Kraemer and King 1990). They also do not recognize 
that the implementation of information technology on its own will not necessarily bring the 
necessary organizational changes in terms of changing people’s work habits in using 
information to back decision making (Volkow 2000).
2.2.6 Limits of Strategic Planning
In the technical-rational concept of strategic planning, the term ‘strategic’ comes from the 
military arena and is associated with the idea of goal-driven control (Cash, McFlarlan, and 
McKenney 1988) and the capacity of an organization to survive (Angell and Smithson 1991). 
Information technology is seen as a strategic resource which can provide competitive 
advantage -  but only if it is managed in a way that supports the organization’s strategy 
(Henderson and Venkatraman 1989) (Kovacevic and Majluf 1993) (Martin 1983). The 
characteristic of being strategic is not something that can be given to an information system, 
even if it is aligned to business objectives.
The assumption of planning as purposeful action has a tradition situated in the prominence of 
abstract and rational thinking in Western culture (Blackler 1992), but there are researchers 
who argue that organizations do not operate in accordance with the rational perspective of 
strategic planning (Ciborra 1991) (Orlikowski 1996). This research shows that the cases 
where an organizational transformation did happen were mainly those in which the change 
started at the periphery of the corporation and were led by local managers, not masterminded 
by the CEO (Ciborra 1991). Such a transformation is often achieved by a combination of 
local and corporate initiatives, rather than just one of these approaches.
The enabling capabilities of information technology as a main agent in promoting 
organizational change (Leavitt and Whisler 1958) has gained wide acceptance. Nevertheless, 
research has pointed out that the technology can also act as a tool to constrain its use (Davies 
and Mithcel 1994). The technology’s role has generally not been sufficiently studied, 
although some research is making it clearer that restructuring and downsizing using 
information technology do not, in themselves, create a new type of organization (Klenke
1994). There is also the need to understand how local conditions can shape information 
systems development and the process of changing the organization.
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In one case study of the transformation of a traditional company into a new form of 
organization, there was a recognition that information technology played an important role in 
enabling the organizational change (Bjom-Andersen, Turner, and Turner 1994). However, 
this research revealed that change took place not as a preconceived master plan, but as a 
process of endless evolution. In this case, key aspects of motivation, co-ordination, and 
allocation of resources were solved ad hoc, producing pragmatic results through a process in 
which local and global needs were being reconciled as the transformation evolved. 
Nevertheless, the vision of how the new organization would look like was essential, as was 
the role of leadership in the process of change (Bjom-Andersen, Turner, and Turner 1994). 
Emergent forms of organization research stress that sense can be made of new arrangements 
only by analysing them within the social, political, and economic circumstances in which 
they are socially constructed (Kraft and Truex 1994).
Various scholars have disentangled the non-rational features of human behaviour in 
organizational change using terms such as situated change (Orlikowski 1996), muddling 
through (Lindblom 1959), and improvisation, tinkering and serendipity (Ciborra 1996). Such 
research has shown that successful strategic transformations involving information 
technology can be achieved without strategic planning. For example, a deep analysis of the 
most famous cases of strategic use of information technology revealed a totally different 
explanation to the one based on a masterminded strategy that leads the organization in pursuit 
of pre-planned aims (Ciborra 1991).
This research challenges rational ex-post reconstructions of so called ‘success cases’ because, 
even if they provide understanding about important variables of the process of change, they 
cannot capture the complexity of social transformation and can prove irrelevant as normative 
guidance to address reality (Ciborra 1998). The analysis described by Ciborra (1998) reveals 
that so-called ‘strategic systems’ were developed to address the specific needs of a particular 
area of the organization, and were not the outcome of a plan masterminded by a strategic 
manager. The actual potential of such a system is typically identified after its development 
had begun, and the eventual use that emerged was then promoted as the type of system that 
became publicly known as a successful case of the strategic use of information technology.
The challenge posed by such research supports the view that competitive advantage can truly 
arise only from the specificity of each organization’s cultural features, which are embedded
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in its information systems. It argues that the use of information technology has to develop in 
an ad hoc way, addressing the needs and indigenous conditions of each organization (Ciborra
1991). According to Ciborra (1998), any information systems implementation involves 
technology ‘drifting’ in a process consisting of frequent adaptations, the re-creation of the 
initial solution, and unexpected outcomes. This view highlights the importance of a more 
flexible approach to information systems development based on a social perspective that will 
enable and support such improvisation in the use of information technology, as explored in 
the next section.
2.3 T h e  So c ia l  Pe r spe c t iv e
The social perspective on information systems has been influenced mainly by the socio- 
technical approach in organizational theory and other social sciences, particularly sociology. 
This has its origins in the research of the Tavistock Institute (Trist 1951) that emphasizes the 
social choices in the use of technology within a specific environment (Land and Hirshheim 
1983) (Mumford 1983b).
The socio-technical perspective has strongly advocated the use of participative methods in 
developing information systems (Checkland 1981) (Land, Mumford, and Hawgood. 1980) 
(Mumford 1983a). It aims to elucidate the nature of the social change process entailed in 
information systems implementation by recognizing the embedded institutional features 
within a context that enables and constrains the use of information technology (Blackler
1992) (Davies and Mithcel 1994) (Orlikowski 1992). The approach also recognizes the 
social nature of technology and regards an information system as both a social system 
(Checkland 1981) (Hirschheim 1988) (Robey 1988) (Walsham 1988) and a political system 
configured by different groups of people with diverse, and even antagonistic, interests 
(Angell and Smithson 1991). It does not consider the managerial process as a rational 
activity of masterminded control and co-ordination, but sees it mainly in its communication 
role in an unstructured reality (Ciborra 1991) (Lindblom 1959) (Orlikowski 1996).
This perspective has no ‘ideal model’ to pursue. Its key concern is to understand the social 
dimension of information systems, with the aim of guiding practice. It focuses on the process 
of transformation, not as the end in itself but in terms of the emergent properties that arise 
within the local conditions where it takes place (Ciborra 1994). This recognizes the
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importance of the way information systems development is influenced by contingent 
conditions, rather than through the planned character of organizational change. Another of its 
propositions is that of ‘situated change’, which identifies the daily practices and 
accommodations users make to improve their job coherence in their particular environment 
(Orlikowski 1996).
This view also sees improvisation as a major factor in the construction of organizational 
reality as situated performance (Ciborra 1996). It considers that one of the important ways in 
which an organization adapts to the changing environment is through improvisation that 
happens at all levels. Decisions are then seen to be contingent and have meaning in specific 
conditions. Planning is still perceived as making sense, but it is dealt with as the highest 
aspect of a complex process of knitting together situated decisions that try to make sense of 
daily work and circumstances, which are in permanent flux. Change is thereby treated as a 
dynamic process (Ciborra 1996).
Researchers within this perspective have used various theoretical backgrounds for their 
studies of information systems. For instance, Unger’s theory of social reconstruction has 
been employed as a framework to explain the need to understand the role of information 
analysts as facilitators of the process of change (Blackler 1992). Other theoretical 
backgrounds that been drawn on to explain the impact of social aspects on information 
systems include the concept of emergent forms of organizations (Kraft and Truex 1994) and 
institutional theory (Silva and Backhouse ) (Van Der Blonk 2000). The theory of 
‘structuration’ has been used to explain the dual nature of information technology 
(Orlikowski 1992). Anthropology has also been applied in seeking a better understanding of 
how information systems are implanted into specific social contexts (Dahlbom and 
Mathiassen 1993).
Walsham (1993) emphasizes the study of context and process within five different theoretical 
approaches:
1. Computers and Cognition: seeks to build an understanding of computers and their 
relationship to human action and cognition, focused at an individual level.
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2. Phenomenology and Hermeneutics: treats the study of information systems as a
process of interpretation of the significance and potential meaning they hold, from the 
perspectives of both the designer and the user.
3. Soft Systems Methodology: based on the idea that organizational intervention has to 
consider how different individuals and groups construct specific interpretations that 
are contingent and do not hold a universal status.
4. Critical Theory: aims at the emancipation of the individual, rather than describing and
understanding the phenomenon, by developing methodologies that promote open 
communication and recognize explicitly the existence of structures of power and 
control in organizations.
5. Post-modernism: focuses on the immediacy of events and the importance of
considering contingent conditions, challenging the idea of specific perspectives or 
future vision, particularly a vision based on the ideal of upward linear progress.
Walsham (1993) advises that theory is important because of two aspects: as a synthesis of 
implicit practical knowledge and a means to communicate the knowledge. Theory is a way 
of seeing and not seeing, which influences what researchers choose to study (Pettigrew 
1983). The aim is not to search for correct theories, but to develop a coherent understanding 
of the phenomenon that can help make sense of it both to other researchers and as a guide to 
assist practitioners with their interventions in organizations (Walsham 1993).
The theory of structuration has been of much value in information systems research. This 
states that a social process is constructed by human actors whose actions are enabled and 
constrained by structures, which are the rules and resources human agents use in their 
everyday life. These structures mediate the way humans interact, and these actions affect 
other structures by modifying or reinforcing them. Technology is created and ‘re-created’ 
when it is used by humans to fulfil some actions (Orlikowski 1992). Although technology 
has embedded structural features, its use is not deterministic as it can be interpreted 
differently in different social settings with distinctive structural properties. Local social 
structures can be reinforced or altered by the use of technology, and the way it is used will 
depend on the structural features of the technology and of the social setting.
Structuration therefore highlights a dual nature of technology that can both enable and 
constrain the way it can be used. The context is then seen to take a predominant role in the
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outcomes of projects that involve the use of information technology (Orlikowski 1992). Such 
research indicates why the character of information technology is not ideologically free, by 
recognizing that it has particular structural properties ingfained with specific values. 
Avgerou (2002) identifies a basic distinction between theories derived from technology 
determinism, which assume a predictable relationship between changes in an organization 
and the implementation of information technology, and the theories that recognize some sort 
of interrelation between the social context and the technology. While this helps to highlight 
and explain the connection between information systems and the environment where they are 
implemented, further research is needed to establish an understanding of the impact of local 
conditions and of the values embedded in the technology.
2.4 In st it u t io n a l ism
Organizations are considered to be functional structures of means and ends from the rational 
perspective, which de-emphasizes their political and social nature (Zucker 1983). 
Institutionalism provides a theoretical base to study processes of change within a social 
environment. It has been used as a framework to study the way characteristics of a specific 
social context affect the transfer of a trans-societal model of organization to nations striving 
to modernize and become part of the international world economic order (Westney 1987). 
‘Institution’ in this theory refers to the established authoritative, rule-like procedures in 
society -  the taken-for-granted norms and rules producing patterned ways of acting (Scott 
and Meyer 1983).
2.4.1 The Key Institutional Factors
Institutional factors include values and common understandings that shape people’s actions. 
They are not consciously or explicitly articulated, but are deeply ingrained in their minds. 
Such factors constitute unconscious bases of authority, legal dogmas, divisions of roles, and 
styles of doing things (Blackler 1992), which create a false necessity and consistency in an 
ideological-closed system (Anthony 1994). They encourage conformity in terms of taken- 
for-granted behaviour, by promoting appropriate and meaningful behaviour, values, and 
shared meanings within an organization. These reinforce the institutionalization of such 
values, as they conform to the patterns of a closed social system where values are constantly 
reinforced through social acting in accord with the system’s legitimacy.
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Institutional factors come from both the organization and the environment (Zucker 1987). 
Within the environment, institutionalization implies a reproduction of social facts, and within 
the organization it implies the generation of common meanings. From this viewpoint, social 
arrangements or projects that are not supported by the institutionalized context may fail 
regardless of their technical excellence, because of their inherent hostility to the environment 
(Blackler 1992).
Early institutionalists suggested that organizations are historically-produced social systems 
whose formal structures and processes are sustained by systems of shared meanings 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991) (Meyer and Rowan 1991). An organization’s origins determine 
the values, symbols, rituals, and myths that are widely shared by its members. These aspects 
can change over time as a result of the efforts of members of the organization in trying to 
make sense of new circumstances (Zucker 1991). The degree of stability depends on the 
extent to which the members’ actions have a shared value and meaning and an accepted 
legitimacy. Cultural persistence happens in highly institutionalized environments, but an 
organizational transformation can take place through the ‘de-institutionalization’ of meanings 
by the loss of their legitimacy. Three mechanisms of institutional change have been 
identified: coercion through force or persuasion; imitation through voluntary acquisition of 
specific features of ‘successful’ organizations; and normative professional conduct (Avgerou 
2002).
2.4.2 Addressing Social Issues at Micro and Macro Levels
The explanation of the social order in sociology is generally addressed at macro and micro 
levels. The macro refers to the social structure or institutions and the shared values that 
conform to the social homogeneity of specific social settings. The micro level concerns 
human actions, preferences, and motivations -  and how they are socially shaped. These two 
levels are described by Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner (Berger, Berger, 
and Kellner 1973: p. 18) as “the dialectic between objective givenness and subjective 
meaning” because there is always something outside that confronts the consciousness of the 
individual. This consciousness is a web of meanings that allows the individual to act in her 
or his environment, and these shared meanings are ‘reality definitions’ that structure a 
particular social setting (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973). Structuration theory identifies 
the macro as ‘structure’ (institutional properties) and the micro as ‘agency’ (ongoing human
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interactions) (Orlikowski 1992). Social context as such is visualized at a macro level by the 
social institutions and at a micro level by human actions, and these two are intrinsically 
linked.
The analysis in this thesis of the Pemex case study will focus on the macro level, specifically 
the character of the social environment. The impact of information technology and social 
environment is studied in two senses: how the social environment influences the use of 
information technology, and how that environment is affected by the use of information 
technology. The analysis is based on the need to study organizations as located in their 
societal contexts (Friedland and Alford 1991) and information systems in their organizational 
settings (Madon 1993) (Ojo 1992) (Robey 1988) (Van Ryckeghem 1992) (Walsham 1988).
Zucker (1983: p.l) points out that “organizations are the pre-eminent institutional form in 
modem society” and Lawrence (1967) that the survival of an organization depends on its 
capacity to adapt to its environment. The institutional approach recognizes that the external 
environment determines the development of the organization. Within the organization, 
institutionalization operates upon a conformity that is rooted in the taken for granted of 
values and acts of people within its social environment. Institutionalization within the 
external environment of the organization leads to the adoption of common policies and 
procedures (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
Organizations are identified as entities by different aspects, such as their specific values, 
professional roles, and structures of authority, and are subject to the supervision of their 
activities by authorities (Avgerou 2002). Participants in an organization are usually not 
conscious of the values that shape their acts and the common understanding between them is 
seldom explicitly articulated; they typically do not even consider that their actions imply 
specific values and conformity -  it is just ‘the way things are’, so has come to be seen as an 
objective part of a world in which acting differently is almost unthinkable (Zucker 1983) 
(Zucker 1987). The formal structure and processes of organizations are maintained by 
powerful ‘myths’: shared assumptions about the organization’s functionality and necessity, 
which may not be based on efficiency (Meyer and Rowan 1991).
Some researchers using institutional theory have differentiated between institutions of the 
environment that affect the organization and the institutions within the organization. Culture
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is conceived of as a collective socially-constructed consciousness of an objective reality 
(Wuthnow, Bergesen, and Kurzweil 1984). A particular social setting does not necessarily 
imply homogeneity in the sense of a distinctive institution, but rather the coexistence of 
various institutions -  each with specific values and norms.
The institutionalized beliefs, rules, and roles become the taken-for-granted way of doing 
things and of perceiving the world, within a shared framework of understanding called a 
shared cognitive system (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Bell (1973) has proposed the idea of 
‘axial’ principles to specify the primary logic of such an organizing frame of society. Berger, 
Berger, and Kellner (1973) defined three types of shared cognitive systems: technological 
production; bureaucratic administration; and pluralization of Tife-worlds’. The first two are 
the primary institutions of modernity. The most pre-eminent has been the bureaucratic form. 
Its pervasive character arose from its foundation on formal rationality (Berger, Berger, and 
Kellner 1973) and the efficiency gains it brought to industry (Zucker 1983).
Meyer and Rowan (1977) identified the role of rationalized formal knowledge in modem 
societies as a key aspect that shapes social understanding. Such knowledge is expressed in 
various ways through rationalized myths. This proposition implies a variety of institutional 
environments based upon institutionalized beliefs, some of which derive from myths. In this 
sense, a social environment does not have a homogenous character but is rather a cluster of 
diverse institutions within which some have greater prevalence than others.
(Meyer and Rowan 1977) make a distinction in institutionalized environments between those 
they call ‘technical’ and ‘institutional’. The technical term refers to sectors in which a 
product or service is exchanged in accordance with market rules, where the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the control of work processes is highly rewarded. The institutional setting is 
characterized by a prevalence of mles and requirements that organizations have to follow in 
order to gain legitimacy (Scott and Meyer 1983). In any institutionalized environment, as in 
a bureaucracy, the aim is to establish the correct structure and processes compatible with the 
quantity and quality of the output. Means and ends become entities that cannot be separated; 
if anything prevails, it is likely to be the means (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973).
These different institutionalized environments are not treated as if they conform to a clear-cut 
dichotomy, but are seen as organizational dimensions because the presence of one does not
imply the absence of the other (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Some organizations are subject to 
the institutional pressures from the environment. Scott (1990) also advises that there can be 
various institutionalized belief systems from which organizations can choose. Organizations 
are not regarded as passive recipients of the influence of their environment, but as entities 
with the capacity to choose strategically which route to follow (Child 1984). The legitimacy 
of the choice would be determined by the level of cultural support for it (Meyer and Scott 
1983).
2.4.3 The Institutions of Modernity
The driving force of modernization has been the incessant struggle for increasing 
productivity: ‘doing the same with less’ to achieve cost reduction in the production and 
distribution of products and services in society. In the technological mode of production, the 
edifice of modem science and technology lies behind every activity. The intrinsic features of 
this type of knowledge are: abstraction; measurability; “componentiality”1, and reproductivity 
(Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973). All elements of knowledge from this standpoint are 
related to specific contexts of social life and can represent specific institutions. One of the 
main features of the technological mode of production is the assumption of maximization: 
“For both technical and economic reasons the logic of the production process always tends 
towards a maximization of results. There is therefore a built-in innovative tendency 
describable, as the case may be, in terms of ‘bigger and better’, ‘more and more cheaply’, 
‘stronger and faster’ and so on (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973: p. 40). Different methods 
and institutions carry the rationale of technical production, and so information technology can 
be seen as a carrier of the rationale of the technological mode of production.
The economic rationale works upon the idea that humans are rational entities who, given 
equal circumstances, will show consistent behaviour and struggle to deploy the least effort to 
achieve a given goal. This line of analysis has been influenced by neo-classical economics, 
which states that individuals make independent, rational choices to maximize utility, without 
taking into account cultural considerations (Friedland and Alford 1991).
The values of rationality are institutionalized in society through the concept of the ‘market’. 
This shapes the understanding of society and the actions of people, which then reinforce -
1 Characteristic of any entity that can be broken into various components to make it manageable.
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within a closed system of values -  those values embedded in the market concept (Anthony 
1994). As the economic rationale is based on institutionalized values, it shapes the way 
people perceive the social environment and how their actions should be channelled towards 
specific goals. People acting in accordance with these values, although not by consciously 
conforming to them, reinforce the institutionalization of those values as the way things have 
to be done. There is not an explicit acceptance of choice of such values. The logic in 
operation here is articulated through the various expressions of formal knowledge that have 
rationality as their basic principle.
The order of rationality arises mostly from ‘hard sciences’ expressed as economic/technical 
rationale. The goals defined by such a economic/technical rationale are presented as the 
optimal conditions to be achieved (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973). They are difficult to 
challenge because they are presented as the only and best way to proceed although, at least 
until the 1980s2, they usually did not consider eventual costs and risks. The economic 
rationale promotes efficiency and effectiveness as universal common goals to all 
organizations. These are to be achieved following normative prescriptions of standard 
arrangements that are ‘best practices’ in accordance with business theory or engineering 
practice. In business theory, economic rationale is identified with the reduction of costs, 
profit maximization, and striving for improved productivity. The technical rationale is 
identified with the engineering normative prescription of how operations have to be carried 
out on the basis of scientific explanations.
The bureaucratic dimension constructs a distinctive order to suit the indigenous conditions for 
each social scenario, which vary between different settings. Unlike the fundamental logic of 
the economic/technical rationale, the key determinants for bureaucracy can be something 
other than productivity, thereby allowing its “peculiar genius” to unfold (Berger, Berger, and 
Kellner 1973: p.45). The rationale of the bureaucratic dimension is also reinforced by norms 
and values not explicitly articulated, which produce a common understanding of how 
operations can be performed without following the logic of economic/technical rationale. 
The foundations that legitimize these values arise from the political sphere and from local 
cultural features in which the daily actions of people are immersed.
2 It should be noted that the book by (Todorov 1997) was published at the beginning of the 1970s when the 
environmentalist movement had not yet taken off.
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Various characteristics of the bureaucratic rationale have been identified, including: an 
‘orderliness’ where everything is ordered in categories into which everything can fit; an 
emphasis on classifying rather than analysing phenomena; an underlying principle that 
everything can be organized; and a prevalence of procedures versus goals (Berger, Berger, 
and Kellner 1973). The limits to these characteristics are drawn by the needs of the 
technological requirements. Operations are structured within the bureaucratic rationale 
without an awareness of how arrangements came to be structured in this way; these have just 
become ‘the way things are done and have to be done’. This is how the bureaucratic social 
order has been shaped historically and why social inertia has enabled it to prevail over time.
The bureaucratic dimension is not optimal in terms of technical universal prescriptions, as the 
operations are carried out in a way that fits the interests of local cultural practices and 
political groups. People do things in the way they do because that is how things have been 
done, or because a person perceived to be in a position of power or legitimacy says they must 
be done that way. The political and social conditioning is so embedded in daily operations 
that people cannot see alternatives to the ways operations are carried out -  they are just the 
way they are, have been, and always will be.
In addition to the technological and bureaucratic paradigms, a plurality of life-worlds is the 
third prevailing institution in modem society identified by (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 
1973). These life-worlds, which arise from aspects such as profession, geographic location, 
etc., are the social orders that give meaning to human existence within a particular reality. 
The rationale of this dimension structures a social order, a dictum of how things have to be 
done. This follows a logic derived from indigenous conditions, including social and political 
arrangements, to give a legitimacy grounded on historic ancestry.
2.4.4 The Application of Institutional Theory in this Thesis
The research for this thesis focuses on providing an understanding of the cultural aspects of 
the environment in one developing country, Mexico. It acknowledges that people act in 
accordance with their cultural values, many of which are different from those existing 
elsewhere. These values structure their behaviour as a taken-for-granted way of acting. The 
research also builds on the understanding of how the identity of a particular culture is
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emphasized when it is in confrontation with another culture -  as anthropologist have shown 
in studies of the conquest of Mexico (Todorov 1997) -  in order to investigate the role that 
cultural confrontation plays as part of the forces that can challenge the de-institutionalization 
of certain values.
The Pemex case study is analysed using the theoretical framework of institutionalism, 
together with the concept of situated organization change. This analysis seeks to identify the 
impact of the social context on the process of organizational change and information systems 
development, as well as how the use of information technology affects the context and the 
process of organizational change. It takes the economic/technical and bureaucratic 
dimensions identified by (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973) and (Scott and Meyer 1983) as 
the two main institutions of modernity, because they appear to prevail in both the national 
and organizational contexts of this case. Modernization has been the rhetoric of the post­
revolutionary governments in Mexico, and Pemex has been the symbol on national 
sovereignty and the foundation of the country’s economic development.
Institutional theory allows the analysis of the process of organizational change to address the 
social, cultural, and political characteristics of the environment in which the organization 
operates, and how Pemex has developed in its own distinctive way of doing things over time, 
in accordance with the particular characteristics of its organization and environment. This 
longitudinal process allows observation of how certain values are de-institutionalized as new 
groups with different values come into the administration of the company, as a result of 
political changes at the national level in Mexico. Institutionalism then provides the 
theoretical base for the analysis of the interaction between the environment and information 
technology use in Pemex as an ongoing process of transformation within a specific cultural, 
social, and political context.
3 (Todorov 1997) describes how the Spaniards identified themselves as different to the local cultures they 
encountered in America. For Pemex, the identity of the group’s culture is also characterized by difference, in 
this case mainly in terms of the oil workers versus the newcomers entering the company with every change of 
administration.
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3 M e t h o d o l o g y
This research involves the in-depth study of Pemex, a large oil company in Mexico, with the 
aim of understanding the effects of local conditions on the use of information technology and 
organizational change. A longitudinal perspective was adopted to account for the 
modernization efforts of Pemex and its use of information technology: the research was 
carried out at intervals over four years. The phenomenon studied has a double nature, social 
and technical, but with its social aspect being the predominant (Hirschheim, Land, and 
Smithson 1984).
This kind of study requires an adequate method that can both address the complexities of the 
case and be suitable for the theoretical basis of the research (Galliers 1992) (Pettigrew 1983). 
For this case, an ethnographic method and a contextualist approach were employed, which 
entail the deep analysis of a unique situation. Even though each particular instance of 
information technology utilization is unique in itself, the experiences of different 
organizations in various countries share common aspects. For instance, the issues that are 
revealed by the analysis of the Pemex case are common to the many organizations in 
developing countries struggling to redefine the ways in which they operate, through the 
enabling potential of information technology. Achieving the benefits potentially offered by 
this technology in developing countries is a complex process heavily influenced by local 
conditions (Korpela 1996) (Madon 1994). A particular challenge in developing countries is 
that the technology is being imported into contexts that are very different to the one in which 
it was originally designed in industrialized countries (Danowitz, Nassef, and Goodman 1995) 
(Woherem 1992) .
The use of quantitative and structured methods has often proved very valuable in tackling the 
technical dimensions of information systems. However, an appreciation of the important 
political dimensions and the diversity that are part of the nature of information systems as a 
social phenomenon require an understanding of the unique aspects of each case, which is best 
done through an interpretive approach. The qualitative approach adopted in this research 
recognizes the various rationalities in the assumptions and orientations of how research is 
carried out (Pettigrew 1983). The aim is the construction of knowledge, the rigour of which 
is provided by the logical construction of the arguments, the relevance of its use in
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understanding the social reality, and the insights it provides to guide future practice 
(Checkland 1981) (Pettigrew 1983) (Walsham 1993).
Ethnographic research focuses on exploring the nature of a particular social phenomenon, 
using unstructured and semi-structured data. Such research employs detailed case studies, 
whose analysis requires the explicit interpretation of the meaning and functions of human 
actions, expressed through rich descriptions of what took place and participants’ explanations 
of those events (Atkinson and Hammersley 1998). The recognition of different cultures is 
important in ethnographic research, which acknowledges that the descriptions of cases are 
reconstructions, and therefore interpretations of events that reflect the social historic context 
in which they were produced and the inscribed values of the observer (Pettigrew 1983) 
(Walsham 1993). The participant observation required by ethnographic research implies 
interaction and reciprocity of perspective between observer and observed in the shared social 
and cultural field. It is in the description of the observed phenomena that the interpretation of 
the observer is privileged in structuring the understanding of the case through the observer’s 
theoretical concepts.
The contextualist approach therefore recognizes the subjective character of the researcher as 
observer. The researcher addresses the understanding and structuring of the phenomenon 
under study using theoretical frameworks to make sense of it. The aim of the researcher is to 
build or construct a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon in its complexity within a 
holistic perspective, and to disentangle the links between context, process, and content of 
change (Pettigrew 1985). In Pettigrew’s words:
“Given history and social processes the chance to reveal their untidiness. To understand 
organizational change examine the juxtaposition of the rational and the political, the quest for 
efficiency and power, the enabling and constraining forces of intra-organizational and socio­
economic and political context, and explore some of the conditions in which mixtures of these 
occur”. (Pettigrew 1985: p. 15).
Contextualist analysis addresses the dynamics of change in vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
The vertical dimension refers to the interconnections between different levels of society, as 
their transformations affect or interact with the process of change of the organization studied. 
In the case study in this research, the relevant levels are the international economy, the 
national political and socio-economic conditions, and the local energy sector. The horizontal 
dimension of analysis refers to the sequence of interconnections of change in time: past,
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present, and future. This approach addresses context and action as mutually affecting each 
other. The history of an organization is seen not just as a sequence of past events, but as a set 
of conditions shaping its present and future. The process of change is constrained by context, 
and is shaped by it. The contextualist approach has been used in research to study the 
changing process in a number of organizations (Pettigrew 1985) (Pettigrew, Ferlie, and Mckee
1992), for example in investigating the role of information technology in the process of 
change in a public organization responsible for rural development planning in India (Madon 
1994) (Walsham 1988).
The contextualist approach allows us to identify those factors in the social context that affect 
the process of change of the organization, and in the use of information technology in 
particular. The research at Pemex was undertaken using the contextualist approach because it 
offers the possibility of linking theoretical development with practice (Pettigrew 1983). It is 
an approach that focuses on the dynamics of change, not of change as a fait accompli. The 
approach leads to the study of the process of change and its relation to the context where it 
occurs. This process is seen as comprising continuous interdependent events in time, 
recognizing the will of managers to transform organizations to meet their ideal models as well 
as the way power relations emerge in the process. For the case studied, this relation between 
‘human will’ and the structure of power of the organization is of particular importance because 
the authorities made explicit their determination to transform the organization into the ideal 
model of a global company, which involves the power play of different groups for or against it 
(Pettigrew 1983).
The study’s objectives have been to: examine the way in which Pemex has been changing as 
an organization; how Pemex has used information technology; and the links between these 
two aspects of the process of change and the context -  that is, the environment in which the 
organization has changed and has used information technology. The analysis also aims to 
understand how the use of information technology has affected the process of change of the 
organization. Thus, contextualism provides a useful framework for studying the interaction of 
organizational change and information technology use within the local conditions of Pemex.
Information systems first allowed the integration of Pemex as a single organization, and then 
its restructuring as a corporate group. As we need adequate theories to make sense of this 
interaction, Chapter 2 explored the theoretical background of institutionalism, a theory
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offering an effective method of identifying the impact of local conditions on the use of 
information technology in the organization. At the same time, the duality of technology 
recognizes that technology both embodies structural properties and is socially constructed by 
the actors through the meaning they attach to it when it is used and institutionalized 
(Orlikowski 1992).
The research will address the institutional factors that have affected the process of change and 
the use of information technology in Pemex. These include pre-established patterns of values 
and behaviour that shape social processes in conformance with those values and behaviour 
(Zucker 1987). The nature of local conditions as characterized through institutional factors is 
shown to be one of the important dimensions of the multifaceted and complex process of 
changing the organization and using information technology, and of the values embedded in 
the technology.
The core time period studied is from the creation of Pemex in 1938 to the middle of the 1990s. 
The contextualist approach deals with past events not as a linear outcome of planned actions 
but as the complex confluence of social, technical, political, and environmental dimensions. 
That is why the context and the process of change and of using information systems are 
presented together within two chapters (5 and 6), each of which corresponds to the two 
historical periods into which the research divides the longitudinal study carried out -  from the 
1940s to 1981, and from 1982 to the mid 1990s. As already indicated, this case treats 
Pemex’s environment as referring both to its national and international context. The 
emergence of this organization and its change process are intrinsically linked to the political 
and economic conditions of Mexico, its relations with important industrialized countries, and 
the development of the international oil market. The research therefore includes a rich 
description of the economic and political conditions of the country during the period studied. 
In particular, the major effort to change the organization was undertaken by Pemex through its 
process of modernization during the 1980s and 1990s, as described in Chapter 6.
The processes studied relate, especially, to pressures from external factors; for example, in the 
arena of foreign policy the main pressure was to liberalize the national energy sector and allow 
the participation of foreign investment (Hollings 1993-94). Also, the collapse of the 
international oil price put enormous pressure on Pemex to address the inefficiencies that were 
publicly perceived to be a major problem. A third international environmental pressure can be
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identified in the growing trend to follow new forms of organization: the ideal models, the so- 
called ‘best international business practices’, that companies believe they have to follow if 
they want to achieve efficiency (Chandler 1962) (Cross, Michael, and Sampler 1997) (Drucker 
1988). Such trends have also implied specific ways of using information technology that must 
be followed in order to become a global company.
The national context has particular significance for Pemex because the organization is a state- 
owned company whose development has been closely linked to the country’s modernization 
efforts. In both historical periods examined in Chapters 5 and 6, national economic policies 
were based upon the development of Pemex, which is the biggest and most important 
organization in Mexico in terms of assets, value of production, employment, and fiscal 
income.
The links with the national economy are multiple and complex, so the analysis takes account 
of the prevailing economic policies of the central government. The period to the early 1980s 
was characterized by the pre-eminence of a welfare state as a generator of demand, distributor 
of wealth, and creator of employment. The second period, to the mid 1990s, is characterized 
by a neo-liberal government with policies favouring privatization, downsizing of bureaucracy, 
trade liberalization, and restrictions on state intervention in the economy. The process of 
change at Pemex is addressed as continuous and dynamic, with its present outcome anchored 
in the way it developed in the past and was shaped by the different modernization efforts 
undertaken by the various administrations throughout its history.
The contextualist approach addresses the way the dynamic of change is both constrained by 
social structures and enabled by them. In the Pemex case, information technology is 
addressed as a core factor that plays a constraining and enabling role in the dynamics of the 
change process. The case explores both how information technology use has been conditioned 
by the organization’s process of modernization, and how its use has affected the process of 
modernization of the organization. It disentangles how the local conditions in which Pemex 
has operated have led to particular uses and outcomes of information technology 
implementation, and how such uses reinforced the process of modernization. The research 
provides a way to interpret the relation between context, process, and outcome. Within this, 
the use of information technology is considered as part of the process of changing the
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organization within the path of modernization, which involves the introduction of rationality 
into local conditions in which a different rationale prevails.
This process of change has been shaped by the development of Pemex as an integrated state- 
owned oil company, the modification of its organizational mission, and significant 
institutional factors that have affected the use of information technology. The content of the 
change is the type of transformations that the use of information brought to the organization, 
from the early simple automation of manual procedures to the later redesign of work processes 
targeted at introducing an economic rationale as the driving force guiding the company’s 
management practices. The content of change also refers to how these changes affected the 
process of change of the organization.
This study traces two types of change at Pemex: the development and implementation of 
major information systems throughout the recent history of the company; and the major 
organizational transformations that the company has been going through. It then examines the 
interaction between these two processes of change. For example, it describes the automation 
of the financial functions that enforce, to a great degree, the standardization of those 
procedures that later facilitate the introduction of an economic rationale into the organization.
3.1 R e s e a r c h  D e s ig n
Pemex was chosen for study because of its importance within Mexico’s economy and its 
particular conditions as a leading-edge user of information technology in a developing 
country. Pemex is well-known to all Mexicans because it is part of the country’s national 
identity and the foundation of its industrialization (Meyer and Morales 1990). This means the 
organization is directly linked to the political trends of a country immersed in a process of 
modernization, and its process of change has been publicized widely through the media. 
These factors emphasized that Pemex would be a privileged place to study the phenomena of 
interest to this research.
It is widely believed that the various efforts of restructuring led by consultants and the 
significant investment in information technology within an ideological framework of 
modernization aimed to assist Pemex to achieve the best way of doing things by following 
what organizations in industrialized countries have done. The initial challenge for this
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research was to understand this belief, which was widely promoted by the business school 
ideology and implicit in official communications and media reports.
Personal connections helped the author to gain access to Pemex. She had worked for the 
company fifteen years ago, for thirteen months in the personal advisors’ office of the General 
Director. This job resembled that of an external consultancy with working facilities on the 
premises. It gave an initial understanding of the conditions of the company and provided the 
motivation for, and interest in, studying its later historical development.
Pemex’s split in 1992 from being a monolithic company into a corporation with four 
subsidiaries was widely covered by the national media. Together with the researcher’s 
background knowledge of the company, such publicity helped to highlight the relevance of 
the case for the purpose of exploring theoretical perspectives of information systems 
development and organizational change in the contemporary context of a developing country. 
Little consideration was given to local conditions in the rhetoric of the official 
announcements that contained the concepts of modernization, acting as a global company, 
and computerization. The company undertook a major restructuring and heavy investment in 
information technology with a very different perspective to the way in which information 
systems had been used in the past. Nevertheless, even brief experience in the company and 
casual knowledge of its history suggested a very strong organizational culture, with well- 
rooted links between the company and the socio-political conditions of the country.
The first step in securing access to the company for the case study was an interview with the 
Financial Director of the corporate group, to present to him the research objectives and ask 
for his support. He immediately showed interest in the research because of the problems he 
was having with the company’s financial information systems. A working contact was made 
with the chief information technology officer of the corporate group, who provided the 
researcher with an office in the executive area of his department. This first stay lasted for a 
period of just over two years, from March 1994 to April 1996, involving daily attendance.
The chief officer and all his staff were very supportive and provided all the types of help 
needed to facilitate the research. They made available official documents of the history of the 
company and of the organizational structure of Pemex. They also provided advice on ‘who’s 
who’ in the company and the roles they had in the past, including the names and biographies
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of people holding relevant posts, which helped to define the list of people to be interviewed. 
The chief officer demanded a work programme for the research. This comprised the 
fieldwork for the research, which involved participant observation, semi-structured open- 
ended interviews, and group discussions. The researcher also had the opportunity to attend 
three demonstrations of systems in use in financial areas and two applications under 
development -  an executive information systems and the system ‘one-stop shop’ for 
contractors.
Detailed notes of the interviews were taken. The interviews were not taped because 
recording was perceived as intimidating for the interviewees. In the local culture, people are 
suspicious of being recorded for fear that the opinions they express might be misused. 
Possibly this feature arises from the non-democratic social environment that has prevailed in 
Mexico for many decades.
The research programme had an initial list of thirty people to be interviewed, from the 
financial, information technology, and operational areas of the company. That original list 
was altered in accordance with recommendations made during the interviews of additional 
people who would provide important information on certain aspects of the process studied, 
although some of the people suggested were no longer in the organization.
During this stage, interviews were conducted with:
• Present and past personnel involved in the information technology activity at all 
levels. The aim was to trace the history of information technology use within the 
organization. Interviewees were encouraged to make critical judgements about past 
events.
• Management and administrative personnel from the company at various levels and 
areas, including users of the systems. These interviews sought to understand how 
non-technical people were involved in the systems development and their views about 
the information systems and the various efforts undertaken to restructure the 
company.
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• Pemex’s Contractors. The objective in these interviews was to understand how third
parties perceived the changes taking place in the organization and their impact on the 
contractors.
The research did not use a structured questionnaire. However, interviews were guided by a 
list of questions (Table 3.1), particularly with interviewees employed by Pemex. The guiding 
questions helped to provide multiple perspectives on developments by proving common 
reference points for considering the same events in different interviews.
Table 3.1 Questions Used to Guide Interviews
• Please describe your vocational training and experience in the 
organization.
• How has central government policies affected the company’s 
information systems?
• Describe how information technology has been managed in the 
organization.
• Which have been the most important factors that have influenced the 
use of information technology in Pemex?
• Can you identify different groups of information technology experts in 
the organization and describe their positions?
• Do you think the corporate systems [called institutional systems within 
Pemex] fulfil the objective of providing reliable information?
• In your opinion, why was Pemex restructured?
• How was the major restructuring that split the company carried out?
• What was the role of information technology in the restructuring 
process?
• How is the organization after the restructuring process?
• Has there been a significant change in the way the organization uses
information technology after the restructuring of Pemex? Explain.____________
Most of the interviews were very long, some lasting more than four hours, and were usually 
carried out over more than one day, especially if the person interviewed had spent a long time 
in the organization. People were very keen to be listened to, and they augmented the 
information they provided at the interviews with documents or diagrams. During this two- 
year fieldwork, around forty people were interviewed, among them:
• Finance Deputy (Under-Director)
• Chief Information Technology Officer
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• Three technical information technology officers
• Three software developers
• Personal assistant to the chief information technology officer (manager)
• Information technology officer of the Industrial Transformation Sub directorate
• Systems manager of the Industrial Transformation Sub directorate
• Budget Manager of Refinery
• Human Resources personnel (four)
• Planning Sub-directorate of Pemex Gas
• Operation Sub-directorate of Pemex Gas
• Planning Sub-directorate of Refinery
• Systems Officer for Operations of Refinery
• Personnel at lower levels of the Corporate Finance Sub directorate (six).
At the end of this fieldwork, the researcher structured the history of Pemex and its use of 
information technology, and validated the description of events with different people. Some 
of the people were still working in the company and others had left it. The research questions 
were refined to accommodate the understanding achieved by the fieldwork. During the last 
year of this period, the company initiated the process of development of an integrated 
financial information system.
The Corporate Directorate’s decision to use the software package SAP R/3 initiated a process 
of negotiation for its acquisition and tendering for consultancy companies to implement it. A 
new opportunity was presented to continue this research through links with one of the 
contractors. This was of value, as the researcher needed to study further the process of 
change in one of the subsidiaries, although she had collected a great amount of data at the 
corporate headquarters about its function. She decided to focus on the production and 
exploration business unit, Pemex Exploration and Production, because of its strategic and 
economic importance. That subsidiary is, in itself, the biggest company in Mexico and the 
provider of the oil export revenues to the national treasury.
This second stage of fieldwork lasted one and a half years. In this period, fifteen interviews 
took place with personnel from the human resources, legal, and acquisitions areas of Pemex 
Exploration y  Production. The interviews lasted, on average, three hours. The researcher
49
attended six workshops organized as part of the process of tendering for the selection of the 
consultants who were to implement SAP R/3.
The aim of the workshops was to analyse the processes and flows of information within and 
between the principal functions of the company, and to identify the problems being faced 
with respect to both information systems and organizational aspects. The participants were 
middle-level managers from the financial and operations areas in both the production and 
exploration business lines, and the interviews with them lasted five hours on average. On 
some occasions, there was an opportunity to ask the workshop participants specific questions 
and receive suggestions of names of additional people to interview.
In this phase, the researcher visited one of the operational sites outside Mexico City, which 
had been selected as the pilot in the organizational restructuring process of this subsidiary. 
She undertook two interviews there, one with the leader of the project and the other with the 
information technology manager for the area. The visit provided the researcher with the 
opportunity to observe the workings of an information systems centre outside Mexico City, 
which helped to envisage the new type of organization Pemex aspired to become. Later, the 
researcher participated in group discussions with the consultants who were selected to 
implement SAP R/3, specifically with the leaders of the project for implementation and 
change management.
In the last six months of the fieldwork, the researcher undertook interviews with top-level 
managers of other subsidiaries of Pemex, and also senior managers who had previously 
worked for the organization. These included four ex-General Directors, the first information 
technology manager of Pemex, and the Finance Sub-director (who had launched the open- 
systems strategy and corporate financial systems in the mid 1980s).
The aim of the interviews with the former General Directors was to contrast the officially- 
stated mission during their period of administration with the outcomes of information systems 
development projects and organizational change efforts. The interviews sought to understand 
how these senior executives had came to join the organization, what goals the President of the 
country had entrusted to them, their corporate policies, how they solved their information 
needs in order to fulfil their managerial responsibility, and the role information technology 
had played in it. The General Directors clarified the historical circumstances of their time
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and tended to take a defensive attitude against any possible criticism. They were willing to 
provide their version of the events, which emphasized their good will and attempts to do their 
best within the limits of the circumstances. These interviews reminded the researcher of the 
critique Handy (1985) makes in relation to the bias that specialists and consultants take to 
address the analysis of the problems of an organization.
The main problems the General Directors faced were directly related to the political sphere, 
and information systems were discussed only on prompting by the researcher. Their accounts 
of the development of computer-based systems usually referred to the state of the art of 
information technology at the time, emphasizing the technical aspects and reflecting the 
government rhetoric of modernization. Moreover, discussion on information technology 
tended to reflect a defensive attitude -  as if they were being forced to deal with a subject they 
had not mastered and about which they did not wish to expose their lack of knowledge.
The research also included a review involving restricted access to historical books, internal 
documents, and official publications. In addition, the researcher’s long stay in the 
organization allowed a thorough observation of: the organizational style; informal flows of 
information (the radio pasillo4)’, and official communications devices, for example posters 
and bulletins. Until recently, the administration provided very little official communication 
to the staff. The news provided by the radio pasillo could be simple gossip about the 
situation of a local work place, or major official decisions such as top management 
appointments or policies emanating from the corporate group. The radio pasillo worked with 
enormous efficiency, often enabling oil workers to have news before the General Director.
During the fieldwork, the researcher found that chats in the corridors and shared comments 
were an enriching source in helping to understand cultural values and the relations between 
groups. Sharing coffee breaks and even birthday celebrations with the personnel also gave an 
insight into the strong and fraternal commitment between the oil workers, despite their 
different interests. While the researcher was in the corporate office, there was a change of 
public administration which allowed observation of the actual dynamics of an event that 
usually takes place about every six years. Being able to see the official communication
4 Radio pasillo can be translated as ‘radio corridor’. It is the name that oil workers give to the informal flows of 
information which are carried out on the premises.
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devices like posters and pamphlets, including the scribbles made on posters by the staff, was 
also an important way to sense the reaction of the staff to the efforts undertaken by the 
administration to change the organization.
Everyone interviewed was very generous with their time, and gave rich descriptions of the 
events and their personal views on them. A typical response was that this was the first time 
somebody had taken the time to listen to what the interviewee had to say and shown an 
interest in understanding their experience as a valuable contribution. The role of the 
researcher seemed unusual to most of the personnel of the company, as she was considered as 
neither an insider nor as alien as the consultants. The generosity with which people 
expressed their ideas and feelings suggested that the researcher was not perceived as being 
threatening, she was not met with the hostility that was often the case with the consultants. 
Some of the technical personnel were able to provide valuable feedback on the documented 
reports of the historical development of information systems in the organization.
The description of the case study should be regarded as a social construction, a possible 
interpretation of the events structured by the researcher using the data gathered during the 
field work, the bibliographic research, and her own theoretical and cultural background 
(Pettigrew 1983) (Walsham 1993).
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4 C o n t ex t  o f  C h a n g e
This chapter describes the context for the process of organizational change at the Mexican oil 
company Pemex. It starts by presenting the ideological framework within which the 
development of Mexico as a modem nation is situated. This provides an overview of relevant 
economic, social, and political developments to help identify the local conditions that shaped 
Pemex as an organization. The economic policy of the central government has determined 
the country’s energy policy, so this is an important aspect of the environment within which 
Pemex and its internal policies have developed. The chapter concludes by exploring the 
characteristics of Pemex as an organization that has been shaped by the national context, 
including observations based on the research which shed light on aspects such as labour 
unions, motivation, and the use of information systems.
The national context and Pemex’s process of change of the organization and its information 
systems development can usefully be divided into two main periods. The first covers the 
development of Mexico as a modem nation and the emergence of Pemex, which extends to 
the early 1980s. In the latter decades of this period, the state played a leading economic role 
as the generator of demand. Neo-liberal economic policies predominated during the second 
period, from the early 1980s onwards, which can be identified as the new age of 
modernization. These periods also correspond to the two different stages of the 
organizational process of change. The first encompasses the development of Pemex as a 
state-controlled, vertically-integrated5 oil company. The second covers its emergence as a 
market-orientated corporation managed as a set of subsidiary companies structured on 
business lines.
This chapter focuses on describing important aspects that help to describe and explain the 
national and organizational contexts which have shaped the development and use of 
information systems at Pemex. Table 4.1 summarizes some key early moments in the first 
period that lay the foundation to what is discussed later in the chapter. More detail is 
provided on the first period in chapter 5 and the second in chapter 6 in these chapters’ 
examination of the processes of change, including time-lined summaries of events at the start 
of each chapter.
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Table 4.1: Some Key Historical Events to 1940 Relevant to the Mexican Oil Industry
• 1901: President Porfirio Diaz issues oil law allowing concessions to foreign
companies.
• 1906: Government contract with two foreign companies allowing oil products to be
exported free of tax.
• 1910: Mexican Revolution begins against the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, who
stayed in power from 1877 till 1911 and defended the interests of the oligarchy. The 
revolutionary forces fought to give the right over the land to the peasants, universal 
suffrage and to prohibit the reelection of the president.
• 1917: New Constitution passed, including Article No. 27 stating that the exploitation 
of national oil resources had to be carried out by the government.
• 1921: End of the war of revolution. Start of emergence of Mexico as a modem nation.
• 1925: Recognition of past oil concessions, accompanied by a demand for their 
confirmation.
• 1935: Creation of the National Union of Oil Workers of the Mexican Republic, which 
came to be in conflict with oil companies over the negotiations of some clauses of the 
collective contract.
• 1938: Defiance by foreign companies of the mandate of the National Supreme Court, 
which ended in the expropriation of foreign oil assets by President Lazaro Cardenas 
through nationalization decree and the creation of a new national oil company 
consisting of three entities responsible for export, production, and distribution; theses 
entities became known as Petroleos Mexicanos with its acronym Pemex.
• 1940: Elimination of the triple structure and creation of one vertically integrated state-
 owned company that came to be a symbol of national sovereignty.________________
4.1 Id eo lo g ic a l  Fr a m e w o r k
4.1.1 Process of Modernization
Since the 1960s, a massive diffusion of information technology has been a common feature 
of most countries. Through this pervasiveness, information technology has affected almost 
every aspect of society (OECD 1988). Many organizations throughout the world have 
embarked on projects to automate their operations, which have regarding information 
technology as a vehicle for modernization. Various researchers have suggested the need to 
consider the social aspects of the process of implementing information technology in order to 
obtain maximum benefits from its use (Angell and Smithson 1991) (Keen 1981), (Ciborra 
1987) (Land and Hirshheim 1983) (Mumford 1983a) (Walsham 1993) (Scott Morton 1991).
5 A vertically-integrated company controls all operations adding value to the products or service it supplies to 
the market. In the case of oil, this includes exploration, production, refining, and petrochemical operations.
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Many organizations still embark on information technology projects in the expectation that 
their investment in hardware and software will be transformed directly into the modernization 
of their operations and structures. Implicit in the concept of modernization motivating these 
initiatives is a belief that the organization will become more efficient and effective through 
the use of information technology. However, this often underestimates the significance of 
local conditions in shaping the outcome of applying this technology.
Until recently, modernization was presented as an unchallenged goal in most countries, and 
was regarded as synonymous with the notion of progress (Sachs 1992) (Berger, Berger, and 
Kellner 1973). This sees modernization as being closely tied to the process of 
industrialization and economic growth driven by the use of technology (Berger, Berger, and 
Kellner 1973), which has been associated with the belief that the application of science and 
technology in daily life provides a value-free ‘best way of doing things’. The scientific 
explanation of life and society represented by this perspective is often presented as rigorous, 
universal, and objective -  and therefore as something that can be imposed over local cultural 
traditions, which usually call for metaphysical explanations or are identified as biased 
towards the political interests of indigenous groups (Touraine 1990) (Giddens 2000).
The process of modernization accepts the homogenizing nature of modernity that, in turn, 
presents itself as the one ideal way to structure society, with an assumed superiority over all 
other models (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973). The process has been extremely significant 
in the rapid industrialization of Western society in the twentieth century, which has brought 
enormous wealth in terms of material well being (Polany 1957). Modernization also implies 
the assimilation of one culture into another, with the Western culture becoming pre-eminent 
(Bauman 1990). The process of modernization represents just one historic period of 
humankind, although it has been presented as if it were mankind’s inexorable destiny, and the 
possibility of alternatives still remains. In recent times, for example, it has been pointed out 
that contemporary society is facing the worst threats in its whole history, threats that do not 
arise from natural phenomena but are related to science and technology, for example the 
threat from global warming (Giddens 2000).
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4.1.2 Historical Background of the Process of Modernization
The origins of modernization date back to the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, which 
made ‘reason’ the unquestionable philosophical answer to life (Touraine 1990). The 
transforming power of reason is expressed through technology, scientific practices, and the 
forces of the market (Polany 1957). Rationalism remains the prevailing philosophy of 
Western culture (Giddens 2000), which generally aims at discovering ‘truth’ as the single 
correct explanation of phenomena (Berlin 1992).
4.1.3 Modernization and the Emergence of Nations
Modernization is seen as the growth and diffusion of a set of institutions rooted in the 
transformation of the economy by means of technology. Various countries around the world 
were incorporated into this process as they emerged as nations, with the primary institutions 
of social change being the bureaucracy and technological production (Berger, Berger, and 
Kellner 1973).
The ideal of modernity has been exported to non-Westem countries and helped shape the 
concept of ‘development’ (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973), a term conveying the dual 
notion of economic growth and social welfare that was seen by the first colonizers as an ideal 
for everyone in all parts of the world. ‘Developing’ countries were expected to move along 
the same track as industrialized ones in order to achieve the common goal of economic and 
social transformation. This was measured in terms of economic parameters, mainly the level 
of production per capita (Sachs 1992). The process of development was not limited to 
economic growth; it also involved the incorporation of institutions associated with 
modernization, as a way of legitimizing the new nation states (Westney 1987).
Freed colonies developed their own processes of modernization. The culture of each country 
was produced by a mix of the culture of the colonizer, the international trends towards 
modernization, and the local cultures of indigenous people. Culture is understood as the 
values and traditions that give common identity to a group of human beings (Wallerstein 
1990) (Mowshowitz 1980). These elements serve to provide cohesion among members of a 
group, and also differentiate them from other groups who do not share them. Different 
cultures overlap in space by sharing, or not, specific values. The concept of culture is 
applicable at different levels: local, organizational, national, or trans-national (such as a
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religious group). A group can be identified as belonging to different cultures at the same 
time, depending on the features it shares or not. The dynamic nature of culture has to be 
understood, and how a culture can assimilate or discard values (Anthony 1994).
Pemex as a state-owned company is immersed in the local culture, but at the same time it 
operates in a global context. The most recent efforts undertaken to restructure the company 
were aimed at transforming it into a global company able to address the conditions of 
globalization. The next section explores further the meaning given to the concepts of 
globalization and culture.
4.1.4 Globalization and Culture
Since the early 1990s, the massive diffusion of information technology has contributed to the 
emergence of the concept of ‘global culture’ in referring to the process of the globalization of 
culture (Featherstone 1990). The study of globalization seeks to understand how the world 
becomes ‘united’ or not. It depicts the history of the world as a process of sequential ‘mini­
globalizations’, each involving the incorporation of territories and the assimilation of cultures 
(Robertson 1990).
The term ‘globalization’ has diverse meanings. For Walsham (2001), it refers to the 
increasing interconnection of societies in terms of their economic, political and cultural life. 
For Robertson, it is the compression of the world and the consciousness of the world as a 
whole (Walsham 2001). For Bauman (1998), globalization divides as much as it unites; it 
encompasses a process of progressive spatial segregation, separation, and exclusion both 
within the society of a country and between countries (Bauman 1998).
Globalization is intimately related to modernity and the diffusion of information technology, 
and in many cases is seen to be tied to neo-liberalism ideas (Aguilar Monteverde 2002). 
While globalization for some authors represents the diminished sovereignty of nations 
(Ohmae 1990) in an integrated world economy, it allows companies to have global choices 
for locating their facilities (O'Brien 1992). Other authors, for example (Clark 1997), argue 
that nation states should pursue the protection of society against the drawbacks that arise 
from this process (Walsham 2001). Giddens relates globalization to the notion that we all
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live in one world viewed as a whole (Giddens 2000), where globalization can be seen as the 
latest stage of a common process (see figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: The Process of Modernization
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Although globalization has its roots in the industrialization of the world, it is a revolutionary 
process that does not have an exclusively economic character as it also entails political, 
technological, and cultural processes. It is not only a process external to the individual but a 
phenomenon that affects the intimacy of human beings (Giddens 2000).
Culture can be understood as “the sense of summarizing the ways in which human groups 
distinguish themselves from others. It represents what is shared within a group, and 
presumably simultaneously not shared (or not entirely shared) outside it” (Wallerstein 1990: 
pp.31-2). It is not possible to talk of ‘global culture’, as one talks of the culture of a country 
or a society. The global culture, or better named ‘globalization of culture’, should be seen as 
a process in which the ideal of modernity is incorporated systematically into local conditions 
as ‘best practices’.
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The indigenous features of each particular locality resist, turn back, and even influence the 
cultural global flows (Worsley 1990). As shown in figure 4.1, the globalization of the world 
can be regarded as a new dimension on top of international cross-border interaction, 
indicating a permanence of continuity and stability within the change (Walsham 2001). The 
process of globalization emerged with the massive diffusion of information technology that 
has enabled a redefinition of the reality in which organizations operate, including a 
redefinition of the meaning of physical distance. Information technology has driven 
globalization (Bradley, Hausman, and Nolan 1993), leading to an intensification of global 
economic competition which has opened an increasing gap between the development of 
different nations (Castells 1999).
The concept of a ‘global company’ used intensively by various disciplines is tied to the image 
of a worldwide corporation that allocates its production facilities anywhere in the world, 
profiting from the best investment conditions through sales of its products in most countries. 
The global company also emerged as a model of an organization with standard procedures 
that have to be followed in order to cope with changes of the environment (Klenke 1994) 
(Bjom-Andersen, Turner, and Turner 1994). These changes are linked to the enormous 
capabilities offered by the uses of information technology, which allow new ways of 
operation that were not possible without it (Checkland 1981). The key objectives pursued by 
such organizations are: global efficiency; national responsiveness; and the ability to develop 
and access knowledge on a worldwide basis (Bradley, Hausman, and Nolan 1993).
In the global organization, information systems become a primary concern because the 
decision-making process is devolved down to the lower levels of the organizations, with the 
higher levels responsible for just defining the frames of decisions. The model of a global 
company is based on the capabilities that information technology offers in handling 
information, and its organizational structure is built through networks working with the 
infrastructure of resources available and the formal hierarchy (Eccles and Nolan 1993).
Organizations throughout the world are striving to transform their way of operating to follow 
this model of a global company. Steps towards this are usually taken with the advice of 
consultants, imply heavy use of information technology, and generally mirror ‘best 
international practices’. Research in this area is typically conducted in settings of private
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companies in industrialized countries, with limited attempts to understand these processes in 
developing countries, especially in public organizations that do not conform to the market 
rationale, of which Pemex is an example.
It is within this ideological context of modernization and the ideal model of a global company 
that this research seeks to position the social setting of Pemex’s change process. Within this, 
two main cultural dimensions need to be identified: the globalization aspects representing the 
homogenizing influence of modernity; and the local conditions of the indigenous cultural 
background, both of the country and the organization, that encompass specific features which 
shape local identities through their prevailing set of values. For Pemex, the unchallenged 
goal of modernization supported its restructuring efforts to the beginning of the 1980s; since 
then, it has tried to become a global company on the assumption that this transformation is 
needed to make it work more effectively and efficiently in the new era of globalization. 
Throughout all these developments, little regard was given to local conditions that, as 
explained in chapters 5 and 6, had enormous influence in the organization.
4.2 N a tio n al  C o n tex t
The specific characteristics of Mexico are described here to sketch out the national context in 
which the organizational change took place at Pemex (see also table 4.1). This is necessary 
because the historical development of the country and its specific political and economic 
circumstances affected the process of organizational change.
4.2.1 Mexico: General Geographical, Historical, Political and Social Background
The territory of Mexico has an area of 1,967,183 square kilometres, according to the Mexican 
National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI). Its northern border is 
with the United States (see figure 4.2) and is around 2000 kilometres long; to the East are the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea; to the West, the Pacific Ocean; and to the Southeast is 
Guatemala and Belize. Mexico is a country of great contrasts, with a varied geography and 
climate. In the North, there are vast desert areas; in the Southeast, tropical rain forests; and 
huge valleys with a mild climate in the centre. Chains of mountains cross the whole country, 
restricting agricultural activities (Mendez 1998).
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F igure 4.2: M exico  G eograp h ic L ocation
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The national currency is the peso and the main economic sectors are oil, silver, tourism, and 
agriculture for export. Mexico is highly industrialized; it is one of the twenty richest nations 
in the world, but it is still considered a developing country due to the disparity in the degree 
of development and social conditions between geographical areas and population groups. 
There are big differences between the standard of living of the rich and the poor, and in the 
state of the infrastructure of different regions.
The population of Mexico in February 2000 was estimated to be 97.56 million people. A 
majority of these are from various ethnic groups referred to as ‘Indians’ or of mixed Indian 
and Spanish ancestry (known as mestizos). Historically, the Indians groups have been 
socially marginalized and excluded from national processes of modernization. In particular, 
the special character of the mestizos has been identified as a major cultural feature of 
Mexicans whose origins were an act of rape, who lack a father figure, and have feelings of 
permanent displacement with little sense of emotional security and belonging (Paz 1981) 
(Ramirez 1977). Generally, the lives of Mexicans are guided more by traditions than 
principles, by pragmatism rather than ideology, and by power rather than law (Riding 1989).
Spain conquered Mexico in the sixteenth century and its colonial rule lasted 300 years. The 
Spanish introduced Christianity to the country. Today, 90% of the population are Roman 
Catholics and Spanish is the official language. The population is highly concentrated in the
6 XII General National Census - INEGI.
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urban areas, with Mexico City containing over 18.3% of the country’s entire population. One 
out of four habitants lives in the metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara, and 
Monterrey, the three biggest cities of the country. The employment distribution in 2000 was:
n
agriculture 16%, industrial 28%, and 53.1% services .
The other important influence comes from the United States, mainly through the pattern of 
economic consumption and industrialization that typifies modernization drives. Mexico and 
the United States have important economic links that have been reinforced through time; for 
example, in the early 1990s they signed the North American Free Trade Agreement, together 
with Canada. Mexico provides cheap labour and raw materials, mainly oil and vegetables, to 
the American economy. The United States exports capital and half-finished goods to its
o
Southern neighbour. Mexico has enormous unemployment and a large underground 
economy which in 2000 represented 9.6% of the total production of the economy9.
Mexico’s history has stamped its culture with two distinctive features, popularly referred to 
by the Spanish words caciquismo and malinchismo. The cacique is a political figure: a strong 
local leader, the “owner of land and souls” who rules through his own law and usually 
represents the autocratic, often despotic, power structure that prevails throughout Mexican 
society. Malinchismo10 is the common attitude of Mexicans in valuing and privileging what 
comes from abroad over what comes from local sources. This feature is present at all levels 
of the society, and is seen within organizations when suggestions from consultants are 
emphasized over proposals made by the company’s own employees. The power of science 
and technology as carriers of modernization is reinforced within this cultural scenario. Their 
merit and superiority are taken for granted and never challenged, due to their alien character 
as something coming from abroad.
Mexico does not have a democratic tradition; open discussion and diversity of opinions are 
not generally tolerated. Even though elections have been held since the end of the revolution
7 Estimated figures from the XII General National Census INEGI.
8 Officially the unemployment rate was 2.2% in 2000 according to Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano from 
INEGI. But other studies suggest in 1998 it reached 21.8% (Calva-Mercado 1999).
9 Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico, INEGI.
10 The word malinchismo is derived from the proper name, Malinche, who was the Indian mistress of Heman 
Cortes, the Spanish conqueror. She was a noble Indian who spoke several languages and, thanks to her help, 
Cortes was able to defeat local peoples. The term encompasses the negative connotation of ‘traitor’.
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in 1921, from the early 1930s only the P R I11 party ruled the country until a real political
7 0opposition emerged in the nineties, with an opposition party, PAN , winning the general 
elections in July 2001. Most Latin American countries have considered the political system 
of Mexico to be a ‘soft dictatorship’ (dictablanda13), because its government managed to 
control its labour without the open repression that has been a feature of other nations of the 
region. The Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa offered this description of the Mexican 
political system:
“the perfect dictatorship, the permanence of a Party, not of a man, a Party that is unmovable, a Party 
that gives enough space to criticism, as long as it serves its interests, because in this way it shows that it 
is a democratic party; but suppresses by any means...the criticism that somehow endangers its 
permanence.” (Hollings 1993-94: p. 95).
The historic lack of democracy in Mexico has not just been in the political arena, but in the 
social sphere people have also not felt free to discuss matters or to give their opinions in 
order to avoid personal conflict, fear of hurting the feelings of others, or putting themselves at 
risk.
The government has profited from this situation by launching all its programmes and policies 
with no public debate or evaluation. Most of the time, policies are presented as the ‘best 
way’, supported by scientific and technical arguments. Risks and costs involved in any 
decision are not discussed openly, or sometimes not even considered at all. Often policy 
definitions or new projects are kept strictly confidential until the day that they are actually 
launched.
The ‘scapegoat’ mechanism is another prevalent cultural feature; if things do not go well, the 
person identified as being responsible is dismissed. This ‘blame culture’ does not allow for 
learning from mistakes and encourages people to avoid taking decisions, in case they make 
errors and risk losing their job. Scapegoating is also used as a weapon in the struggle for 
power between groups, as a way of getting rid of ‘undesirable people’. There is a common 
saying in the government: ‘people should not move if they want to appear in the picture’. An
11 Partido Revolucionario Institutional (Institutional Revolutionary Party).
12 Partido Action Nacional (National Action Party).
13 The term dictatorship in Spanish dictadura is formed by the words: dictum and hard. To compose the term 
dictablanda, the word meaning ‘hard’ has been changed to one meaning ‘soft’.
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attitude of risk avoidance therefore prevails in some public organizations, where things 
happen without open and transparent decision-making processes and clear definitions of areas 
of responsibility.
Since the late 1970s, the top tiers of government have been held by young professionals who 
have undertaken post-graduate studies abroad, mainly in the United States. They are known 
as the ‘technocrats’ and largely support the economic policies recommended by the 
International Monetary Fund (Ortiz Wadgymar 1997). Masters and doctorate titles are the 
source of authority and legitimacy, but work experience is not. These young professionals 
have usually little or no work experience outside the academic world, and claim power 
through the attitude that they know what is best and the past has nothing good to offer or to 
be learned from. In this sense, both the country as a whole and the organizations within it 
have lost important knowledge because of the low value placed on historical memory and 
experience. This attitude is also strengthened by the publicly-known corruption of some 
members of past administrations, often called ‘dinosaurs’.
4.2.2 Historical Background of Petroleos Mexicanos
The presence of oil in the region was known by pre-Hispanic cultures, who burned it in 
rituals and ceremonies, used it as pigment, and employed it in medical applications. During 
the colonial period, royal legislation established that the King of Spain owned all the mines, 
fossils, or any ‘juices of the earth’; only he had the right to award concessions to exploit these 
resources. After the war of independence from Spain, all rights belonging to the crown were 
assigned to the new nation of Mexico in 1821 (Mexico. 1940) (Villegas Moreno 1988). This 
link between national policy and energy affairs that has remained until the present day.
Successive governments of the new nation maintained these rights. In the middle of the 
nineteenth century, a royal government, with the Archduke Maximilian of Austria as ruler, 
realized the economic importance of natural resources and issued an Imperial Decree 
declaring that nobody had the right to utilize any of these resources without a formal 
concession from the authorities. It was not until 1884 that the country abandoned its 
nationalist tradition in legislation regarding natural resources. The government at that time, 
inspired by the economic liberalism, issued a new code that gave the owner of a plot the
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rights over both the land and the resources underneath it (Mexico. 1940) (Villegas Moreno 
1988).
In 1901, the liberal government of Porfirio Diaz issued the first oil law that allowed federal 
authorities to grant concessions to oil companies established in the country. The concessions 
given for exploration over areas of land belonging to the state proved to be very 
advantageous to the companies, providing: franchises; tax exemptions for imports of 
machinery and all items required for the activities of the companies; fiscal allowances; and 
the right to take ownership of the land if oil was found (Villegas Moreno 1988).
Apart from a stamp tax, the capital invested in oil production was exempted from fiscal 
obligations for ten years. This legislation also established that companies, even if they were 
foreign owned, were legally Mexican and had to comply to local laws. In 1906, the 
government signed a deal with two foreign oil companies that allowed them tax-free exports 
of all types of oil products for a certain period of time (Mexico. 1940). In exchange, the 
companies agreed to carry on with investments in the country. Some oil companies enjoyed 
this type of preferential treatment for a very long period -  they did not pay export taxes until 
1917, or import taxes until 1935.
The start of the Revolutionary War in 1910 saw the beginning of a time of great uncertainty, 
with foreign companies paying secret agents in all oil producing areas to destabilize the 
revolutionary governments (Duran 1982). The popular political movement claimed that 
natural resources were the nation’s wealth. In 1917, a new Mexican Political Constitution
tilwas promulgated. Its 27 Article stated that the exploitation of hydrocarbons was an activity 
to be carried out solely by the government of the Republic14. In 1918, a new decree on oil 
affairs established that the exploitation of natural resources could be made only through 
concessions granted by the government.
The legislative changes tended to be more restrictive towards the activities of the foreign oil 
companies. Succeeding laws established limits to the areas of exploitation and created a levy 
of 5% on fixture probable production. These changes in the law intensified the problems that
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oil companies had with the governments that succeeded Porfirio Diaz (Meyer 1982). There 
are many instances of abuse by the oil companies, such as their intervention in Mexican 
political affairs and in international campaigns to discredit the country. In 1925, during the 
government of Plutarco Elias Calles, a new oil law was promulgated that recognized the 
legitimacy of the oil concessions signed in the past, but established that the oil companies 
should ask for a confirmation of their concessions. This new law also established that all 
concessions were terminated after 50 years, without exemption (Mexico. 1940) (Meyer 
1982).
Workers in the different oil companies tried several times to organize themselves into a 
national union. These efforts mainly faced the companies’ disapproval (Prevot-Schapira 
1982). In 1935, the workers finally succeeded in establishing the National Oil Workers 
Union of the Mexican Republic with the support of the government. The Union proposed a 
collective contract for the foreign oil companies and agreement in principle was reached on 
most of the points, except for the workers’ demand for fringe benefits. The companies 
claimed they could not cope with the economic demands of the workers. The government 
tried many times to find a negotiated solution but the oil companies refused to compromise. 
The conflict ended in the Supreme Court, which dictated a settlement favourable to the 
Union. Even then, the foreign companies refused to comply (Mexico. 1940).
4.3 O r g a n iza tio n a l  C u ltu r e  : ‘M a k in g  a  C r o c o d ile  Fl y ’
The culture of the organization, ‘the way we do things around here’, gives a sense of identity 
to a company. An organization is a dynamic entity, and so is its culture. There are authors 
(Warner 1989) who distinguish between ‘climate’ and ‘culture’, the latter being the enduring 
features of the organization that change only because of major internal or external dynamics 
(Anthony 1994). For some companies, the founder becomes the key determinant of the 
character of its organizational culture (Schein 1992).
In the case of Pemex, the characteristics of its culture were determined by the events around 
the decree of expropriation in year 1938 that gave birth to the company. From the origins of 
Pemex, it is possible to trace the features of its culture and follow the way they have evolved.
14 Article 27 stated: “...it is up to the nation to direct the control of the oil and its products, no concessions nor 
contracts will be granted for its exploitation, because the nation will do it directly, through the institutions
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It is the biggest company in Mexico with installations scattered throughout the country, 
reflecting different sub-cultures. The size of the company and its economic importance has 
been the determinant of the political strength of both the company’s management and its 
workers’ Union.
Pemex’s status as a state-owned company provides the general institutional context in which 
its operations are carried out. Its activities are regulated by the central government. The 
mission of the company has been, until recently, centred in its original raison d'etre: 
producing the oil that the Mexican economy required. The events that followed the 
expropriation produced an organization strongly characterized by cohesion. The former 
foreign owners organized a campaign to discredit the new enterprise as being a group of 
‘burglars’ with no technical knowledge (Sampson 1988). This view had some truth, because 
all the engineers who worked for the international oil companies were foreigners, who left 
immediately after the expropriation. The Mexican workers had to continue the operation of 
the oil wells and distribution centres, while the new corporation had no managerial 
experience.
The whole process by which Mexicans took responsibility of oil operations in their country 
was carried out with a very profound patriotic feeling. The workers participated in this with a 
deep sense of pride, wanting to prove to the world that Mexicans were able to carry on 
producing and distributing oil in an organized way (Garcia Hernandez 1971). However, this 
was done with minimum considerations to efficiency or to the rationality of Pemex’s 
operations. This ‘sense of being’ -  of approach and behaviour -  became embedded in the 
culture of Pemex, which became a bureaucratic organization with a reputation for red tape, 
inefficiency, and abuse. Things were done and goals were achieved, but at very high costs.
The irregularities and abuses had been the cost of keeping Pemex run as a tight vertically- 
integrated organization and hierarchical power structure with no major industrial relations 
conflict. It was commonly stated that managers gave orders, and their personnel obeyed, 
regardless of the feasibility of the command. Workers did the best they could, but if it was 
not possible to achieve what was expected, they would just make up data, as long as they 
could say ‘the order was fulfilled’. For example, during interviews for this research oil
created by the nation for that purpose.”
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workers commented that among them they share a joke about the boss ordering them to make 
a crocodile fly. They will do it, they will make the crocodile fly; just not too high.
The Union comprised groups with leaders who have been able to negotiate benefits in their 
own personal interest. This structure worked to keep the labour force under control and 
allowed the company to achieve its production goals, defined unilaterally by the central 
government. The energy policy of the country has always been dependent on the economic 
policy of the government. This feature was reinforced by the nationalization of the oil 
industry in 1938, which led to decisions regarding production levels being directly 
determined by the financial needs of the central government.
The ways in which the Mexican government has exerted control over Pemex are summarized 
in table 4.2. The power of the General Director was directly linked to the nature of his 
relationship with the President, who appointed him, and to his political ability to negotiate 
with the Union and with government authorities, especially with the rest of the cabinet. This 
feature permeated the power structure of the whole organization and made personal relations 
highly valued, in the sense of ‘who you know’ and ‘who knows you’ determines ‘who you 
are’.
Table 4.2: How the Mexican Government Exerted Control over Pemex
• Appointment of Pemex’s General Director and senior management.
• Definition of the company’s goal.
• Determination of the prices of products.
• Taxes on revenues.
• Budget approval.
• Total control over finances.
• Audit of all company operations.
• Data required for National Accounts.
• Legislation over financial, human resources, and procurement policies.
The public administration changes every six years in Mexico, and with it the appointment of 
the General Director of the company. The organizational culture of Pemex has been 
influenced by these periodic political changes. Since 1976, every change of administration 
has meant a massive influx of white-collar managerial staff as personnel de confianza. 
During the interviews in this study, several middle manager stated that the massive influx of
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these personnel had resulted in a break up of both the structure of public-service careers in 
the company and the technical legitimacy of top managerial posts. Oil workers despised the 
privileges the newcomers gave themselves and the way they sometimes made decisions 
without consulting internal technical experts about the impact of their decisions. On the other 
hand, newcomers often despised the oil workers and considered them all corrupt and 
inefficient, which is why they did not consult them when reaching decisions.
These two perspectives were clearly identified in the case study when analyzing the origins of 
the personnel interviewed. One culture belonged to the permanent staff, the oil workers, 
whose jobs were linked to operations and who stayed in the company regardless of the 
changes of central government and the company administration. The second culture 
belonged to the group of senior administrators who come into office temporarily with each 
change of public administration, usually staying in Pemex for around six years.
The culture of the permanent staff can be linked with the origins of the company and the need 
to produce oil to keep the Mexican economy running. These predominantly male oil workers 
have strong fraternal bonds; they help each other as a family, respecting strong hierarchical 
values. Until 1988, they enjoyed job security. The culture of each ‘temporary’ management 
group, in contrast, has been determined by the economic policies of the public administration 
in power at the time. For the oil workers, every change of administration implied new 
temporary management with whom they had to cope. Each team appointed by a new General 
Director knew that were likely to be in the post for the six years of the presidential period. 
Oil workers expressed in their own words: “we know it is just a matter of time, they will 
leave the company sooner or later”.
A ‘syndrome of the conquest’15 was repeated within Pemex each time the public 
administration changed. The new group in power identified everything that came from the 
past as evil, and built its church on top of the pre-Hispanic pyramids, enforcing their own 
values. The ‘new gods’ were intolerant of past practices and values. Even technical 
professionals become vulnerable to the influence of the currently prevailing political dictum
15 The term ‘syndrome of the conquest’ is used as a parallel with the conquest of the Aztec Empire by the 
Spaniards in the sixteenth century. The Spaniards demonised every aspect of the pre-Hispanic cultures and were 
intolerant of any manifestation of the culture and religion of the Indians. They built their churches on top of 
pre-Hispanic temples.
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when they were appointed to senior managerial posts. “To avoid conflict and keep their 
posts, the technical managers have to comply with the political line of the group in power,” 
commented a senior Pemex manager.
Until the beginning of the 1980s, the two cultures of the permanent and the temporary groups 
were able to co-exist more or less at ease. They did not have key conflicting values, with 
both groups sharing a common vision of the mission of the organization: producing oil as an 
ultimate goal, without other considerations. Every new administration brought its own 
managerial style, with its particular values and flair, in seeking to improve efficiency and 
bring the financial situation of the company under control. In practice, their work was 
determined mainly by political interests, and at the same time they had to comply with central 
government or their direct boss to maximize their personal political capital.
Some of the interviewees in this study felt that the values of these two cultures have been 
radically different since 1982. The cultures of the more recent temporary management 
groups were aligned with the latest fads of strategic planning and business theory16. The 
corporate culture of the group that arrived in 1982 created a severe conflict because it 
challenged the oil workers’ style of operations, and their basic values of job security. In the 
early 1990s, half the employees of the company were made redundant. The group that 
promoted the managerial perspective of strategic planning gained enormous power and tried 
to change the organization, following an economic rationale based on advice from foreign 
consultancy companies.
Many of these senior managerial groups managed to stay in the company through various 
changes of administration, while sustaining an enduring economic rationality. They were 
appointed to the highest posts; until the end of 1999, the General Director was the main 
strategist of the process of change. Some of the junior managers learnt to respect the 
competence of oil workers, and felt they had themselves been ‘petrolized’. At the same time, 
many technical experts from the oil workers identified themselves with the need to change 
the organization to make it work more efficiently; they said that they have been ‘smurfized’.
16 The researcher had access to documents, mostly developed by external consultant, that clearly showed this 
feature, for example in the restructuring efforts to change from a functional to a cost-centred organization.
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A distinction can be made between organizational culture and corporate culture (Anthony 
1994), with the former being the ‘way we do things around here’ and the corporate culture 
referring to the values that the authorities want to introduce as an ideal mode of operation. 
This distinction proved particularly relevant in Pemex’s case, as there has been an explicit 
effort from authorities to change the traditional ways of doing and thinking about things in 
the organization. Oil workers share the feeling that the new programme incorporates the 
implicit judgement that things were not carried out properly previously and that a better way 
would be to follow the ideal model of a global organization that incorporates the ‘best’ 
international business practices. This effort tried to mirror the reorganization of other oil 
companies, such as British Petroleum (Cross, Michael, and Sampler 1997).
The project to manage culture at Pemex has been led by consultants with a rational 
perspective, and has been separate from other efforts to change the organization. In 
organizational theory, research has sometimes dismissed such efforts as an irrelevant 
simplification of the complexity of the phenomenon. The simplification allows consultancy 
companies to market such services easily to managers, as an all-in-one solution (Anthony 
1994). For some of the interviewees, the real effects of these efforts will still be open for 
questioning when the next administration comes into power. The feeling of the oil workers 
towards the consultants is illustrated by an anecdote related by one of them. As she was 
standing in the entrance hall to one of the main buildings of Pemex with colleagues, when 
some oil workers passed through the consultant’s group they started to say in an ironic tone: 
“money, money, money”.
After the split of the company in 1992, the separation and clash of the two cultures persisted 
and most efforts linked to managing the corporate culture were still regarded as being alien to 
the organization. The oil workers considered this as one more ‘business text-book recipe’ 
with which that they had to cope. In the most recent change efforts studied, some consultants 
said that they have become more conscious of the need to work with the oil workers in their 
workplaces. They tried to operate as facilitators to promote negotiations between the 
different groups, but the feeling of some oil workers was still one of contempt, typified by 
phrases like: “Who are they to tell us how to be, and what we should do?” The management 
demonstrated its commitment to sharing with employees the benefits of changing the 
organization by bringing in new working hours. In the old timetable, there was a three-hour 
lunch break, after which staff came back for an evening session in the office that lasted late
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into the night. The new schedule gave an hour-and-half lunch break, with staff leaving the 
office at 6:00 P.M. To enforce this change, lights in the buildings were switched off at this 
time.
Table 4.3 summarizes the researcher’s analysis of the aspects of Pemex’s operations that 
exhibit dysfunctionalities typical of a public organization.
Table 4.3: Key Dysfunctionalities in Pemex’s Operations
• Periodic turnover at senior managerial levels.
• Lack of transparency in the operations of the company.
• Absence of coordination between operational and administrative functions.
• Predominance of informal flows of information in the operational areas and in their 
relationships with the administrative functions.
• Lack of data regarding costs.
• Definition of the operational goals from outside the company with no direct relation 
to the actual needs and conditions of the company, only to that of the current public 
administration.
• Managers forced to put their personal ‘political capital’ before technical efficiency.
• Recruitment made through personal contacts.
• National scale of operation providing a source of vulnerability to industrial relations
conflicts.
• Modernization as an aim in itself.
• Centralization of decisions without regard of their impact on operations at the local 
level.
• Excessive power of Trade Union leaders at all levels.
4.3.1 Role of the Labour Union
The role played by the Trade Union in the development of Pemex is central to understanding 
the institutional features of the company. The National Union of Oil Workers was 
established to unite workers against the foreign oil companies. It was in conflict with the 
collective contract that brought about the expropriation, and the national power of the Union 
and its support from the wider national labour movement allowed President Cardenas to 
defeat the foreign oil companies. The oil workers led the process of nationalization together 
with the government authorities. When this crisis passed and the company’s operations were 
running normally, the conflict started to increase between the workers and the central 
government and their new management (Prevot-Schapira 1982).
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Trade Union leaders have had great power at all levels in Pemex. The oil workers’ leaders 
wanted the administration of the company under their control, for which the nationalization 
of the Mexican railways in 1937 was a precedent in which the Union kept control of the new 
company. But oil policy was a different affair for the government, who considered oil to be a 
strategic resource that had to be managed at a national level to support the economic 
development of the country. As it was unable to have total control of the company’s 
administration, the Union channelled its efforts towards labour demands (Meyer and Morales 
1990).
At the time of oil nationalization in 1938, the Union demanded the fulfilment of the collective 
contract it was negotiating previously with the foreign companies. This was not possible due 
to the economic difficulties that brought about the expropriation, but control, the Union’s 
control over recruitment enabled it to increase the number of oil workers from 15,895 to 
23,073 in the 18 months after nationalization. This situation was unacceptable for the 
government and it demanded a reduction of the company’s labour force. The government 
wanted to have direct control over personnel recruitment. The conflict became a national 
economic problem, until the national labour authorities gave power to the government to 
manage the company’s recruitment policy; subsequently, the Union regained this power 
(Meyer and Morales 1990).
In 1942, the government and the Union signed the first collective contract. However, 
differences remained; for instance, in 1946 the President used the army to prevent a strike. In 
time, some of the Union leaders became staff in Pemex’s -  employees de confianza -  and 
split from the Union. The Union was composed of various groups, some of which had 
considerable autonomous local power, mainly due to the geographical dispersion of company 
operations and the local political structures of the caciquismo. At first, the election of Union 
leaders was a democratic process linked to the different local structures of power. However, 
over time, the Union became a tight hierarchical organization of power groups. The top 
Union positions were rotated among the most powerful local leaders of the strongest oil 
regions of the country. By 1947, the oil leaders had reduced their ambition to manage the 
company. In exchange, the government gave them the power to manage the ‘Mexican oil 
system’ that was integrated through the economic, social, and geographical areas of the 
country where there was oil activity.
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The Union developed a parallel power base to that of the company’s authorities (Prevot- 
Schapira 1982). One of the most important foundations of this Union power was the 
authority given to them by the government in 1947 to recruit the personnel of the company 
and to participate as a contractor or intermediary for other companies in the development of 
projects for Pemex. It became a pre-requisite for contractor companies to hire workers via 
the Union. In the allocation of project contracts, the Union was given preference after the 
evaluation of the proposals, if other circumstances were equal. Most of the labour force of 
Pemex (both personnel with tenure and transitorios under temporary contract) belonged to 
the Union. Transitorios had to pay fees to the Union even if they were not entitled to receive 
the privileges and benefits of Union membership (Meyer and Morales 1990). The permanent 
workers enjoyed job security until 1994, when 90,000 workers were made redundant; 
nevertheless, all the workers who were sacked received statutory compensation.
After difficult negotiations, the authorities and the Union agreed quotas for different types of 
recruitment. It was established that not more than 10% of workers should be personnel staff 
de conflanza and under 5% could be transitorios. This set a tight limit to the recruiting 
capacity of the company and it had to rely on a small group of technically-qualified 
bureaucrats dedicated to managing the administrative decisions of the oil sector. The rest of 
the labour force of the company was in the hands of the Union. The workers were 
automatically signed up as members of the Union when they were hired, without having a 
choice; thereafter, their fees were deducted from their salaries. The privileged treatment 
given to the oil workers compared with the rest of the national labour force strengthened even 
further the Union leaders’ power of manipulation (Prevot-Schapira 1982).
There were several attempts to organize a Union for technical staff, which would have 
enforced promotion policies in accordance with professional qualifications and experience, 
and avoid favouritism and nepotism in the appointments to technical posts. However, neither 
the General Director of the company nor the federal labour authorities accepted this. In the 
early 1970s, 3,600 workers were transferred from being staff de conflanza to becoming 
permanent oil workers, with compulsory membership of the Union (Meyer and Morales 
1990).
All these events demonstrated the will of the company’s authorities to maintain the 
hegemony of the Union. This relationship between the leaders of the Union and the company
worked because all labour conflicts were managed by the Union to avoid disruption of the 
industry. The Union developed a nepotistic system of ‘self-recruitment’ within which posts 
were inherited by members of the worker’s family and new workers were recruited from 
among relatives of people recommended by Union leaders. During the research interviews, 
personnel repeatedly complained about such excesses from the Union leaders.
In 1961, the company gave the Union the power to provide labour to Pemex’s contractors. 
These workers were called ‘shaved heads’, pelones; like transitorios, they were not members 
of the Union but depended on Union leaders to be hired on a temporary basis by the 
contractors. They had to pay a fee to the Union each time they were hired, but did not 
receive back any of benefits of Union membership (Meyer and Morales 1990). The Union 
therefore managed all the oil labour force, including highly-qualified technical staff, general 
white-collar personnel, and blue-collar workers. The power of patronage that the recruitment 
system gave the Union leaders meant that the personnel recruited were sometimes not 
properly qualified for the post or were not needed at all. This situation created problems for 
managers, who stated several times during the interviews that they did not have the qualified 
personnel to achieve the expected level of performance.
The ratio of workers with tenure to transitorios was not stable, ranging from 32.5% of the 
labour force in 1961 to 40.4% in 1973. This agreement was beneficial to the company as it 
could contract workers as needed. The Union also gained because it received fees from the 
transitorios, and manipulated them to its own interests. For example, it could ask them to 
work for the Union’s enterprises for free in exchange for a promised tenured post in Pemex. 
In the early 1960s, the transitorios organized themselves to demand their de-casualization 
and stop this excessive manipulation by Union leaders. In 1967, the Union created a new 
category of membership of super-numerario for the transitorios that allowed them to obtain 
tenure automatically after having worked six years under this type of contract. To make this 
agreement work in its own interest, the Union redefined its mechanisms of control (Meyer 
and Morales 1990).
Another important source of Union power was its linkage with the national workers’ 
movement. During the period of the process of expropriation, the support given by the 
national labour movement to the President proved decisive in his campaign against foreign 
companies. The leaders of the National Oil Union had been promoted to the top posts of the
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national labour movement and the Union’s ability to solve internally problems among its 
factions helped it to develop as a hegemonic power. Conflicts between its leaders were 
avoided through the rotation of senior posts between the leaders of the most powerful regions 
(Prevot-Schapira 1982).
In their fight for power, union leaders exceeded their strict role as negotiators with the 
company and started to develop wider activities, such as social development in the oil 
regions, transport co-operatives, warehouses, building societies, shops, and schools. Most of 
these activities were the responsibility of the company, but the Union’s control over their 
development reinforced its economic and political power (Meyer and Morales 1990).
The oil workers environment was a feudal one. The legitimacy of local leaders in the 
different installations of the company had usually been developed through their proven 
technical competence and their experience in the organization. The managers of the plants 
were very powerful; it was recognized by the local people that they were ‘owners of lives and 
land’. The power of the local managers was linked to the political power of the Union, which 
went back to the period of expropriation. This meant that the Union was so powerful that it 
could disrupt the operations of these plants. “The Union leaders traded posts as if they were 
their own personal assets, and behaved as owners of the company,” complained a manager.
The Union had three regions of power. The northern region became the most powerful in the 
1960s under the firm leadership of Joaquin Hernandez Galicia, La Quina, who was General 
Secretary of the Union from 1961 to 1964. He used a combative rhetoric against the 
company authorities, although he was able to negotiate benefits for his members without any 
real confrontations. The strength of his leadership was founded in paternalism towards the 
oil workers. He made the Union compete with the company in providing welfare facilities to 
oil regions (Prevot-Schapira 1982) and was publicly regarded as a patriarch -  hated and 
feared by many, sanctified by those whom he helped17.
17 There are plenty of anecdotes about how people waiting at La Quina’s office to seek an audience to ask him 
for all types of favours, even personal ones. For instance, when one woman went to complain about the 
drinking problems of her husband, La Quina told her: “Go home, I will take care of this fellow”; and so he did, 
as it was said that the husband stopped drinking after La Quina had a word with him.
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La Quina became the director of the National Oil Workers Union’s Programme of Social and 
Revolutionary Projects when he left the General Secretaryship. In his new post, he controlled 
the finances of the Union, which became one of the most powerful in the country. The new 
General Secretary was Salvador Barragan Camacho, La Quina’s close friend, and they joined 
forces to eliminate any internal opposition within the Union. Union leaders were initially 
elected through votes assigned for individual candidates. This was later modified in 1973 to 
a system based on electing groups of people identified with certain values, known as 
planillas, who formed power factions within the Union that could not be challenged by 
anyone else. It became a coercive system to control members’ votes.
As the Union became a contactor for the company, it also had enormous vested interests in 
other economic activities in the oil system. Union leaders in the oil regions ruled local 
economic and social life, granted personal favours to workers leaders in exchange for their 
future political support. The government provided the Union and its bureaucracy with 
enormous power in exchange for their support in securing the stability of the company that 
was the foundation for the economic development of the country. In time, such arrangements 
became the source of the government’s greatest weakness. “Union leaders were so powerful 
that were able to blackmail even the President to get their own way in negotiations,” stated 
one former Director of the company.
The oil boom that started in the late 1970s cemented the Union’s power. The rapid expansion 
of the industry reinforced the Union recruitment system and gave it even more strength than 
before. There was very active recruitment during that period, mainly of transitorios, whose 
their numbers increased by 156% between 1974 and 1982. The Union’s presence grew with 
this. In the period 1970 to 1976, 89.6% of Pemex’s labour force belonged to the Union; by 
1982 this proportion had increased to 94.1% (Meyer and Morales 1990). The Union was in 
practical controlled of projects to develop the company’s oil export infrastructure.
Thanks to the hegemony of the Union, the company did not face labour conflicts that might 
have hampered its expansion. The working relationship established between the Union and 
the company authorities ensured that the expansion programme of the national industry was 
carried through without labour problems. The workers’ support was rewarded through the 
privileges gained by the Union, which was able to negotiate far better working conditions, 
such as reducing the working week to 40 hours and obtaining social security benefits for
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transitorios (Meyer and Morales 1990). Prevot-Schapira qualifies this arrangement as a 
“loyal relation” with total solidarity among both parties (Prevot-Schapira 1982).
In 1977, at the beginning of the oil boom, the Union was given 40% of all drilling contracts. 
It then negotiated an increase in the number of posts with tenure and was given 2% of the 
value of all the contracts awarded to third-party companies, as a direct contribution to its 
treasury. The Union enforced its practices of selling posts, with the price of a tenure costing 
an average 70,000 pesos in 1977, increasing to 200,000 pesos in 1982. The company also 
signed a Training Programme through which the Union provided scholarships to oil workers 
for attending training schemes intended to assist their promotion. In 1980, the company gave 
the Union the rights to ‘slop oil’, the remains of oil from storage tanks, which Union leaders 
sold to American companies. Pemex also supported the Union in the creation of an oil 
transportation company with a fleet of 18 ships, to which it gave contracts without fulfilling 
the requirement to issue a public tender (Meyer and Morales 1990). The Union also 
strengthened its position at the national political level when five of its leaders became part of 
the national Congress in 1988.
Enormous financial resources to develop the Union’s welfare programmes came from: the 
fees from its members (workers with tenure, transitorios, and the pelones workers of the 
contractor companies); sale of the slop oil; and receipt of the 2% of all Pemex’s investment 
projects carried out by third-party contractors (Meyer and Morales 1990). With all these 
resources, the Union was able to build itself an image of generosity and paternalism. Several 
oil workers openly recognized during interviews that this powerful structure worked because 
leaders splashed privileges and benefits on the closest members of their groups.
An ex-General Director of the company acknowledged in an interview that the members of 
the administration who came into post in 1982 had open conflicts with the Union, which were 
made evident through industrial accidents linked to technical sabotage. The measures taken 
by the new administration in attempting to improve efficiency in the company, and the 
government’s moral crusade of renovation, challenged the Union’s privileges. For example, 
an official decree was published in 1984 stipulating that all contracts entered into by Pemex 
should follow a strict process of public tender. It specifically mentioned that any Union 
committee wishing to participate in Pemex’s public tenders should follow the procedure and 
register as a contractor.
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This decree marked the disappearance of the Union’s role of broker or intermediary with 
third party contractors, which had given it enormous power. The company signed contracts 
with foreign oil transport companies and abandoned those with the Union’s transport fleet. 
The ex-General Director of the company responsible for the decision stated that it was taken 
on the ground of choosing the best price. This conflict with the company brought internal 
differences among Union leaders. A member of the central committee was put in prison on 
charges of fraud. He denounced the internal corruption of the Union and the inability of the 
authorities to control their leaders’ power. A human resources manager during an interview 
pointed out that this broke the Union’s hegemony and the tacit loyalty pact among its leaders.
In this new situation, the Union hindered, passively and overtly, programmes carried out by 
the authorities in their search for efficiency and productivity. For instance, when there was a 
huge explosion at a Pemex gas storage facility in 1984, the Union used the lack of 
maintenance of the installations as its major argument against the authorities. Technical 
accidents proliferated thereafter; the media argued these were cases of sabotage. The 
conflicts with the administration worsened, until the General Director resigned in 1985.
Relations with the Union subsequently improved through negotiations with Francisco Rojas, 
the General Director appointed in 1985. The Union was granted a reduction in the numbers 
of the personnel de conflanza; maintenance budget allocations were increased; and a deal was 
struck regarding the contracts for the services of the Union’s transport fleet. An ex-General 
Director recognized that the concessions granted by the authorities showed the power still 
held then by the Union.
In 1988, the government challenged once and for all the power of the Trade Union. It used 
the army to imprison the leader with the greatest power, La Quina. The new Union leaders 
were people identified with the political position of the government. Since then, the 
authorities have been able to reduce the number of staff at Pemex through various 
restructuring initiatives, with no major labour conflict. However, in some cases during the 
process of changing the organization, the authorities had to negotiate with the workers to 
avoid disruption of production.
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4.3.2 Work Motivation at Pemex
When Pemex was founded, the motivation for work arose primarily from patriotic values. 
This can be understood only within the context of the process of expropriation and the 
cultural background of the oil workers, who mainly had no professional training and were 
from rural areas (Garcia Hernandez 1971). When these conditions changed as the 
organization developed, work motivation needed other foundations. These sometimes had to 
be vested in personal interests not compatible with social ethical values.
A top manager explained that the organization did not have a human resources structure built 
on meritocracy, as this was not promoted by the relationship the company had with the 
central government. He said that when the company was created the central government 
“sent mixed messages to its administration regarding efficiency”. The company had no 
system of rewards or punishments to motivate the efficiency of personal work. Its oil 
workers tried to do things better just for the sake of their personal satisfaction and 
professional ethics. Whether or not work could be carried out more efficiently to reduce 
costs and increase profits made no difference to the company or any of its employees. 
Because of their engineering background, workers generally considered that “the technical 
and middle managerial staff with professional careers had the values of economic rationality 
and technical efficiency firmly installed during their vocational training”. The company had 
no system of evaluating workers’ performance. The nepotism built on the Union’s power 
structure also hampered the struggle for efficiency.
Within the political environment of the organization, Pemex’s oil workers performed their 
jobs in accordance with their professional values, following a technical rationale and trying, 
as they repeatedly expressed it: “to do things as best we could”. Most of the senior and 
middle managerial levels from the operations areas had been trained in the national 
institutions for higher education created by the post-revolutionary government, especially the 
National Polytechnic Institute. The prevailing ideological perspective in Pemex was of 
engineering, with absolute male domination. Women were found in clerical jobs or middle 
administrative functions, with very few at managerial levels; that was evident when visiting 
any work place.
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The job security enjoyed by oil workers in the past allowed them to exercise decision making 
without compromising their professional values, but only at certain managerial levels. “The 
actions of the professional oil workers were able to follow the technical rationale in 
accordance with the values of efficiency,” stated a top manager during an interview for the 
study. However, because higher-level appointments in Pemex were mostly political, even 
technical managers promoted to higher posts had to compromise professional values in order 
to safeguard their political capital. The oil workers were aware of their privileged position in 
the labour force of the country. Nevertheless, most of those interviewed had mixed feelings 
regarding the role of the Union, due to the overt and known abuses by some of its leaders, 
and they themselves may have been victims of such abuse.
The internal processes undertaken within Pemex to define policies have followed the tight, 
totally centralized hierarchical power structure of the organization. Until recently, there were 
no official communications regarding managerial decisions, and the operational levels got to 
know about changes to be implemented only through the informal channel of the radio 
pasillo. “The senior hierarchical levels defined the changes without prior consultation,” 
complained several managers during interviews. The more junior managerial levels were 
expected to obey the orders of their immediate superiors as defined by the organizational 
chart, which used to have a large number of layers. Since the early 1980s, the structure has 
been flattened through various organizational restructuring processes, as several official 
documents showed. However, the oil workers interviewed felt the hierarchical culture has 
prevailed in the areas of operations, and seniority achieved through experience was still 
respected as a source of legitimacy and provided political prominence in the organization.
During the administration of Adrian Lajous, who became General Director in 1994, an effort 
was made to promote official communication of the different policies to be implemented, 
such a Total Quality Management campaign. Oil workers usually considered such methods 
alien, at best, or manipulation in the worst case, as shown in the following anecdote. In the 
premises of the corporate group there was a poster promoting Total Quality Management that 
said, in large red letters: “We are all quality”; underneath, there was a handwritten answer 
made with a clear sense of mockery: “Really!”
The lack of participation by oil workers in decisions usually ended up with their passive 
retreat. “They will not overtly object, for it is not worth risking their political capital or their
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jobs,” stated a human resource manager. Even by 1997, after all the processes of change that 
had taken place over the previous twelve years, some workers were still waiting for the new 
fads and fashions that would eventually come with the next change of administration.
4.3.3 Information Systems in Pemex
Information systems development in Pemex was identified largely with the central 
information technology unit, located mainly under the Financial Directorate. The process of 
developing the company’s mainstream use of information technology in Pemex, linked to the 
administrative functions, is described in chapters 5 and 6. The technical and main strategic 
information systems of the organization are described in chapter 7, which deals with the 
content of the change. An appreciation of the role and development of the technical and 
strategic systems is an important part of understanding the case study and the outcome of the 
overall process of change as they were developed by areas of the company other than the 
central information technology unit, followed their own particular style, and were usually not 
linked to the mainstream organizational use of the technology headed by the financial 
function. One system even opposed the mainstream use of information technology in an 
open confrontation, as highlighted by the manager leading it.
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5 P r o c e ss  o f  c h a n g e : F ir st  P e r io d
This thesis divides its research into the process of change at Pemex into two historical 
periods, within which specific differences are identified at three levels: Mexico’s economic 
development, Pemex’s organizational change, and its use of information systems. The 
presentation of these three aspects is done together in this and the next chapter in order to 
build a coherent understanding of how they are intrinsically related. The two distinct periods 
have a common denominator: the rhetoric of modernisation and use of scientific knowledge 
to support policies. This indicates how the processes of changing an organization and 
developing its information systems are not suspended in space and time (Pettigrew 1983), but 
are contingent on the specific circumstances of where and when the change happens.
This chapter covers the origin of Mexico and its early development as a modem nation up to 
1981. Neo-liberal economic policies predominated during the subsequent second period, to 
the mid 1990s, which is identified as the new age of modernization in Chapter 6. These two 
periods correspond to the two different stages of the organizational process of change.
5.1 H isto r ic a l  C h a r t  fo r  F ir st  P er io d , 1901-1981
Table 5.1, like table 6.1 at the start of chapter 6, charts key events in Mexican history, the 
Mexican oil industry with particular reference to Pemex, and in the development of 
information systems in Pemex; table 5.1 refers to the first period studied, from 1901 to 1981, 
while table 6.1 focuses on the second period. As well as locating the events in time, the table 
aims to help the reader follow the process of change in the case study and to understand the 
relation between national development, organizational change, and information systems. The 
last column in the table includes references to key events in world history, some of which had 
a direct impact on the development of Mexico.
Table 5.1: Historical Events Relevant to Case Study, 1901-1981
Year Mexico18 Mexican Oil Sector/Pemex Information Systems World
1901 Liberal parties were 
dissolved.
Strike in Rio Blanco.
President Porfirio Diaz issues 
oil law allowing concessions 
to foreign companies.
18 The change of public administration in Mexico is on the first day of December of the previous year identified 
in the table.
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Year Mexico18 Mexican Oil Sector/Pemex Information Systems World
1906 Government contract with two 
foreign companies allowing 
oil products to be exported 
free of tax.
1910 President Porfirio 
Diaz re-elected. 
Francisco I. Madero a 
revolutionary leader 
promulgated San Luis 
Plan against re- 
election.
Mexican Revolution 
started.
1911 President Porfirio 
Diaz resigned. 
President Francisco I. 
Madero elected
1913 President Francisco I. 
Madero assassinated. 
President Victoriano 
Huerta elected.
1914 First World 
War starts
1917 The Mexican 
Constitution was 
passed.
Article No. 27 stated that the 
exploitation of national oil 
resources had to be carried out 
by the government.
Russian
Revolution.
1918 End of First 
World War
1921 End of Mexican 
Revolution.
Start of emergence of 
Mexico as a modem 
nation.
1924 President: Plutarco 
Elias Calles.
1925 Bank of Mexico 
(central bank) 
founded
Recognition of past oil 
concessions, accompanied by 
a demand for their 
confirmation.
1928 President: Emilio 
Portes Gil.
1929 Plutarco Calles 
founded the Party of 
the Mexican 
Revolution (PRI).
Major world 
economic 
crisis begins 
(The Great 
Depression).
1930 President: Pacual 
Ortiz Rubio.
1934 President: Lazaro 
Cardenas.
Adolph Hitler 
became 
fuehrer of the 
Third Reich in 
Germany.
84
Year Mexico18 Mexican Oil Sector/Pemex Information Systems World
1935 Creation of the Union of Oil- 
workers of the Mexican 
Republic. Labour conflict with 
oil companies over the 
signature of the collective 
contract.
1938 Oil industry 
nationalization and 
expropriation of 
private companies’ 
assets.
Creation of the national oil 
company with three entities 
responsible of export, 
production, and distribution. 
Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) 
had responsibility for 
production and general 
management of the oil sector.
17 companies with different 
managerial styles and 
information systems.
British and 
American 
embargo on 
trade with 
Mexico.
1939 Second World 
War starts
1940 President: Manuel 
Avila Camacho.
Elimination of the triple 
structure of the national oil 
company and creation of 
Pemex as integrated company. 
Mission: Producing oil for the 
national economy.
Pemex became a symbol of 
national sovereignty, with a 
Board of Governors including 
government cabinet members, 
Pemex managers, and Union 
leaders. First General Director 
(GD): Efrain Buenrostro.
Hitler captures 
Paris.
1945 End of Second 
World War 
Creation of 
UNESCO, UN 
educational, 
scientific and 
cultural 
organization.
1946 President: Miguel 
Aleman Valdez. 
Internal oil prices 
frozen to subsidize 
the industrialization 
of the country.
GD: Antonio Bermudez. 
Development of Pemex as an 
integrated oil company. 
Mission: Produce oil and oil 
products for the national 
economy.
Pemex non-profit oriented. 
Exports only surplus oil 
production (‘slop oil’).
1st Computer, 
ENLAC.
1950 Korea War 
starts
1952 President: Adolfo 
Ruiz Cortines.
1953 End Korea 
War
1954 Peso’s Devaluation. Pemex faces difficult financial 
situation.
Mao Tse Tung 
became leader 
of China.
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Year Mexico18 Mexican Oil Sector/Pemex Information Systems World
1958 President: Adolfo 
Lopez Mateos.
GD: Pascual Gutierrez 
Roldan.
Cut backs in exploration 
activities.
Heavy drilling activities. 
Participation of private 
investment in Petrochemical 
operations promoted.
Cuban
Revolution.
1960 Nationalization of the 
electricity industry.
Pemex finished honouring its 
financial commitment for the 
nationalized assets of foreign 
oil companies.
Use of single-register 
machines to process data 
payroll.
Creation of 
OPEC group 
of oil- 
producing 
countries19.
1964 President: Gustavo 
Diaz Ordaz.
GD: Jesus Reyes Heroles. 
Strong nationalistic 
leadership.
Administrative reforms.
Relationship was established 
with computer experts from 
the National University.
Creation of 
UNCTAD, 
UN trade and 
development 
commission.
1965 Creation of the Mexican 
Institute of Petroleum to 
promote research in technical 
areas of the oil industry.
Office of Mechanization and 
Computing established.
USA enters 
Vietnam War.
1966 Oil exports are stopped. Indira Gandhi 
became leader 
of India.
1967 First mainframe used to 
process payroll system.
Seven Days 
War in Middle 
East.
1968 Olympics in Mexico 
City
Students repression in 
Tlatelolco
1970 President: Luis 
Echeverria Alvarez. 
Fiscal expansionary 
policies.
Mexico hosted 
Soccer World Cup 
Championship.
GD: Antonio Dovali. Salvador 
Allende 
elected 
President of 
Chile.
1971 Pemex imported oil.
Decree of Pemex Organic Law 
that increased the number of 
members of the Board of 
Governors.
Pemex faced severe financial 
crisis.
19 OPEC consists of Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Libya, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
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Year Mexico18 Mexican Oil Sector/Pemex Information Systems World
1973 Oil prices within 
Mexico increased.
OPEC oil 
embargo. 
International 
Oil price rises 
to $2.8 per 
barrel.
End of 
Vietnam War.
1974 Pemex able to export oil 
surplus.
Information technology 
strategic planning.
International 
oil price:
$ 10.84/b.
1976 President: Jose Lopez 
Portillo.
Peso’s devaluation. 
Internal oil prices 
increased.
Economic
Adjustment Program.
GD: Jorge Diaz Serrano. 
Heavy investment in 
exploration and production. 
76,000 workers employed.
Mao Tse Tung 
died in China. 
General 
Franco died in 
Spain.
1977 Oil boom started.
1978 Expansionary 
economic policy. 
President Lopez 
Portillo presented the 
World Energy Plan at 
the UN.
Iranian 
Revolution. 
International 
oil price:
$ 12.7/b.
1979 Oil boom.
Oil production: 2.2 million 
barrels a day.
Oil exports: 1.1 millions 
barrels a day; 56% of Pemex’s 
income.
Oil spill of Ixtoc offshore oil 
rig.
108,000 workers.
Gerencia de Informatica 
under the Finance Direction.
Second Oil 
Shock.
Iran-Iraq War. 
International 
oil price: 
April,
$ 14.55/b; 
October, 
$18.00/b. 
Margaret 
Thatcher 
became Prime 
Minister of 
Great Britain.
1980 Basic Information Unit 
Institutional Database 
developed on a mainframe.
International
oil price:
April,
$28.00/b.;
October,
$30.00/b.
1981 Mexican Debt Crisis. 
Peso’s Devaluation.
Pemex reduces its oil prices 
by $4.00 per barrel, causing 
Diaz Serrano resignation as 
GD.
New GD: Julio Rodolfo 
Moctezuma Cid.
Executive Information 
System (the Control Room 
Project).
International
oil price:
April,
$32.00/b.;
October,
$34.00/b.
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5.2 T h e  N a t i o n a l  C o n t e x t
5.2.1 Early twentieth century: Mexico’s Emergence as a Modern Nation
Mexico as a nation was founded at the end of the War of Independence from Spain in 1821, 
but its emergence as a modem nation can be identified with the end of the War of Revolution 
in 1921 (Lopez Gallo 1973), when Mexico was organized as a federal democratic republic 
with three powers: the President, the Congress, and the Senate. The President is elected 
every six years, with no possibility of being re-elected. The official party, the PR1, controlled 
the political life of the country for 70 years, until the late 1990s. During this period, the 
government developed a strong Presidentialism: almost every aspect of the nation’s life was 
ruled by this political figure. The people had very little power to evaluate the quality of the 
public administration or hold it to account.
Mexico has strived to have a place within the international community ever since it first 
emerged as a nation. Although Mexico has its own local culture, as a modem nation it 
demonstrates features that identify it as being what is regarded as a ‘developing country’. In 
the early twentieth century, the country underwent a process of heavy modernization under 
General Porfirio Diaz, whose dictatorship lasted for three decades. This process, which had a 
strong French influence, developed the economic infrastructure of the country with the heavy 
participation of foreign investment. The economic policies of that period were identified 
with the liberal perspective (Historicos. 1981). The regime ended with the War of 
Revolution, from 1910-1921.
After the end of the Revolution, there was a period of political and social upheaval, but 
gradually the tendency towards economic and political stabilization prevailed. Post­
revolutionary governments defined the economic development of the country within the path 
of modernization, with the quest for modernity as the foundation of all their policies. In the 
1930s, the Mexican economy had two periods of recession. The first was due to the impact of 
the Great Depression in the international economy; the second was caused by the embargo 
brought about by the nationalization of the oil industry, carried out by the socialist-oriented 
government of President Lazaro Cardenas (Contreras 1980). His administration established 
the economic, political, and social foundations that later allowed a prolonged period of 
growth with relative stability. He fostered the institutionalization of political movements for
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the working and rural classes, helped with the creation of chambers of business, and carried 
out one of the nation’s most important programmes of agrarian reform (Shulgovski 1977).
5.2.2 1940-1970: Economic Dynamism, Social and Political Stability
Between 1940 and 1970 the Mexican economy showed a period of great dynamism, 
accompanied by social and political stability. The government implemented an agrarian 
reform programme and an import-substitution policy to compensate for the effects of the 
Second World War and to promote the industrialization of the country (Solis 1981). Mexican 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at more than 6% annually. There was a major shift in 
the significance of different economic sectors in terms of their contribution to the GDP. In 
1940, agriculture contributed 23.2%; industry 31.0%; and services 45.8%. By 1967, these 
figures were: 15.8% for the primary sector; 36.7% for industry; and 47.5% for services . 
The government undertook a very ambitious spending programme during this period, 
including its direct participation in the economic life of the country, such as implementing 
complex subsidy programmes and tax exemptions to stimulate investment in industry. Public 
investment was directed towards infrastructure development.
The import-substitution policy established an extensive framework of protection for the 
domestic industry, which developed at the expense of a captive demand base and isolation 
from foreign competition (Solis 1981). This allowed companies to obtain high profit 
margins. In principle, this protective trade policy aimed at preserving the consolidation of the 
national industry, but even when Mexico’s industrialization progressed, the level of 
protection did not decrease. Mexico became dependent on half-finished and capital-goods 
imports, provoking continuous annual balance-of-trade deficits. These were initially financed 
with agriculture exports and tourism income; however, these revenues rapidly proved 
insufficient and structural limits hindered sustained growth. The economy had developed an 
infrastructure of very inefficient industrial plant, leading to the availability of goods 
combining poor quality and high prices, with the burden being borne by the captive national 
consumers.
By the end of 1940s, Mexico faced a balance of payment crisis that eventually resulted in a 
devaluation of the peso by approximately 40% between 1948 and 1949. The devaluation and
20 National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics.
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favourable economic effects of the Korean War released the pressure on the balance of 
payments. Nevertheless, internal prices continued to grow faster than world prices; the 
government took advance actions to prevent capital flight by devaluing the peso by 30% in 
1954 (Solis 1981). Social peace prevailed. The government controlled the trade union 
movement through national labour organizations, whose leaders (Uderes charros) totally 
supported government policies.
The industrialization of the country continued to be based on import substitution, although 
rhetorically the government stressed the importance of promoting exports. The balance of 
trade registered deficits that needed to be financed. The agricultural sector met this need by 
earning foreign currency and supplying food and raw materials at low costs. An agrarian 
reform programme promoted the migration of rural population to the cities, providing low- 
cost labour for industry. Throughout this period, the government supported the development 
of public universities and polytechnics. These institutions became centres of excellence in 
research and teaching, thereby providing the professionals that industry required.
The Stabilizing Development Programme implemented by the government during the 1960s 
fostered a high rate of economic growth, averaging 6.5% during the 1960s, together with 
price stability with an average annual inflation rate of 3.6%. This period has been called the 
‘Mexican Miracle’. The economic growth rate slowed down towards the end of the 1960s, 
when pressures of unemployment appeared in urban areas. At the end of the 1960s and 
beginning of the 1970s, the political status quo in Mexico was challenged by various political 
movements, principally from students at public universities. The army severely repressed 
these movements, which came to international attention with the killing of 400 students21 at 
the start of the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City (Poniatowska 1997). Only minor guerrilla 
movements, located mainly in the mountains of the southeast of the country, remained active 
throughout that decade. With the repression of the student movements, the state changed its 
policy towards the public universities and they were brought under closer government 
control. Although some disciplines remained centres of excellence, in general the academic 
reputation of public universities decreased. After this period, private-sector institutions of 
higher education flourished and became the major providers of qualified professionals in 
most academic disciplines.
21 This was the official figure, but people knew that the number of deaths was much higher.
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5.2.3 1970-1981: Economy Expansion and Stability, Oil Boom and Crises
In the early 1970s, the administration of President Echeverria undertook a fiscal expansion 
policy to address social welfare problems; this stimulated demand through increased public 
spending, but was not accompanied by an equivalent growth in income. The resulting public 
sector deficits were financed initially by expansion of the money supply and later by 
incurring foreign debt. Inflation was rekindled from various sources. A crisis in the 
agricultural sector, due to the stagnation of its production, led to increasing raw materials 
prices that resulted in growing costs for industry and pressure on salaries from rising food 
prices (Cordera and Tello 1981). There was also pressure on internal prices from imported 
inflation that resulted from the 1973 international oil shock and the consequent international 
monetary crisis, as Mexico was an oil importer at that time. This faced the country with 
economic and political problems: the government and the private sector broke their 
mechanisms of compromise, which provoked a reduction of private investment, flight of 
capital, and the loss of government credibility -  culminating in a general crisis in 1976. The 
peso was further devalued, ending a long period of exchange rate stability (Tello 1993).
In December 1975, President Jose Lopez Portillo became President of Mexico and 
implemented an economic stabilization programme to balance the external deficit. This 
ended in 1978 when he began a large-scale programme to exploit the nation’s recently 
discovered oil reserves, which saw the beginning of a phase of accelerated economic growth 
financed by foreign loans. Foreign currency income increased at an average rate of 45.3% 
annually from 1978 to 1981 (Tello 1985). During these years, when the economy grew at an 
8.6% average annual rate, economic expansion created bottlenecks in various sectors of the 
economy, with oil becoming the heart of the national economy (Gutierrez 1982) (Bueno 
1982). The government liberalized imports to relieve the restrictions on economic growth 
and to take advantage of the high oil prices in the international market. Mexican imports then 
grew dramatically, at an average annual rate of 43.6% from 1978 to 1981. Both trade and 
balance-of-payments deficits deteriorated (Cordera and Tello 1981).
The development of the Mexican oil production infrastructure was financed with foreign 
resources and did not stimulate internal economic activity because the technology and 
equipment were mainly imported, and at the same time the massive income from oil exports 
stimulated the import of luxury products. Some sectors of the government that were aware of
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the risks of the ‘petrolization of the economy’ (Gutierrez 1982) (Bueno 1982) wanted to 
promote the substitution of capital imports, but the President did not back them. The foreign 
debt increased from $10.9 to 433.4 billion from 1978 to 1980 and reached $58.1 billion in 
1981 (Tello 1985). Mexican oil exports grew dramatically in this period, but foreign 
currency income was insufficient to cope with the external financial commitments of the 
country.
Pressure on the prices of basic goods increased because of the bottlenecks created by the 
growth in demand. Government economic policy maintained a fixed exchange rate and kept 
prices for basic goods and public services under control. These subsidies were also financed 
by external financial resources. The country’s future was therefore mortgaged to the hard 
currency revenues that the government thought oil exports would bring. The economic 
policy of rapid development based on oil revenues was accompanied by a political discourse 
that maintained the oil was an asset of the country and its people, so this industry should 
bring benefits to all Mexicans. The population did gain from higher standards of living, but 
at the cost of high inflation rates (Gutierrez 1982). The benefits were gained mainly by the 
middle-class urban population. When the flow of oil revenues collapsed in the 1980s, the 
structural problems of the Mexican economy reappeared with greater strength (Villareal 
1988).
By the end of President Lopez Portillo’s administration in 1981, international economic and 
market conditions had deteriorated. Interest rates in the international financial market 
increased, and with them the interest payments Mexico owed to international banks 
increased. The US dollar was revalued in the currency markets, which meant the real price of 
imports increased at a moment when they were running at a very high level in Mexico. The 
international oil market showed signs of a glut and a change in its structure, with the balance 
of power going back to the oil companies and consumer countries. The oil price collapsed 
and with it the financial underpinning of the Mexican government. The authorities were 
immediately forced to reduce government spending and borrow more in the form of short­
term loans contracted within an adverse financial climate (Villareal 1988).
The obvious overvaluation of the peso and the generalized expectation of an imminent 
devaluation brought about a massive capital flight, of around 13 billion dollars in 1981. The 
government maintained its defence of the overvalued exchange rate, borrowing more from
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foreign sources in highly unfavourable conditions. Deterioration of the balance of payments 
deficit reached a crisis point in February 1982, when the peso was devalued. The financial 
measures that the government introduced were not enough and the international oil conditions 
also changed dramatically, further reducing oil revenues. In August that year the government 
declared a virtual suspension of payments and the peso was again devalued. In September, 
the President introduced exchange rate controls and nationalized the banks because they were 
accused of promoting capital flight (Tello 1985).
The paradox of the ‘Mexican Wealth’ chimera was therefore clearly revealed by the early 
1980s: the oil revenues that had promised Mexican economic progress had actually built a 
path to dependence, in which the export capabilities of the country were developed with 
foreign resources and the Mexican economy was tied to servicing an enormous foreign debt 
with its oil export revenues (Gurria Trevino 1988). The country ended up being the main 
strategic energy reserve of the United States, and the national economy was controlled by the 
fluctuations of the international oil market because most of Mexico’s public financial 
resources came from oil exports.
5.3 O r g a n iza tio n a l  A spec ts
5.3.1 Expropriation of Foreign Oil Companies
On March 18, 1938, President General Lazaro Cardenas issued the law expropriating the 
foreign oil companies operating in Mexico by nationalizing their assets. Petroleos Mexicanos 
(Pemex) was founded as a result of the refusal of the oil companies to comply with Mexican 
Law. On the day of the expropriation, President Cardenas gave a very long and moving 
speech in which he explained clearly the facts that had brought him to the “unavoidable 
decision”, and he asked “the people of Mexico for their political and economic support”:
“The oil companies have refused to comply to the highest mandate of national justice, ... the 
Executive Power can face strong social pressures, ... if oil demand is not satisfied properly,... 
it can provoke a crisis which is incompatible with the progress of the nation,... that could even 
put at risk the very survival of the government; ... without economic power it could also lose 
political power and then chaos would come ... it is an act of economic emancipation. ... It has 
been said that the oil companies have brought enormous amounts of capital, this statement is 
exaggerated. The oil companies have always enjoyed very privileged treatment ... in the 
present circumstances the nation’s progress and survival are threatened ... urging the only 
solution to this problem.” (Mexico. 1940: p. 35)
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From a social science perspective, the viewpoint of the observer determines the explanation 
(Checkland 1981). The companies’ point of view on these events was that the Mexican 
government wanted to reassert a dormant principle (Sampson 1988). From this perspective, 
as the government needed money to pay its defaulted foreign loans, post-revolution regimes 
had implemented various regulatory changes and tax increases that fuelled the conflict 
between the two parties. The United States government backed its companies in order to 
protect ‘vital’ American owned oil reserves in Mexico (Yergin 1991).
On many occasions, Washington’s intervention was a real threat. The most important 
American interests and rights were often attacked and contracts and bargains were 
continually broken, so Washington saw instability, insecurity, banditry, and anarchy in 
Mexico. From the Mexican viewpoint, the oil companies represented ‘Yankee imperialism’, 
foreign exploitation, humiliation, and violation of sovereignty -  as reflected in Sampson's 
(1988) description of the days after the expropriation which also indicated how the initial 
euphoria did not last long. The Americans, British, and Dutch boycotted the nationalization 
of the oil companies and publicly predicted that the ‘Mexicans will drown in their oil’. The 
foreign countries considered that the new state-owned oil company was run corruptly and 
incompetently, without enough experts or engineers. Mexico was forced to pay financial 
compensation of $130 million for the assets nationalized (Meyer and Morales 1990).
Most Mexicans considered the nationalization of the oil industry to be a historic event that 
asserted the country’s dignity. People of all social levels donated cash and goods to 
contribute towards payment of the financial compensation (Garcia Hernandez 1971). The 
foreign oil companies fuelled a campaign to break the financial stability of the country and 
the government was forced to devalue the peso. The companies declared publicly that the 
Mexicans would not be able to cope on their own. There was adequate reason to believe this, 
because the oil installations had not been maintained for three years, all the managerial staff 
were foreigners who left the country after the expropriation, and the companies took all the 
exploration maps (Meyer and Morales 1990) (Meyer 1981).
For the Mexican nation, the expropriation was seen as an act of courage, as it was for the 
workers who had to carry out the nationalization process. The Mexican workers had to order 
their foreign former managers to leave the offices and installations on instructions from their 
Union leaders that they received by telegraph (Garcia Hernandez 1971) (Mexico. 1940).
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When new orders from the Union leaders arrived, the local telegraph offices lit fireworks so 
that the workers in the installations could know the news immediately. There are anecdotes
of how the workers faced this difficult moment with great courage. The attitude of the
00  •workers was in many cases rooted in the macho culture of Mexico: yo soy hombre y  como
23macho no me rajo .
The expropriation of the assets of foreign oil companies that brought about the birth of 
Pemex became the foundation of the organizational culture of the company. The 
characteristics mostly valued were courage, not giving up, coping with anything to achieve 
the goals of production, the feeling that the company was theirs, and pride in having the 
historic opportunity to fulfil the task of saving their nation. The government took on an 
enormous debt with nationalization, and was committed to honouring it. To achieve this, it 
had to create a new Mexican-owned oil industry -  and in the months after expropriation it 
took a number of decisive steps towards that:
• On March 19, 1938, the day after expropriation, the Consejo Administrativo del 
Petroleo was set up to take charge of the provisional management of the financial 
assets of the expropriated companies (Mexico. 1940).
• On March 31, the government created the Exportadora Nacional de Petroleo to 
manage all oil exports.
• Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) was founded as a one integrated company on June 7 as 
a decentralized institution with its own legal identity; it was vested with the oil assets 
and charged with the responsibility of managing the oil sector, including 
responsibility for production. Management of the newly formed company was a 
difficult task. This was partly due to the mixture of management styles, accounting 
practices, and operational practices at the sites that had previously belonged to 
different foreign oil companies, but also because of the lack of parts for maintenance 
and the difficulties of selling oil on the hostile international market. Technicians were 
unable to buy spare parts because of the embargo imposed by the United States, and 
Britain (Sampson 1988) (Meyer 1981). The only foreign countries that bought oil 
from Mexico were Italy, Germany, and Japan.
22 The macho culture is based on the emotionless male figure of total power.
23 “I am a man, and like a man I do not give up”
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• On July 8, 1938 the national financial collection that had been organized to pay the 
obligations arising from the expropriation officially came to an end. The government 
then created a third company for the nationalized oil sector: Distribuidora de 
Petroleos Mexicanos with responsibility for oil distribution.
Management from the three entities that had become responsible for Mexican oil exports, 
production, and distribution participated in all the boards of governors of the three 
companies, together with ministers from the central government and leaders of the National 
Oil Workers Union (Meyer and Morales 1990). The process of standardizing the different 
administrative procedures used by the foreign companies also started on the day after 
expropriation, when a comprehensive inventory of the nationalized assets began. At the time 
of nationalization, the 17 foreign oil companies active in Mexico had around 13,000 
employees who worked with various different types of equipment and followed different 
procedures. In the first months after the expropriation, production levels decreased. The 
overall mission of the new companies was to satisfy the local demand for oil and to keep the 
national economy running (Garcia Hernandez 1971). This was achieved through a reduction 
of oil exports. By the end of 1938, Pemex had returned to the former production levels; its 
main problem then became selling oil on the international markets in the face of the 
American and British embargo (Meyer and Morales 1990).
The National Oil Workers Union had a major role as a competing source of power to 
company management; it even strove against the government for ultimate control of the 
sector, as described in Chapter 4. In Mexico, national unions have always been powerful, but 
this Union’s power was greater because of the strategic character of the oil industry. To 
avoid open labour conflicts, the Pemex authorities established a working relation with the 
Union that has proved very expensive over time, although it also actually advanced the aim of 
developing the industry (Meyer and Morales 1990) (Prevot-Schapira 1982). The role of the 
Union has great relevance to the evolution of information systems at Pemex because of the 
strong influence it has had over most of the company’s operations and data flows. Any effort 
to modify the way the company controls information has therefore affected the Union’s 
vested interests. The evolution of this difficult and complex relationship is described in 
section 4.3.
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Once established as an organization, the history of Pemex can be divided into two periods, as 
it has been divided in this thesis between chapters 5 and 6. The first period, covered in this 
chapter, was the time when Pemex developed as a state-owned, vertically-integrated oil 
company, with the mission of producing oil as a public service. Its goals then were to 
provide the oil that the national economy needed and, later, to expand oil exports to generate 
the financial resources required for the economic development of the country. The second 
stage comprised the modernization of the company to transform it into a market-oriented 
corporation, where its mission was redefined to that of producing oil utilizing operational 
standards that conform to an economic and technical rationale. This process of change 
started with the modification of the political and legal framework that hampered the 
transformation of the company. Later, the company undertook restructuring efforts to change 
it into a global company. This second period is examined in Chapter 6.
5.3.2 Pemex as a State-controlled Oil Company, 1938-1981
At the start of this period, the administrative structure of the newly-nationalized Mexican oil 
industry consisted of three separate companies -  covering production, exports, and 
distribution -  but this was abandoned due to the political problems that arose among the 
directors. On August 8, 1940, President Manuel Avila Camacho centralized the 
responsibility of the national oil sector in Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) as one integrated 
company and this is the organization that existed until it was split in 1992 (Secretaria de 
Energia 1992) (Ortega San Vicente 1993). The development of Pemex is described below, 
classified according to the main features of the administrations of its successive General 
Directors24.
5.3.2.1 1940-1945 Administration
Efrain Buenrostro became responsible for managing the assets of the nationalized oil 
companies when he was appointed General Director of Pemex in 1940. The unified company 
was empowered to control all operations related to the oil industry, with its main mission 
being to satisfy the internal demand within Mexico for oil and refined products in order to 
prevent the collapse of the economy. The board of governors consisted of five appointments 
made by the national President and four made by the Union. The President could remove at 
any moment anyone appointed to any post in Pemex, even the General Director; this vertical
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structure of strict hierarchy and absolute power has been pervasive throughout the company 
and the Union (Garcia Hernandez 1971) (Meyer and Morales 1990).
The need for an international alliance in the Second World War put an end to Mexico’s 
political conflict with Britain and the United States. The Mexican government compromised 
and agreed to pay interest on the nationalized assets (Meyer 1981). By the middle of the 
1940s, Pemex’s authorities were addressing problems not related to the effects of the 
expropriation, but they had difficulties coping with growth in the internal demand for oil 
provoked by the economic boom induced by the war. The government subsidized internal oil 
prices to foster the industrialization of the country. Financing Pemex’s activities became the 
major managerial concern, mostly because credits came principally from foreign sources in a 
period when Mexico faced difficult relations with the main world economic powers (Garcia 
Hernandez 1971) (Meyer and Morales 1990).
5.3.2.2 1946-1958 Administration
In 1946, Antonio Bermudez became the General Director of Pemex and stayed in the post till 
1958. His major challenges were to develop Pemex as a vertically-integrated oil company 
with a centralized administration, and to keep relations with the Union under control. Pemex 
was responsible for providing resources for the national welfare state and was clearly defined 
as a non-profit orientated company. It became the symbol of the nationalistic rhetoric of the 
post-revolution government and of Mexican sovereignty. Its identity has been quite distinct 
from that of other state-owned companies in the country and the rest of the world (Meyer and 
Morales 1990).
During this period, the growth of the oil sector was still directed to the internal market, with 
exports restricted to the sale of surplus production. The company needed resources to invest 
in infrastructure development in order to: increase production and refining capacity; build 
pipelines for a national distribution system; and relocate refining and petrochemical facilities. 
These facilities needed to be moved closer to the centres of demand because export-oriented 
foreign companies had built their installations mainly on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. 
Pemex also needed to generate sufficient income to pay both the financial compensation due
24 The change of public administration is on the first day of December of the previous year.
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to the foreign companies for the expropriated assets and the salaries of the workers, whose 
numbers kept increasing (Garcia Hernandez 1971).
The cost of variable capital was very onerous because the administration kept labour relations 
under control by giving its work force high salaries, excessive fringe benefits, and other 
social privileges (Prevot-Schapira 1982). The net revenue of the company was restricted both 
by the policy of subsidizing internal oil prices and the transfer of revenue to the national 
Treasury through taxes. The subsidized prices were a symbol of the public ownership of the 
company, a benefit to which all Mexicans believed themselves to be entitled. These forces 
shaped the perennially difficult financial situation the company has faced throughout most of 
its history (Meyer and Morales 1990).
The company administration had not considered exporting oil at that time because 
international prices were low and internal demand was increasing. There was also the fear of 
making the national economy dependant on oil sector export revenues, known as ‘petrolizing 
the economy’ (Garcia Hernandez 1971). The strategy was directed towards producing value- 
added oil products to foster economic growth and job creation. The main problem for this 
administration was managing the company’s finances within a legal framework in which all 
major decisions of the organization regarding prices, budget, and production levels were 
defined by the central government; this situation was repeatedly confirmed by most of the 
middle managers who were interviewed for this research.
The burden of subsidizing internal prices for oil products was very high; it has been 
calculated that between 1954 and 1958 Pemex lost about $10 billion in income due to the low 
prices at which it sold its products to the internal market (Meyer and Morales 1990). This 
was equivalent to half its actual revenues between 1953 and 1958. The company was unable 
to generate the surplus needed for its investment programme and was financed with foreign 
resources instead. These resources were not easily available and most of the borrowings that 
the company was able to obtain in the international financial market were short-term credits 
with onerous conditions. Pemex was also forced to sign up to joint-venture projects with 
foreign companies to carry out drilling activities, as a condition for credit negotiations 
established by United States authorities (Meyer and Morales 1990) (Villegas Moreno 1988).
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Bermudez complained several times to the President that the constraints under which the 
company operated put it permanently in a difficult financial situation. In his arguments, he 
exposed the high costs of subsidies and other expenses on the company’s budget, but he 
never considered the inefficiency of Pemex’s operations (Meyer and Morales 1990). Even 
though its legal framework was based on the company being the symbol of nationalism with 
a social mission, the company could not isolate itself from the operational standards of the 
international oil industry that were driven by technological developments, exploration risk, 
and the cycles provoked by changes in market supply and demand.
There has been an ongoing debate in Mexico about how Pemex’s operations should be 
evaluated. Some authors suggest that state-owned companies cannot be assessed by their 
capacity to generate profits, in the same way as private corporations (Kaplan 1994) 
(Labastida Ochoa 1983). They suggest that the evaluation of state-owned companies has to 
consider the social benefits produced. Others argue that, even in the context of its social 
mission, Pemex could have carried out its operations more efficiently: on many occasions the 
costs of the social benefits it has provided have been used as an excuse to cover the mistakes 
of its administration (Meyer, 1990). During his twelve years as General Director, Bermudez 
strove unsuccessfully to achieve more independence from the government in managing 
Pemex.
The development of Pemex as a vertical-integrated oil company implied technical, financial, 
political, and managerial challenges. A reorganization was carried out, concentrating all the 
decisions under the General Director. At the beginning of his administration, Bermudez had 
three organizational entities called divisions: technical production, administration and legal 
affairs, and trading. He later created a fourth, finance. The Union also unified the demands 
of all oil workers scattered throughout the country. Both the company and the Union became 
very powerful institutions at the national level, with the Union’s power concentrated in the 
hands of its leaders (Meyer and Morales 1990).
During Bermudez’s administration, oil workers’ salaries at Pemex were reduced in real terms, 
but the Union compensated for the loss by obtaining a great variety of fringe benefits that 
helped it to keep labour conflicts under control. These non-salary benefits were of various 
types, such as: mortgages for workers; school and hospital building; payment of supplements 
to the salaries of teachers who worked in the oil regions; provision of medical services
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through hospitals and clinics dedicated solely to oil workers; premises for the Union; 
scholarships for relatives of workers; and co-operative shops (Prevot-Schapira 1982).
Pemex developed its particular state-owned company style to help solve a difficult equation. 
On one hand, its workforce felt itself to be the owners of the company with the right of 
involvement in managerial affairs. On the other hand, the administration’s decision-making 
power was in a straightjacket; it had to comply in most affairs with the authority of the 
central government. The organization started to build a reputation for inefficiency, although 
ultimately it did fulfil its mission: providing cheap oil and oil products to the national market. 
From a technical perspective, Pemex’s engineers had a good professional reputation; the 
company built a tradition of career development for its technical workforce, which is 
explained in section 4.3.
5.3.2.3 1958-1964 Administration
Pascual Gutierrez Roldan headed Pemex’s administration from 1958 to 1964. He strove to 
improve the financial situation of Pemex and achieved a reduction in gross revenue taxes 
from 21% to 12%. During this period, the oil sector continued to develop in the same 
direction and rhythm as in the previous decade. The goal of the company continued to be to 
provide, at subsidized prices, oil products for the development of the national economy, as 
well as being the symbol of Mexican nationalism. Pemex ceased exploration and Mexican 
companies were given preference in the allocation of contracts for drilling. The joint risk 
ventures with foreign companies were cancelled (Meyer and Morales 1990) (Villegas 
Moreno 1988).
Even if the government’s political message was that the oil sector had to remain nationalized, 
this General Director promoted the participation of national private capital in the production 
of sixteen basic petrochemicals and the participation of foreign capital in producing 
secondary petrochemicals . However, the company kept facing financial problems. Prices 
were controlled by central government policy even if Pemex’s social goal did not necessarily 
require that it had to operate inefficiently and that prices should not reflect the cost of 
products. Nominal prices were kept unchanged during this period. In 1962, Pemex
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completed the payment of its financial commitments arising from the nationalization of the 
assets of the foreign oil companies (Meyer and Morales 1990).
One manager explained in an interview that “there was a lack of planning and co-ordination
of the operations of the company, and little exploration was carried out, which provoked the
• 0 ( \ reduction of the number of years of known oil reserves of the company” . Between 1959
and 1962, production increased from 168 to 202 billion barrels, and reserves from 4,348 to
5,150 billion barrels (Meyer and Morales 1990). This meant that the ratio of proven reserves
to years of potential production decreased from 26 to 22 years, with a further deterioration of
this indicator. To keep up with the growth of the internal oil demand in Mexico, the
company had to increase its volume of production in prioritizing short-term requirements. It
did so through the intensive extraction of crude oil, which went against technical best
onpractice. Too many wells were drilled, sacrificing the long-term optimization of production 
capacity and increasing unnecessarily the costs of production. The reduction of the sector’s 
productivity demonstrated the company’s inefficiency. During the period from 1958 to 1964, 
the extraction cost per barrel increased from 12.9 to 18.5 pesos, and refining from 7.62 to 
10.67 pesos. The organization’s public image of inefficiency intensified, and was worsened 
by the abuse of personal discretion in the exercise of power by some of the company’s 
managers and Union leaders. This latter factor is more fully described in section 4.3 on 
organizational culture.
5.3.2.4 1964-1969 Administration
Jesus Reyes Heroles became General Director of Pemex in 1965. He brought only five 
people to the company with him, while leaving in their posts the technical staff who had 
developed their professional careers in the company. This was stated during the interview 
with the information technology manager of that period, who was no longer in the company. 
The General Director publicly recognized that Pemex was overstaffed and that the lack of
25 The definition of primary and secondary petrochemicals was set in accordance with the need of the 
administration to comply to the legal framework of the Constitution, which established that all oil sectors 
involving primary petrochemical products should stay state owned due to their strategic nature.
26 Exploration is a high-risk activity with long-term results because what are thought to be oil reserves 
frequently turn out be water deposits or other type of geological formation; it can take up to twelve years to 
produce oil from a project fortunate enough to identify exploitable reserves.
27 Oil engineering techniques prescribe requirements to optimize the long-term production of oil deposits. 
These are related to the number of wells that can be drilled in order to manage the pressure of the deposit 
properly, and to allow the optimal extraction of oil.
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planning for its development had created industrial bottlenecks, problems of co-ordination in 
project development, and mistakes in engineering calculations. “There were cases in which 
regional warehouses had stocks to supply the company with products for 25 years. In other 
cases, operations had to be stopped because a required piece of equipment was not in stock 
and it took a long time to procure it,” stated the first information technology manager of 
Pemex. “He [Reyes Heroles] tried to reorganize the company to combat inefficiency through 
administrative reforms, but these efforts did not alter the vertical power structure.”
For Reyes Heroles, the previous administration’s opening up of opportunities for investment 
in petrochemicals to private and foreign capital was a sign of national weakness; his mission 
was to ensure the oil autonomy of the country. He stopped the construction of a refinery that 
was planned by the previous administration, and for which some of the equipment had 
already been bought, because of corruption: he discovered some top Pemex managers were 
among the contractors (Meyer and Morales 1990). Reyes Heroles’ nationalistic perspective 
sometimes made his administration too restrictive. For instance, as he felt importing oil was 
a sign of the loss of national sovereignty, he once refused to import crude oil although the 
refineries were operating below capacity and the country was importing refined products. He 
promoted exploration projects in the Gulf of Mexico and restrained the over-drilling. He also 
restricted joint-venture exploration contracts with private companies and fostered the 
optimization of extraction through gas and water injection techniques. The deposits near the 
surface were exhausted and Pemex had to move to exploiting deeper deposits; the company 
started to drill down as far as 3000 meters, which implied higher exploration costs (Meyer 
and Morales 1990).
The Mexican Oil Institute was founded in 1965 to promote the development of the 
technological autonomy and sovereignty of the national oil industry. This research institute 
specialized in the oil sector; its aim was to provide training and to help the development of 
Pemex as a vertically-integrated company through the development of new engineering 
techniques. The Institute had an important role in the development of local engineering 
expertise whose professional quality was internationally recognized. During the interviews 
for this study, several managers pointed out that there was a considerable rotation of staff 
between Pemex and the Institute. According to a manager who had worked previously in the 
Institute, this organization was a “key factor in the development of technical expertise in the
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national oil industry and a central component of the technical pride that has characterized the 
organizational culture of the oil workers”.
During this period, Pemex moved its headquarters to a new property developed exclusively 
for it. This was called the Pemex Administrative Centre and was located in Mexico City, 
which came to be a clear symbol of Pemex’s centralized management style. The premises 
were of a high standard and were a signal to the international community of the intended 
permanence of the organization28.
Under this administration, the company’s production kept being channelled to the internal 
market, still at subsidized prices. Pemex stopped exporting from 1966 to 1973. The level of 
oil production kept increasing, but the 9.9% rate of growth of the internal demand for oil 
between 1969 and 1972 was higher than that of oil production, at 4.1% (Meyer and Morales 
1990). The lack of infrastructure for storage and distribution were factors that contributed to 
the crisis that later faced the oil sector. During an interview, a technical manager explained 
that the maintenance and rational development of the national pipeline infrastructure had 
been prevented until 1968, because it was only then that reliable drawings of the 
infrastructure became available. Gas was burnt due to the inadequate infrastructure available 
to process and distribute it. Pemex continued to finance its investment programme, 
operational costs, and the servicing of its debt by more borrowing because, by the mid 1960s, 
the company was able to negotiate long-term credits (Meyer and Morales 1990).
The company kept developing in its own peculiar style, with local managers having a very 
strong control over its data and decision making. It was during this period that the company 
started to use information technology to solve specific problems. The General Director, who 
was a major political and intellectual figure of the time with strong links with the National 
University, asked for advice on the use of electronic data processing technology from experts 
at the University, which had a very strong professional reputation. The intervention of these 
experts proved very useful and some of them were hired by Pemex and entered into the 
company’s professional career structure, as the company’s first information technology 
manager recalled when he was interviewed.
28 Within the local political culture of that time, it was understood that a public organization’s director had to 
provide it with a large building in the central area of the capital city in order to ensure its survival.
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5.3.2.5 1970-1975 Administration
Antonio Dovali became General Director of Pemex in 1970; he had a pragmatic approach and 
also had links with the academic world of the National University. He joined at a time when 
the company faced a serious crisis. To avoid the further deterioration of Pemex’s trade 
balance, this pragmatic new General Director decided to import crude oil in 1971. Two years 
later, the first oil shock caused by the Arab oil embargo had a dramatic impact upon the 
future of Pemex. Its critical financial situation and the international oil crisis brought oil 
policy to the top of the Mexican Government’s agenda.
The government created the Energy Commission, whose purpose was to produce a national 
inventory of oil resources; its members were national technical experts with good 
professional reputations, who had strong influence on the definition of energy policy. The 
Organic Law of Petroleos Mexicanos of 1971 had increased the number of board members at 
Pemex to six named by the government and five by the Union. The finances of the company 
deteriorated further, and in the worst years the government transferred extraordinarily large 
amounts of revenues to Pemex as returned subsidies. In 1972, this income represented 6% of 
its total revenues, and 4.7% in 1973 (Meyer and Morales 1990).
In 1974, new oil reserves were discovered in the southeast of Mexico. Given this potential to 
increase production, General Director Antonio Dovali realized that exports were necessary to 
rescue the financial situation of Pemex. The company needed to fund its investment plan 
with savings and not through the contracting of external resources, which were increasing the 
public debt burden. He was able to negotiate the unfreezing of internal oil products prices 
with the government.
By the end of 1974, having satisfied the internal oil demand in Mexico, the company was 
able to export oil again. Nevertheless, there was still political pressure inside the government 
to restrain exports on nationalistic and technical grounds. A group of experts, headed by the 
former General Director Antonio Bermudez, carried the debate to the public. They wanted to 
prevent Pemex becoming the main provider of financial resources to the government, 
insisting that the levels of production should be dictated by technical factors not political 
goals. The financial crisis at the end of President Echeverria’s administration changed the 
direction of the oil policy (Gutierrez 1982).
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The internal price of oil was increased in 1973, then remained unaltered until 1976. The 
internal revenues and the currency income from oil exports promised a financial recovery for 
the company. In 1975, the government increased the tax on Pemex’s internal oil sales and 
put a tax of 50% on its exports revenues to finance the public budget. The investment plans 
of the company therefore still required foreign loans, so the financial situation of Pemex did 
not improve (Meyer and Morales 1990).
5.3.2.6 1976-1981 Administration
Jorge Diaz Serrano, an engineer from the private sector with very strong links to the oil 
industry, became General Director of Pemex in December, 1975. His appointment meant a 
major change to the political nature of this post. He was neither a public servant nor a 
political figure; he had been until then a private contractor to Pemex, as he explained during 
his interview for this study. He was well known and respected in the oil sector for his 
technical expertise and entrepreneurial character.
The operational conditions of the organization changed dramatically during Diaz Serrano’s 
administration. He brought 300 new people into the company, and since then the 
professional career path within the organization has lost its power as the sole source of 
legitimacy; some of the oil workers interviewed commented that the new arrangements 
favoured personal political relations. Most of the technical experts who had worked for the 
company in the past, and who were strongly identified with the nationalistic perspective, 
retired. Diaz Serrano became the only person with a voice in public administration who had 
expertise on oil matters.
A major difference between his administration and the previous ones was that the 
development of the oil sector stopped being linked to national industrial development (Meyer 
and Morales 1990) (Gutierrez 1982). At that time, international oil prices were increasing. 
Diaz Serrano’s administration was in a race against time to increase petrodollar revenue, in 
order to make Mexico an international oil producer. He was aware that the conditions of the 
oil market favouring oil producers would not last, so he had to maximize oil revenues and 
take advantage of those temporary conditions. For him, the expansion of oil production
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capacity was a goal in itself. Not all members of the cabinet shared this view; some wanted 
to continue to translate the oil revenues into the means to industrialize the country.
Diaz Serrano announced a very ambitious investment plan for the company. The goals, as 
recorded in an official document, were to:
• increase oil production from 700,000 to 2.2 million barrels a day and increase 
exports to 1.1 million barrels a day;
• increase gas extraction;
• double refining capacity;
• triple petrochemical production;
• increase the distribution infrastructure; and
• promote exploration projects heavily.
These goals were achieved. Pemex brought its extraction capability from 800,000 barrels per 
day in 1976 to 2,550,000 barrels a day in 198129. The goal of the organization was to 
increase production as rapidly as possible, with no other consideration. For the government, 
Pemex became the main source of financial resources. The President’s aim was to finance 
the development of the country with petrodollars, which meant the economy had been 
petrolized (Gutierrez 1982).
In 1981, the General Director announced a dramatic increase in oil reserves: to 72 billion of 
proven reserves, 58.6 billion barrels probable, and 250 billion barrels potential . These 
increases were sometimes achieved through manipulating data, a practice known locally as 
‘data makeup’ according to a manager involved in the development of an institutional data 
base at Pemex. The overall goal was to increase the political presence of Mexico in the 
international arena to obtain financial and technical support from the international community 
to continue with the investment plan. Mexico became the fourth largest oil producer in the 
world. During this period, the Mexican government had a very active foreign policy, which 
was not always aligned to American interests (Pellicer 1982).
29 Official document, Pemex, 1981.
30 Ibid.
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By law, Pemex’s investment projects have to be supervised by the Ministry of Energy31. But 
thanks to the personal relationship between Diaz Serrano and the country’s President, Lopez 
Portillo, the investment programme of the company was pushed forward with little regard for 
formal authorization mechanisms, stated a manager who had worked in the company at that 
time but was no longer in it. The goal had been to achieve a massive growth of production 
capacity in the least possible time. The vision and over-enthusiastic climate driving 
operations was expressed in the following official statement:
“The extraordinary dynamics imposed on the activities of the petroleum industry by the administration 
of President Jose Lopez Portillo, supported by the richness of our subsoil and by the efforts of all the 
technicians, workers, and officers of the company, has made possible the design of a plan for the 
economic development of the country, for the present and for many years to come, without any energy 
restrictions.”32
The goals were achieved quickly, but at a tremendous cost and with a further loss of control 
by the central administration of company activities outside its headquarters. The company’s 
operations lacked co-ordination and planning, in the view of a technical manager interviewed. 
A dramatic publicly-known example of this situation was the construction of a 48-inch 
pipeline from the gas well of Cactus to the border of the United States, although relevant 
trade agreements had not been negotiated and the contract had not yet been signed -  and was 
never actually signed This expensive distribution infrastructure was useless even for the 
original purpose for which it was built. There was a lack of strategy to define oil exports 
policy and no public debate as to how the oil revenues should be managed, although oil was a 
strategic national resource. This period saw the further reinforcing of the vertical control of 
decision making that had always characterized the oil sector.
The dramatic expansion of oil production provoked a variety of problems in all areas of the
l a
sector. For example, a severe spillage at an offshore rig called Ixtoc in 1981 revealed 
Pemex’s dependency on foreign technology. Foreign contractors carried out the drilling for 
the expansion effort, but did not assume financial responsibility for accidents. Public opinion
31 At the time of Diaz Serrano’s administration, this was called the Ministry of National Wealth and Industrial 
Promotion.
32 Ibid.
33 The Ixtoc, which went out of control in June 1979, has been described as the worst oil spill in history. It 
lasted 295 days, with the loss of oil calculated as 4 billion barrels.
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expressed through the media was very critical of the lack of response of the company 
regarding the severe ecological damage caused by the oil spill.
Between 1976 and 1980, the number of employees at Pemex increased from 88,000 to 
108,000, during which time the Union strengthened its power (Meyer and Morales 1990). 
With the oil boom, the cost of operations rocketed. The dramatic expansion of Pemex’s 
facilities created a growth of demand for supplies and equipment that increased the cost of 
inputs. Stocks and inventories were managed poorly and there was a lack of control over the 
company’s assets and development projects. The inherited inefficiencies were aggravated. 
The administrative systems were unable to cope with the oil boom due to the speed at which 
the programme was carried out, as was recognized by Diaz Serrano when he was interviewed 
for this study. The lack of adequate information systems made the programming and 
planning of activities an impossible task. Construction projects were delayed, resulting in an 
escalation of costs.
Oil workers described how many projects were carried out without the necessary budgeting 
and work planning. The situation was chaotic at the company’s headquarters, although out in 
the operational sites there was some form of control structure enforced by local leadership, 
but managed with a great deal of personal discretion. This situation created political tensions 
with the central government authorities who were responsible for controlling the budget. In 
addition, the public image of Pemex was also problematic for two reasons: the lack of 
consistency in the information given to the media; and the publicly-known abuses of personal 
discretion in the use of power in allocating the company’s resources by some of its managers.
As the goal of the company was to achieve a certain level of production regardless of any 
other considerations, the only financial data that mattered was the cash flow level, the income 
earned by exports, and the level of internal sales within Mexico. Costs were of no concern 
within the environment of abundance created by the oil boom and high output from the 
company’s oil wells, as a manager involved in information systems development at Pemex 
observed in an interview. Operations could have been carried out more efficiently, but that 
was not seen as an issue that mattered. In fact, due to the richness of the wells, the 
company’s figures showed productivity gains, as explained in an official document: “Proven 
reserves and crude production increased by 12 and 3 times respectively from 1976 to 1980,
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while staff increased by an annual average of 5%. Consequently operating expenses, which 
in 1976 represented 54% of the total sales incomes, in 1980 represented only 31 %.”34
The dramatic development of Pemex has to be understood within the context of three 
elements: the international oil market; Mexico’s relation with the United States; and the 
economic crisis of the Mexican government. The first oil shock revealed the vulnerability of 
the American internal oil market to a disruption of oil imports. From 1973 till 1979, OPEC 
managed increases in oil prices with a long-term perspective of protecting real income 
revenues while discouraging new explorations and diversification of energy resources, in 
order to prolong the control of the market from the supply side. The Iranian Revolution in 
1978 and the war between Iran and Iraq brought about a second oil shock. International oil 
prices rocketed. Mexico became strategically important for the American economy because 
it was a major non-Arabic oil producer and shares a common border with the United States 
(Pellicer 1982).
The United States Government’s Energy Plan identified the Mexican oil reserves as being of 
strategic national interest to America. At the same time, the oil price increases flooded the 
financial markets with petrodollars. The international banks were looking for investment 
opportunities and many were attracted by Mexico, a sovereign debtor backed with enormous 
oil reserves (Escobedo 1985). All of Pemex’s investment plans were financed with loans 
raised in the international markets, many on a short-term basis, and were carried out with 
high levels of capital-goods imports (Meyer and Morales 1990).
The oil price was at its highest level at this time. Because most drilling was offshore, Mexico 
developed its oil industry through the use of expensive foreign resources and sophisticated 
imported technology. The tremendous productivity of the marine oil deposits compensated 
for the enormous cost of the development of the infrastructure needed to exploit them. Most 
of the oil was sold to the United States, although several attempts were made to diversify its 
customer base, noted Diaz Serrano during an interview. The company built a new office 
block at its headquarters in Mexico City, an enormous building of 42 floors similar to those 
of the oil multinationals, which came to symbolize the oil boom and the centralized decision 
making of the company.
34 Official document, Pemex, 1981.
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Diaz Serrano described how the international oil market showed signs of a glut at the 
beginning of 1981 -  earlier than expected -  which gave Pemex problems in selling its oil. As 
General Director, he faced the dilemma of reducing production or cutting prices. He chose 
the latter, bringing down the price by $4 without consulting the President or other members 
of the cabinet. Some ministers objected to what they perceived as the passive reaction of 
Pemex to market conditions and the unilateral decision from him that had by-passed 
Presidential authority. The central government retracted his decision: the President ordered a 
reduction of production and increased Mexican oil prices by $2. Oil sales fell, and Mexico 
was unable to sell 700,000 barrels per day. This meant that the country’s oil revenues were 
abruptly reduced by $22 million a day, a situation which triggered legitimacy problems for 
the political leadership of the country. The public image of the company deteriorated even 
more following news published by the media regarding the way Pemex was managed: the 
arbitrary use of discretion and the abuse and corruption at all levels, including senior 
management and Union leaders. Diaz Serrano resigned.
In 1981, the President appointed a new General Director, Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid: a 
public servant with a strong political background, good public reputation, and a very close 
friend of President Lopez Portillo. He remained in office until the end of the presidential 
term. The media considered that the President had wanted to save his reputation with this 
appointment. Moctezuma Cid’s administration lasted about 14 months, during which there 
was much turnover of personnel at senior levels. It faced strong financial pressure from the 
country’s treasury and had to sell oil at even lower prices than those of OPEC, with no 
consideration of the implications this could have on the international arena or on internal 
political affairs, explained Moctezuma Cid when he was interviewed.
Most of the managers with long careers in the company believe the oil boom was a lost 
opportunity to recover Pemex’s financial situation. Internal Mexican oil prices were 
increased both in 1977 and 1980, but they deteriorated in real terms because the inflation 
growth rate was higher than the price rises. The company planned to generate enough 
revenue to fund its investment plans by 1982, thereby ending its dependence on foreign loans. 
In practice, the income of the company was higher than expected due to the effects of the 
second international oil shock. Pemex became dependent on its oil export revenues; for
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instance, in 1976 exports generated just 16% of total sales revenues and by 1979 they had 
increased to 56%.
Real income doubled between 1980 and 1982, but the company’s expenses also rocketed, due 
to the fiscal burden and growth of the costs of operations (Meyer and Morales 1990). In 
1977, 63.4% of Pemex’s expenses were channelled to operations and 35.2% to pay taxes. By 
1980, in the middle of the oil boom, these proportions of financial resource allocation were 
reversed: operational costs consumed 31.1% of expenditure and taxes 57.5%. The external 
debt of Pemex continued to increase, with its worst surge between 1980 and 1982 when it 
grew from $925 million to $20.26 billion; this represented 32.7% of the government’s 
external debt at the time. “The richness of Mexican oil reserves turned from being a blessing 
to become a curse, in less than 5 years,” remarked Meyer and Morales (1990).
5.4 In fo rm a tio n  Sy ste m s  a t  Pem ex
5.4.1 Computer-based Information Systems
The history of computer-based information systems at Pemex also characterizes the 
development of Mexico’s information technology. The company has been at the leading 
edge in the process of information technology diffusion nationwide. Because of its size and 
economic power, Pemex has been in a strong position to negotiate with vendors. This is 
illustrated by a quote from an executive of the company: “The computer companies do not 
sell to us, we buy from them”. The introduction of information technology was related to the 
need to solve certain problems, and its use was undertaken by applying an engineering 
perspective and common sense. During the first historical period of this study, which is 
examined in this chapter, the specific problems for which information technology was used 
were usually focused on the need to process massive volumes of data, as was stated by the 
first information technology manager of Pemex when he was interviewed. The description of 
the use of information technology in Pemex in the following subsections was structured by 
the researcher using the data collected during the interviews and the official documents that 
this manager provided to the researcher.
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5.4.2 Proprietary Systems and the Office of Mechanization and Computing
The single-register machines were used by the foreign oil companies. El Aguila introducing 
the first one in 1928 (Cantarell and Gonzalez 2000). The first types of computer equipment 
used by Pemex were such single-register machines, which were widely used by the 1970’s to 
process the payroll and some financial data by simply automating manual procedures. 
Mechanical and electrical engineers operated these computers. Until the 1970s, the country 
did not have academic institutions offering vocational training in electronics or computer 
sciences.
In 1965, Pemex created the Office of Mechanization and Computing as a specialized unit to 
manage the information technology resources of the organization. Its organizational structure 
(see figure 5.1) consisted of a number of units:
• Administration Department: Management of human and material resources; 
administration of contracts for products and services.
• Operations Department: Computer operation and control of subcontracted 
maintenance services.
• Systems Department: Development and management of payroll and warehouse 
systems.
• Mathematical Computing Department: Development of highly specialized
mathematical programming, such as forecasting and critical path analysis.
• Engineering Department: Development of technical engineering systems, such as 
calculations for the distillation towers.
• Offices at oil production centres outside the city, reporting directly to the Office of 
Mechanization and Computing’s under-manager.
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Figure 5.1: Organizational structure of Office of Mechanization and Computing
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The Office of Mechanization and Computing had its headquarters in Mexico City, with seven 
other offices scattered throughout the country in the main oil production centres: Poza Rica, 
Salamanca, Azcapotzalco, Tampico, Cd. Madero, Reynosa, and Coatzacoalcos. The Office 
was located within the jurisdiction of the company’s Under-Directorate of Administration. 
The responsibilities of this Office were to manage and co-ordinate information technology 
activities that had been developed previously in an ad hoc manner, described by an 
interviewee as “anarchic”. Each local accounting office developed its own systems, using 
different information technology environments.
In 1967, Pemex’s General Director, Jesus Reyes Heroles, had political problems with the 
workers related to payroll. As he was a political figure and an intellectual linked to the 
National University, he asked for advice from engineers with expertise in the use of 
computers within the University. They realized that the company had severe problems 
processing the massive amount of data needed for the payroll. Wages had to be paid every 14 
days, and every work centre had its own style that depended on the local interpretation of the 
collective contract.
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The main difficulties were that the payroll was never ready on time and personnel kept 
queuing in vain at the cashier’s office, losing time from their working hours. Later, the 
people in charge of paying workers had to go to their offices several times in order to find the 
people who had not received their salary and give them their money. The wages were paid in 
cash, which created a high risk in having to carry around a large amount of payroll money. 
The project to overcome such problems was led by a chemical engineer who had worked for 
Pemex for six years as a process engineer and was also lecturer at the National University. 
He undertook the task with a team of twelve people. He used information technology 
because it was the appropriate solution to the problem.
The development of the system encountered severe difficulties, including opposition from 
some powerful forces. For example, the personnel responsible for measuring the amount of 
overtime worked were a key enemy. They were very powerful because they received 
commission from the workers in exchange for favourable readings. Most of them were very 
rich and had great local power; they therefore had a strong vested interest in preserving the 
status quo.
The technical staff worked out the proposed system’s requirements analysis together with its 
users; the analysts did not want to impose their views, as the first information technology 
manager pointed out when providing his personal historical reconstruction of these events to 
the researcher. During the analysis phase, the users kept insisting that it was an impossible 
task to achieve a standardized payroll system for the organization. In an open sabotage 
campaign, the staff who recorded overtime readings destroyed payroll printouts from the 
computer. They even undertook legal action against the developers of the system. The 
authorities negotiated with the Union to make its leaders understand that the system would 
bring benefits to the workers because they would be paid on time.
After 3Vi months, the project development team ran the payroll system for the first time in 
Mexico City, in parallel with the manual system operated with calculators. From then on, the 
wages were paid on time. The system was then taken to other work centres. The developers 
also faced problems in other locations, but with the experience of implementing it in Mexico 
City they addressed the implementation of the system in a different way. They talked to the 
personnel and explained to them what the changes would be and what benefits they would 
receive.
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The information technology manager recalls that, in his opinion, the project team faced its 
worst situation in Reynosa. There, the personnel measuring overtime destroyed the 
equipment and openly threatened the analysts, asking them if they thought they were going to 
take their way of living from them so easily. The top manager of this work centre was 
advised in advance that problems could worsen, so he brought the army into the company’s 
local installations to help sort out the problems. “The managers were ‘hangman and knife’ 
leaders, with strong characters willing to take tough decisions if needed, with the aim of 
modernizing the company,” stated the first information technology manager. The posts of the 
personnel that measured overtime disappeared. The team involved in developing the 
information technology system learned with these experiences that such systems could not be 
imposed on workers. “The users have to be motivated; if they are not, they will just not use 
the system,” as one commented.
Solving the problem of excessive spending on warehouse management was a major challenge 
posed by the General Director to the technical personnel who had expertise in the use of 
computers. It was a very difficult task, noted this same manager: Pemex had 95 major 
warehouses all over the country, each dealing with an average of 40 different products. 
When a requirement arose for a specific item, the warehouse personnel usually answered 
automatically that they did not have it in stock and that it had to be bought; that seems to 
have been a common practice as several oil workers described it in a very similar way. If the 
technical staff suspected that an item was in stock, they went and demonstrated to the 
warehouse personnel that it was actually there; but this was a very tortuous procedure. 
Sometimes, finding the item was a matter of trying different names because there were no 
standards for classification. The warehouse management problem deteriorated even more 
due to the buying procedures that required various steps to be followed, each needing specific 
paper work covering: the requirement notice; order details; public tender; and warehouse 
entry.
The warehouse project was led by the same chemical engineer who headed the payroll 
development. He decided to initiate the system in the Salamanca refinery because, as he 
commented, the chief manager was his close friend. The project team was extremely 
surprised to discover that there were 200,000 orders every year. It realized that warehouse 
staff did not check the stock levels before placing a new purchase order. In addition, the
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same number of orders were generated each year, usually adding 10% to the previous year’s 
quantities. The warehouses were saturated; in the project leader’s perception, warehouse 
stocks in some instances could have lasted for 70 years at prevailing levels of demand. The 
staff of the warehouse had a strong vested interest in this process of placing new orders35. 
The General Director realized the magnitude of the problem and appointed more staff to the 
project. Although the analysts were repeatedly threatened, the team was eventually able to 
implement the new system. The managers of the warehouse then realized the benefits of 
controlling their stocks because they were able to reduce costs. The system remained in 
operation for ten years, from 1967 to 1977. At the time of the field work in the early 1990s, 
the researcher found that the technical staff involved in software development knew nothing 
about this past experience.
Pemex bought its first mainframe in 1967, which was installed in the Mexico City 
headquarters, where it processed the payroll for the head office. From then on, the company 
installed mainframes in different production and distribution centres throughout the country. 
All these computer-based systems were for payroll, aiming to automate the manual processes. 
At that time, no top manager of the organization wanted to keep the Office of Mechanization 
and Computing under his jurisdiction. The Office was seen as a risky ‘hot potato’, in the 
words of the first information technology manager, because of its technical complexity, high 
levels of investment, and shortage of trained resources.
Information systems management was totally centralized at the time because of the type of 
proprietary technology then available. The process of buying equipment for each project had 
to follow the procedures specified by the central government’s procurement regulations. 
Each project was put out to public tender. The technology to be acquired and used depended 
on which vendor won the bid, decided on strictly financial considerations. Pemex developed 
a technological platform of islands of automation, in which each system operated on its own.
Managers who were responsible for information technology agreed, in interviews for the 
study, that the mainframe technology and restrictive buying procedures of the public sector 
explain why information systems management developed as a centralized structure. The 
information technology policy was defined by a section of the President’s office. It specified
35 Warehouse managers received commissions from the companies that sold products to Pemex.
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that all procurements had to be authorized by central government. There was a central 
committee of experts (mostly engineers and mathematicians) who evaluated the projects. At 
first, it took them a week to give their verdict, but with time its decision making became 
slower and resulted in it becoming a bottleneck in the national diffusion of information 
technology (Noriega Blanco 1992). The regulations regarding imports of information 
technology were based on protectionist trade policies.
During 1974-75, Pemex made its first attempt to plan and structure systems development 
activities in accordance with a defined future strategy. A middle manager noted that users of 
the systems were neither consulted nor informed about this plan. Copies of the final plan 
were given only to senior managers. Users were usually not taken into account in any 
decisions related to systems development.
During this period, the users were captives of the dictates of the technical staff, with analysts 
defining the systems without user participation. “People carrying out the daily operations of 
the organization did not know how computers could help them in doing their jobs more 
efficiently,” recalled a middle manager. According to him, the systems analysts felt they were 
the ones who knew ‘the right way’ to do things. Systems were therefore developed on the 
premise of ‘blind faith’ that the use of technology would help do things more efficiently. The 
company invested heavily in the development of its information technology capabilities 
without any evaluation of the projects. This middle manager accepted that many systems 
never brought about the expected benefits; in his opinion, up to 70% of the analysts’ time was 
dedicated to maintenance. The need for more computer-based systems kept increasing, but 
when future procurement was planned the projections of processing capacity required usually 
fell far short of real needs.
IBM had a big presence in Pemex. Its equipment was very expensive, but in the opinion of 
top manager it was regarded by the technical experts as being ‘the safe decision’ because of 
its permanence in the computer market. Known as the ‘Big Blue’, IBM actually controlled 
the market and was de facto the company that defined standards. It also had a high reputation 
for providing good customer service. A manager heading an information technology area 
said that most times ‘Big Blue’ defined the conditions for systems, or imposed them upon 
Pemex. This situation changed in 1975, when this manager explained that “the power of 
IBM in the Mexican market was challenged once and for all”.
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At that time, Pemex wanted to create a system to transmit data between five work centres 
located at different geographical sites. The project to develop facilities for data 
communication was structured in such a way that all the information had to pass through 
Mexico City, which was defined as the central node. This was an important project because 
of its magnitude and the significance of data transmission between machines. It came to be 
known as the ‘integral system’ in the technical jargon of the company engineers. IBM won 
the tender for the project, based on the provision of various mainframe and 
telecommunication equipment. However, the contract was never signed because IBM 
insisted on imposing certain conditions that Pemex did not accept. The project was then 
undertaken with machines from Sperry and Burroughs, but the idea of data transmission was 
not carried out because of technical incompatibilities between the different brands of 
mainframes. The manager who described this project noted that, in the end, these computers 
were bought merely to satisfy the data processing needs for the automation of the manual 
payroll procedures for each work centre. In the opinion of a top technical manager, this 
project came to be the turning point in Pemex’s procurement policy; it was when IBM lost as 
its customer this powerful organization that was the leading-edge user of information 
technology in Mexico.
5.4.3 1976-1981: Informatics36 coordinated by the Gerencia de Informdtica
0 7  #
In 1977, according to official documents , programmes relating to the operation and 
development of the expanding oil industry needed support from information systems services. 
The General Director of Pemex at the time, Diaz Serrano, approved a restructuring of the 
Office of Mechanization and Computing, with the aim of building a structure that would be 
able to support the main areas of the organization. This official document stated that these 
areas required “efficient and effective support of computing technology applied to the 
solution of problems of information, engineering, financial management and planning”. It 
also noted: “the informatics resources should be the channelled towards the optimization of 
the decision processes in order to increase productivity”. This document forecast a growth in 
the demand for these services and advocated the co-ordination of the Informatics Office and 
user departments. The aim was to achieve effective participation of the users in planning and
36 This research uses the term ‘informatics’ because it is the way the information technology capabilities are 
named in Pemex; it is derived from the French word informatique, coined by Nora and Mine (1978).
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designing information systems. Most official documents present the ideas using the jargon of 
managerial techniques and the prevailing technical state of the art.
The official position also advocated a permanent evaluation of the informatics services and of 
the mechanisms for controlling the use of financial and technical resources within this 
activity. The aim of permanent evaluation, as noted in the official document, was to 
undertake an ongoing supervision of these activities in order to control them and understand 
the impact of these investments. The restructuring of the Office of Mechanization and 
Computing ordered by the General Manager resulted in the creation of Gerencia de 
Informatica, at a higher level in the hierarchy under the Technical Administration Under- 
Director. This new unit (see figure 5.2) was responsible for co-ordinating the informatics 
services provided to six areas of the company:
• Primary Production
• Industrial Production
• Trading
• Administration
• Planning and Finance
• Projects and Construction
Figure 5.2: Organizational Structure of Gerencia de Informatica
37 Official document explaining informatics reestructuring strategy
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In 1979, responsibility for Gerencia de Informatica was relocated to the Under-Director of 
Finance. The tight control by centralized information systems management provoked many 
areas of operations into creating their own informatics centres to satisfy their local 
information systems needs. Various users and mangers said that these activities were not 
officially recognized, and were usually disguised by names that made them appear as support 
areas. The Gerencia de Informatica was unable to cope with the enormous demand for new 
information systems developments and the local areas could not cope with the delays in the 
development of the applications they needed. These centres were scattered throughout the 
organization, with no overall supervision or guidance. The systems were developed to 
address the needs of each particular area of operation, following peculiar ad hoc styles and 
ways of doing things using a variety of minicomputers with different operating systems. A 
technical manager stated that the diffusion of telecommunications capabilities triggered a 
fight for power between the Gerencia de Informatica and the local centres. The head of the 
central function, who had an engineering background, was never able to accept the existence 
of the other informatics groups, as that would have been seen as giving up his technical 
supremacy.
In 1981, there was a great demand for personnel who had expertise in understanding both the 
business and technical aspects of developing information systems. To achieve this, the
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company hired chemists, industrial and electrical engineers, and business administrators who 
were given a three-month course of structured analysis, technical design, and programming; 
every year, a group of about 45 new people was hired for this training. After their training 
period, these personnel were sent to the different work centres to develop and maintain the 
payroll or technical computer-based systems, according to their specialist area of expertise. 
A chemical engineer who had gone through this training explained this process to the 
researcher. Not all work centres had mainframes, so the smaller centres worked with remote- 
entry terminals, a modem, and an analogue terminal line. As these systems were too slow to 
deliver the payroll on time, the systems analysts had to rush by coach to the main work centre 
to have their data processed. The engineer noted that they used to call the system a “coach- 
driven decentralized process”.
The oil boom was a success in terms of developing the physical infrastructure of the 
company, but it provoked chaos in the administrative sphere. The information systems for 
controlling warehouse management “were pushed into the background”, according to an 
executive that headed the Financial Direction and who had left the company. He added: “The 
financial data was very limited and pedestrian, but the condition of information regarding 
operations was even worse; the least that could be said was that it was unreliable. The 
information systems was not compatible with the size and importance of the company”.
In the last year of the oil boom in 1981, when the oil crisis started, there was a major effort to 
develop an executive information system as a ‘control room’. The General Director who led 
that project stayed a very short time in the company. The project ended as another 
investment in information technology that did not bring the expected benefits to the 
organization. This failure stimulated the growth within the organization of a strong group of 
opponents to the mainstream informatics function. The differences between the local 
informatics groups and the Gerencia de Informatica were usually related to definitions of 
technical standards and styles of systems development.
5.5 Su m m a r y  o f  the  Fir st  Pe rio d  Studied
During the first period examined in this chapter, Pemex continued to develop as an integrated 
state-owned oil company and the most important company in the country, with a management 
totally dependent on the political life of the country. It had built up expertise in using
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information technology, but basically only in the financial areas of the company. The 
activities related to information technology were influenced by the process of learning about 
it within the company and by knowledge from elsewhere. In pursuing its prime objective of 
producing oil with little regard to other aspects, the oil boom of the late 1970s induced a 
massive development of Pemex’s infrastructure -  but its information systems lagged behind. 
From this background, Pemex initiated a new period in its process of changing, as explored in 
the next chapter.
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6 Process of Ch a n g e: Second  Period
This chapter presents the historical development from 1982 to the mid 1990s of the Mexican 
nation, the process of organizational change within Pemex, and the company’s information 
systems development. It aims is to highlight the relationships between these three elements. 
After summarizing key events for this second period of the study, the chapter examines how 
the nation developed through a new age of modernization that was based mainly on tight neo­
liberal economic policies. Organizational changes at Pemex are then viewed in terms of what 
happened during the administrations of different General Directors of the company, followed 
by a detailed description the path followed by the information systems developed at Pemex to 
meet the changing organizational requirements. During this period Pemex tried to introduce 
economic rationale to its operations.
6.1 H ist o r ic a l  C h a r t  f o r  Seco nd  Pe r io d , 1982- m id  1990s
Table 6.1 uses the same format as table 5.1 in Chapter 5 to provide a historical chart which 
covers: Mexican national history; Pemex and the Mexican oil industry; information systems 
developed within Pemex; and what was happening in the wider world in this second period.
Table 6.1: Historical Events Relevant to Case Study, 1982-mid 1990s
Year Mexico38 Mexican Oil Sector/Pemex Information Systems World
1982 President Miguel de 
la Madrid elected. 
Tight economic 
policy.
General Director (GD): Mario 
Ramon Beteta.
Planning and auditing were 
the central activities of the 
administration.
Economic rationale was 
introduced to control the 
company’s activities.
‘Smurfs’ administration.
International consultancy 
MacKenzie undertook 
organizational restructuring 
project.
International 
oil price: $34 
per barrel. 
Falklands War 
between 
Britain and 
Argentina.
1983 Jailing of Jorge Diaz Serrano, 
GD from 1976 to 1981.
Introduction of Arthur 
Andersen information 
systems development 
methodology.
Gerencia de Informatica 
restructured as Gerencia 
Institucional de Informatica.
January
International
oil price:
$34/b;
October:
$29/b.
Raul Alfonsin 
became 
President of 
Argentina.
38 The change of public administration in Mexico is on the first day of December of the previous year identified 
in the table.
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1984 Huge gas explosion in 
Pemex’s Ixhuatepec gas 
installations.
Pemex contracts assigned by 
public tender.
International 
oil price: 29/b.
1985 Strong earthquake in 
Mexico City and 
volcanic eruption in 
the south of Mexico.
GD: Francisco Rojas Open Systems Strategy. 
In-house development of 
financial corporate systems.
International 
oil price: 28/b.
1986 Mexico hosted 
Soccer World Cup 
Championship.
Standardization of 
accounting procedures.
International 
oil price: 
12.65/b.
1987 Economic Solidarity 
Pact
1988 President: Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari. 
Neo-liberal economic 
policy; privatization 
of all stated-owned 
companies except oil 
and electricity 
industries.
GD: Francisco Rojas 
reappointed.
Strong management focus on 
decentralization as well as 
industrial security and 
environmental protection. 
Top Union leader’ was put 
into jail.
Basic Information Unit 
relocated under Planning 
and Co-ordination Under­
directorate.
Institutional database 
migrated to end-user 
computer platforms.
1990 Organizational restructuring 
into Divisions by products. 
Creation of the Petrochemical 
Division.
Re-unification 
of Germany. 
Iraq invaded 
Kuwait.
1991 Gulf War. 
End of 
Apartheid in 
South Africa.
1992 Massive oil-related explosion 
in Guadalajara.
Company was split into a 
corporate group and four 
subsidiaries.
1993 NAFTA signed. 
EZLN Indian 
political movement in 
the southeast of 
Mexico.
Four subsidiaries started their 
operations officially.
Business Strategic Plan by 
business line.
1994 Official Presidential 
candidate Luis 
Donaldo Colosio 
assassinated. 
Emesto Zedillo 
elected president.
GD: Carlos Ruiz Sacristan 
who after a month in this post 
was named Minister of 
Telecommunications due to a 
cabinet reshuffle.
GD: Adrian Lajous
1995 “Tequila Crisis” 
Devaluation of the 
Mexican Peso
Pemex Exploration y  
Production undergoes major 
organizational restructuring. 
Strategic Business Plan. 
Pemex Gas y  Petroquimica 
Basica faces competition in 
distribution.
Some Pemex Petroquimica 
Secundaria centres put out to 
tender.
Corporate group selected 
SAP R/3 for its Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) 
system and started its 
implementation.
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1996 First financial results are 
generated by SAP R/3 in the 
corporate group.
Pemex Gas y  Petroquimica 
Basica and Pemex 
Exploration y  Production 
started the implementation 
of SAP R/3.
6.2 T he  N a tio n a l  C o n tex t
6.2.1 1982-1987: Emergence of a New Age of Modernization
The election in December 1981 of Miguel de la Madrid as President of Mexico marked the
TOend of the old political era of ‘the dinosaurs’ and the start of the era of ‘technocracy’, as it 
was described by the media. Young professionals who had undertaken post-graduate studies 
abroad were named by de la Madrid as members of his cabinet. University titles became a 
symbol of status and legitimacy. The public administration abandoned the previous welfare 
model in favour of neo-liberal policies that followed the requirements of the International 
Monetary Fund. The government brought in a strict stabilization programme, targeted 
primarily at reducing its financial deficit (Republica 1982). It also implemented wage 
controls, tight constraints on public spending, redundancies among public-service employees, 
severe credit restrictions, and the devaluation of the peso by 258% in 1982 and 71.5% in 
1983. This last year the GDP contracted 4.2% and the inflation rate reached 102% (Mendez 
1998).
The administration also had as a main goal the fight against corruption. It created a Ministry 
of Comptrollership and jailed several public servants. Among those jailed was an ex-General 
Director of Pemex, Jorge Diaz Serrano, on the grounds of secret dealings over shipping 
contracts. He took the decision to buy two new ships without fulfilling all the central 
government requirements for such a process. If this emergency situation had not been 
resolved, it that would have forced the closure of oil wells that were in production or the 
wasteful burning away of gas. The charges against him were never proved through the 
judicial process, but he was kept in prison mainly for political reasons. Another major goal 
of de la Madrid’s administration was to reorganize the pattern of national economic activity
39 The old political figures were called ‘dinosaurs’ to denote their inability to evolve, which led to their 
extinction.
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to reduce the dependence on oil revenues. It enacted policies to diversify exports, liberalize 
trade, reorganize the public administration, and privatize state-owned companies.
In 1984, GDP increased by 3.6% and inflation fell to 65.4% -  but the balance of payments 
worsened due to the collapse of oil revenues. There was a renewed capital flight from 
Mexico that ended in another devaluation of the peso, which itself promoted a further exodus 
of capital. Economic activity was also hit badly by natural disasters40 (De Leon 2000). The 
government renegotiated several of its foreign debt agreements. In 1986, the GDP contracted 
3.8% due to its reliance on oil revenues. Mexican oil prices fell from $25.50 to $13.20 per 
barrel and the peso was devalued again, this time by 102%. Government finances worsened 
because of both the reduction of oil revenues and the increased burden of its foreign and 
internal debt. The Mexican economy was therefore trapped in a vicious cycle of wage and 
price increases, with a serious threat of falling into a hyper-inflationary spiral (Gurria Trevino 
1988).
During this period, a new political opposition group developed from people who had left the 
PRI, which was the official party. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, who had been a federal state 
governor, and Porfirio Munoz Ledo, who had headed the Ministry of Education in the 
previous government, were the leaders of the new party, the FDN (Democratic National 
Front)41 (Margain 1995). This brought together left-wing intellectuals and members of the 
middle and lower classes who wanted to build a truly democratic country. The new party 
strongly identified itself with nationalistic ambitions, such as defending public ownership of 
the oil industry. An opposition party from the right wing, PAN (National Action Party) 42, 
also increased its level of political activity. The population was demanding a more 
democratic society that would better suit the economic liberalization of the country (Ortiz 
Wadgymar 1997).
6.2.2 1987-1992: Strategies Based on National Economic Pacts
In December 1987, the Mexican government announced a new economic strategy, called the 
Economic Solidarity Pact, which sought to combat inflation by reaching agreements between
40 A strong earthquake caused severe damage in Mexico City and a volcanic eruption had negative ecological 
impacts in the south of the country.
41 Later it became the PRD (Revolutionary Democratic Party), Pdrtido de la Revolucion Democratico in 
Spanish.
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the different economic and social sectors of the country. These negotiations were possible 
due to the tight control that the government had over labour organizations. The Pact sought 
to strengthen government finances through: cuts in subsidies to public services43 and in levels 
of investment; adequate taxation to prevent the public deficit from growing; privatization of 
public companies; increasing interest rates to attract savings; restricting wage increases; 
adjustments to the prices of basic goods and to the exchange rate; and the rationalization of 
import restrictions to foster trade liberalization. It achieved a reduction in inflation that 
allowed the government to negotiate five extensions of the Pact (Mendez 1998). At the end 
of 1988, the economy showed the need for new adjustments; both the world oil market prices 
and the level of international interest rates had increased by then.
It was also at this time a man with a strong character and a reputation for powerful leadership 
and tough decision making became President of Mexico: Carlos Salinas de Gortari. 
However, the political opposition argued that he had not won the elections because the 
government had officially announced his victory at a time when the computer-based 
information systems used to count the votes had broken down without explanation. His main 
economic goal was to consolidate previous achievements, such as the fight against inflation, 
fostering recovery through economic growth, and modernizing the country (Ortiz Wadgymar 
1997).
Salinas had been the strategist behind the Economic Solidarity Pact, and his stabilization 
programme had a similar title: the Economic Stability and Growth Pact. Its main measures 
were: strict control over government finances; optimization in the use of resources for the 
provision of public services, adjustments in the prices charged for public services to reduce 
subsidies; peso exchange rate slippage; reduction of some import tariffs; foreign debt 
restructuring; modernization of public administration; and negotiation with the private sector 
to control wage increases (Mendez 1998). In the political sphere, he showed his 
determination by putting into jail Joaquin Hernandez Galicia knows as “la Quina” the main 
oil worker’s leader. Salinas used the army to capture him in his home through an ambush. 
This was a major move by the government to regain control over the oil industry.
42 Partido de Action National in Spanish
43 The public services provide by the Mexican government include water, gasoline, gas, and electricity.
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To encourage the macroeconomic restructuring of the country, Salinas promoted trade 
liberalization, deregulation of the economic system, and reduction of government 
participation in the economic life of the nation by the further privatization of state-owned 
companies. The revenues from these sales of public assets were channelled as social welfare 
spending through the National Solidarity Programme (Solidaridad), which had a very 
positive political impact on lower-income sections of the population. Marginalized urban and 
rural areas were able to develop their social infrastructure with Solidaridad resources; the 
government provided material resources and the population contributed their own work 
efforts (Mendez 1998). Although the Solidaridad programme and its social initiatives were 
implicitly linked to the PRI’s political image, the opposition parties kept winning elected 
positions.
The Economic Stability and Growth Pact was extended without any major modifications. 
The foreign debt was renegotiated to reduce its burden and free resources to finance 
economic growth. Public confidence in Mexico’s economic stabilization programme allowed 
a reduction in interest rates, the evolution of a more realistic exchange rate avoiding its 
overvaluation, and a decrease in the inflation rate. The main objectives of the National 
Development Plan for 1989-1994 were to achieve economic growth with low inflation and 
the modernization of the country in a context of economic realism within market criteria 
(Mendez 1998).
The government redefined the permitted levels of foreign participation in different economic 
sectors and in joint ventures for infrastructure development, thus favouring international 
capital. This policy had a direct impact on Pemex and changed its type of contracting from 
services to ‘turnkey’44 projects. Mexican small and medium sized engineering companies did 
not have the capacity to work in this new style, and they also had to face foreign competition 
too abruptly to be able to adjust in time. In addition, the financial sector was restructured to 
allow more freedom to banks to determine interest rates and the types of services they would 
offer.
44 A ‘turnkey’ project is a way of contracting all services and activities needed for the development of any 
specific task in the form of one complete project with one contractor, for example to develop an offshore rig. 
Pemex previously contracted various contractors to carry out different parts of the project, such as using one 
contractor to build an offshore rig structure , another to do the drilling on the rig, and so on.
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In 1989, the Mexican economy grew 3.4%, inflation was 19.7%, and the rest of the main 
economic indicators also improved thanks to private sector spending. The deterioration of 
real wages was moderated. The rate of devaluation of the peso was reduced. Some economic 
indicators improved again in the following year due to adjustments of public-service prices 
and the exchange rate: the GDP grew to 4.4% in 1990 but inflation was 29.9%. The 
international community showed confidence in the Mexican economy in the media and the 
flow of foreign investments increased. The government sold banks and other enterprises 
owned by the state, such as the Mexican telecommunications company Telefonos Mexicanos 
(Telmex). The privatization of these assets was criticized, mainly because the way they were 
carried out fostered a heavy concentration of capital. The resources brought in by these sales 
were channelled to create a contingency fund to protect the national economy from future 
external shocks.
The process of trade liberalization continued and Mexico negotiated the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada. The population was 
suspicious of the consequences for small and medium sized companies and for employment 
(Ortiz Wadgymar and Nunez 1998) (Margain 1995). There were also worries about the loss 
of local culture and traditional social values, with fears that the Mexican tradition of very 
strong family bonds would be undermined by the influence of the individualistic culture of 
the Americans. Mexico also negotiated trade agreements with some Latin American 
countries.
During 1991, Mexican economic policy remained unaltered; there was a further contraction 
in the financial deficit and a reduction of the rate of the devaluation of the peso. The 
economy grew 3.6% and the inflation rate was 18.8%, but there was a deficit in balance of 
payments. That year, $14.63 billion of capital entered the country, $4.76 billion in direct 
investment and $9.87 billion in securities. However, the volatility of the capital flows and 
persistence of inflation caused unease regarding the economic future. The Pact was extended 
until January 1993, with minor changes: there was a reduction of the devaluation rate of the 
peso, an increase in Value-Added Tax (VAT), and adjustments of prices for public services 
and products.
In 1992, Mexican GDP grew by 2.8% and inflation was 11.9 per cent. The reduction in the 
growth rate was due to the uncertainty caused by a delay in signing NAFTA and the
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persistence of a deficit in the balance of trade. The Mexican Stock Exchange Index behaved 
erratically. That year, agriculture was badly hit by adverse climatic conditions and there was 
a reduction in foreign demand. The exchange rate faced contradictory pressures: the deficit 
in the balance of trade indicated an overvaluation of the peso, at the same time as pressure 
towards revaluation was coming from the surplus in foreign currency caused by the inflow of 
foreign capital (Ortiz Wadgymar 1997). In October 1992, the government signed a new 
agreement with the economic sectors, called the Stability, Competitiveness, and Employment 
Pact. The key objectives were the same as the previous pact: to stimulate growth and 
economic modernization with fiscal discipline; reduce inflation to a single digit; restrain 
increases in wages; and widen the peso fluctuation range. In 1993, the economic figures 
were not as positive as were predicted, with GDP rising only 0.4% and inflation at 8.9% -  but 
exports managed to grow (Mexico 1993).
6.2.3 1993-mid 1990s: NAFTA Signed and Political Unrest Grows
NAFTA was enacted in January 1994, after the United States Senate approved it by a small 
margin at the end of 1993. The energy sector was explicitly included in NAFTA through a 
statement that guaranteed full respect for the constitution of each country. Nevertheless, the 
agreement included concessions to the Mexican Government aimed at opening certain areas 
of the oil sector to private investors and foreign companies (Ortiz Wadgymar 1997) (Margain 
1995).
In this period, the Bank of Mexico was attempting, free of government control, to create more 
economic certainty through tight monetary policy. Meanwhile, in the southeast of Mexico on 
the border with Guatemala, a political movement exploded into life in opposition to Salinas’ 
neo-liberal policy. Called EZLN (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional) 45, this 
movement had an Indian character and a nationalistic perspective. It caused unease, but 
remained confined to the southeast. Peace talks with it have remained a priority item on the 
political agenda of the country until 2001, many local and international intellectuals were 
involved (Ortiz Wadgymar 1997).
Although the government showed a conciliatory attitude most of the time, the political 
climate still remained uncertain. 1994 was the year for the selection of candidates for the
45 Emiliano Zapata was a revolutionary leader who fought to give the land to the peasants.
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elections of President, Senate, and Congress. In March, the official PRI Presidential 
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated in a display of contempt towards the 
ruling political group. There was general social indignation towards the assassination and the 
consequent political unrest adversely affected economic expectations. The following year, 
the head of the PRI party was assassinated, provoking further deterioration of the internal 
political situation and the international image of the country. When the 1994 general election 
was held, the result for the presidency was disputed by the opposition parties, but the winner 
was still the official PRI candidate, Ernesto Zedillo (Margain 1995). The economy was 
characterized at the time by structural problems with the foreign sector, which led to its 
collapse in January 1995 and the devaluation of the peso. The government then implemented 
restrictive economic policies once again (Mendez 1998).
6.3 O r g a n iz a t io n a l  A s p e c t s : Pe m e x  a s  a  M a r k e t -d r iv e n  O i l  C o r p o r a t io n
The second period of this longitudinal study covered the change of Pemex’s mission by the 
introduction of economic rationality to the evaluation of its operations. The process of 
transforming the company into a participant in the global market started with international 
productivity standards in 1982 and is still being continued. The collection of field data for 
the study ended early in 1997, when the corporation was implementing a major integrated 
information system as part of this globalization process.
6.3.1 1982-1987 Administration
Mario Ramon Beteta, a public administrator with a financial background and a long public 
career, was appointed General Director of Pemex in December 1982. His management 
followed central government policies very closely, by focusing on economic adjustment and 
auditing. From the time he took office, as he expressed during an interview for this study, 
Beteta was publicly critical of the way in which the expansion of oil production had been 
undertaken: with no planning; a lack of systems to control operations; a scarcity and 
unreliability of data to analyse operations; unawareness of the ecological impact of the 
industry; and the allowance of excessive power to the Union. The President made the 
definition of the oil export policy the responsibility of a newly created Comite de Comercio 
Exterior del Petroleo, which involved members of the government cabinet. In this way, he 
broke the monopoly of this area that Pemex managers had held during the previous 
administration.
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Under Beteta, Pemex went through a period of transition that tried to overcome the heavy 
financial and political cost of the oil boom of the 1970s. The main goals during this 
transition, as stated by him during an interview were to:
• reduce Pemex’s debt and try to finance investment with its own resources;
• foster productivity and profitability;
• decrease the company’s fiscal burden;
• eliminate subsidies to consumption that had promoted wasteful habits;
• solve problems in distribution and storage facilities;
• reduce technical dependence on imported equipment and parts; and
• initiate techniques of secondary extraction because many deposits were becoming 
unproductive due to inadequate decisions being taken about the production levels of 
oil wells.
As a first step in this second period’s pursuit of the introduction of a new economic rationale 
to the organization, Pemex was restructured in 1982. Figure 6.1 shows how this restructuring 
led to the establishment of three major branches (called ‘under-directions’) set up to integrate 
areas dedicated to planning and administrative activities: Industrial Transformation; Primary 
Production; and Project and Construction. In addition, a subsidiary company, Pemex 
International, was established with the responsibility of exporting oil. Pemex remained as 
one huge company after the reorganization. Decisions and strategic planning was centralized, 
which made the management and control of overall operations an impossible task.
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Figure 6.1: Organizational Structure of Pemex in 1982
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At the same time as this restructuring took place, Pemex changed the logo of the company 
from el charrito pemex*6, a little person in the colours of the Mexican flag (green, white, and 
red), to a stylized figure of a conch shell that was also a drop of oil. The change of public 
image had a clear message of wanting to leave the old nationalistic Pemex behind in favour 
of becoming a modem company. Pemex forced the holders of oil station concessions to 
employ the new image, which required repainting all oil stations that were in green, white, 
and red to the new official colours of blue and orange. The holders of the oil stations also 
had to display the new logo. Many of them did not support the change, but were forced to 
comply in order to keep their concessions47.
The reorganization of the company involved several efforts that changed different aspects of 
the company in trying to achieve the ideal model of a global company. The researcher
46 This figure was a representation of a short man with a big hat and curved legs for horse riding, painted in red, 
green, and white -  the colours of the Mexican flag.
47 Information provided in an interview with a oil station owner.
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identified five main facets of these changes concerning the efforts the company undertook 
from 1982 in trying to reorganize:
• redefinition of organization charts;
• downsizing of the company;
• cultural change;
• information systems development; and
• process re-engineering.
Beteta’s administration hired the services of mostly foreign consultancies and took advice on 
various aspects of management, such as organizational development, cultural management, 
and total quality management. The prime goal has been to transform the company into a 
more efficient and transparent organization in which operational decisions are taken in the 
light of technical requirements, rather than following only a political dictum.
The restructuring efforts were carried out at various levels, sometimes encompassing the 
whole organization and in some cases just specific areas. An example of these efforts is the 
restructuring of the Information Systems Administration Unit, which is analysed further in 
section 6.4. Usually, restructuring initiatives were isolated and each consultancy company 
worked on its own, within the area of its own expertise. Gradually, the role of the foreign 
consultancy companies became central to the restructuring drive. Opinions of the consultants 
carried enormous weight in the company’s reorganization during all these processes, 
especially the opinion of the American firm that was favoured by Adrian Lajous, the General 
Director’s Strategic Advisor, because he firmly believed in its professionalism and expertise. 
Lajous later became the General Director of Pemex during the final period covered by this 
research.
The ex-General Director Beteta, explained in an interview that, since 1983, Pemex has been 
able to use internal funds to pay the costs of its operations, its investments, and the servicing 
of its debt. This has been achieved even though the government increased the tax burden in 
1982 to 58% of its total oil export revenues plus a 5% ad valour duty. In 1985, the company 
kept only 30% of its revenues from oil exports, with 70% transferred to the National 
Treasury. The Beteta administration insisted on the need to reduce this burden. In 1986,
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54% of the government’s total fiscal income came from Pemex. The reduction of 
international oil market prices has continued to affect Mexico dramatically due to the burden 
of its external debt, which obliged the government to keep oil export volumes high in order to 
earn the money required to service the debt. The future volume of oil exports has been linked 
to the conditions of debt re-negotiations (Meyer and Morales 1990).
Beteta had very difficult relations with the Union (see section 4.3.1). He was criticized for 
having increased, within an austerity programme, the number of personal de continua 
(‘trusted personnel’) -  employees who are hired directly by the authorities of the company 
and do not become members of the Union. In the opinion of some technical managers, this 
also represented the destruction of the organization’s professional career path. Beteta 
brought his team into the company to enforce administrative control, and his personnel were
A O
known by the very pejorative term Smurfs . These personnel, who mamly had high 
qualifications from abroad, called the oil workers ‘crocodiles’49, another pejorative term. 
Most of the personnel that Beteta brought into the company were also quite young, which for 
many oil workers was another blow to what one interviewee referred to as the “mystique of 
experience as a source of legitimacy and the end of the golden years”. Planning became a 
key activity of the company’s administration.
Oil workers had mixed feelings about the reorganization efforts. On one hand, they 
recognized that something had to be done, but they did not like the way it was carried out. 
Many managers said in interviews for the study they believed the consultants were -  for most 
of the time -  abusive, charged very high fees, and did not give value for money. An oil 
worker encapsulated a general view: “Intervention by consultants is the new way foreigners 
have developed to take the national wealth abroad; the country is again exchanging glass 
beads for gold as in the time of the Spanish conquest and the colonial period.” The expertise 
of the consultants, endorsed by the legitimization of the authorities, had silenced the 
experience of oil workers, who had to follow the consultants’ advice even if they did not 
agree with it.
48 Beteta’s team were called ‘smurfs’ because, in the children’s cartoons of that name, the characters do not have 
a mother.
49 The term ‘crocodile’ was used to indicate an entity with ‘a long tail that could be stepped on’, which implied 
past corrupt practices by oil workers.
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The oil workers had a common appreciation that the leaders of the consultancy companies 
who negotiated the deals were experts, but the staff who actually came into the company to 
do the work were managed by young professionals who had recently graduated from 
university and had no work experience. The oil workers considered that it was they who 
generally finished doing the job the consultants were paid for, as illustrated by this remark: 
“They just take the material the people of Pemex give them, then they process it into a nice 
presentation to give back as the deliverables established in the services contract.” They saw 
the consultants’ intervention as being positive in terms of diagnosis, but felt that their role 
had not been enough.
The oil workers also objected that the diagnosis by the consultants told them what to do, but 
not how to carry out the proposals50. The dilemma the authorities faced was that they knew 
something had to be done, but not who could make it happen. Insiders who knew and 
understood the complexity of the organization belonged to groups with vested interests; 
outsiders were identified with the goal of providing efficiency but could not grasp the 
complexities and peculiarities of the organization. The policies and methods recommended 
by consultants therefore had little effect in promoting change; the status quo prevailed when 
they left the organization or, worse, their proposals were just not appropriate to Pemex’s 
peculiarities. Managers had taken the opportunity for hiring the services of consultants in the 
hope of improving the organization’s efficiency. However, the oil workers knew for certain 
that sooner or later the consultants would leave, because it was the current administration that 
hired them and so they were expected to stay in Pemex for this Presidential period at the 
most.
A top manager with a long career in the company said that during this period the senior 
managerial co-ordination units increased from 69 to 121. There was open confrontation 
between the oil workers and the new management team, arising from a clash of values 
between the groups; this was explored in section 4.3 about organizational culture. The Union 
publicly criticized the privileges and high salaries of the new staff and the lack of
50 Across the organization the oil workers share a joke about an ill man who, being desperate about feeling 
miserable for a long period of time, decides to pay the expensive fees of the most respected medical doctor. 
After a long interview and a detailed inspection, the expert tells him. “Good, I know what your problem is and 
what you need to do to solve it. Your problem is being human, all you have to do is to become a dog.” The 
patient asks back, “Well doctor that is fine, but how do I become a dog?”. In reply, the practitioner says that his 
job is diagnosis and prescribing the treatment, but it is up to the patient to find the way to carry it out.
137
maintenance of the technical facilities of the company. In November 1984, a massive gas 
explosion in Pemex installations in San Juan Ixhuatepec, a suburban area of Mexico City, had 
a high human toll. The Union insisted that the authorities were responsible for neglecting the 
maintenance of industrial sites.
Relations between the Union and the authorities kept deteriorating. The company had 
various minor industrial accidents, for which the company’s authorities and the Union 
blamed each other. These events were widely publicized by the media. In 1985, in order to 
smooth relations, the President changed the General Director by appointing Francisco Rojas, 
previously the Minister of Comptrollership. The political signal of the change was clear; it 
was aimed at enforcing stronger auditing and control while avoiding open confrontation. The 
new General Director was able to solve problems by granting important concessions.
6.3.2 1988-1993 Administration
In 1988, when Carlos Salinas became President of Mexico, Francisco Rojas was retained as 
General Director of Pemex. Although Rojas had brought his own team, most of Beteta’s 
team stayed in the company. Among them was the strategist Adrian Lajous, who was named 
Under-Director for Operations. The authorities continued to undertake efforts to improve 
efficiency and to transform the organization into a competitive and modem oil company. The 
Union was kept under control; in the words of Rojas: “The government recovered the control 
of the company from the hands of the Union.” This was a prerequisite to carrying out further 
changes in the organization to promote efficiency. The size of the company workforce was a 
major problem. It was overstaffed by international standards, and the company announced a 
big redundancy programme that cut the number of workers by almost 40 per cent.
The organizational structure was still centralized and organized by functions. In 1990, the 
company undertook a restructuring that created Divisions specializing in specific business 
lines, as shown in figure 6.2. The goal was to decentralize functions and decision making 
(Sanchez and Bardacke 1992). The key idea of the project, led by consultants, to achieve this 
was to create cost centres; these would allow the economic evaluation of the operations and 
enable work to be done by projects within a flatter organizational structure. The reduction of 
hierarchical levels was achieved mainly in the operational areas.
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Figure 6.2: Organizational Structure of Pemex in 1990
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The main change of this reorganization of Pemex was the creation of the Under-direction of 
Petrochemicals and Gas. This business line was an important definition from a political 
viewpoint, as it created an economic space in the oil industry within which private capital 
could participate in accordance with the regulations of the National Constitution. To avoid 
public confrontation, Pemex managers explicitly advised officially that the reorganization did 
not threaten national sovereignty and that “nationalism was not incompatible with efficiency 
but, on the contrary, it demanded it” stated Francisco Rojas ex-General Director of Pemex 
during an interview The duty of the government was to do the best for the company for the 
sake of the nation; he recalled that the official slogan was: “Do more with less and do it 
better.” The company’s price policy became more flexible to reflect the market conditions. 
Although its operational costs decreased, Pemex’s financial difficulties persisted because of
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the heavy fiscal burden. The reorganization was later accompanied by further redundancy of 
its workforce.
The authorities kept insisting that the company was to remain state-owned but its operation 
would be carried out efficiently. The official mission read: “Pemex has to achieve excellence 
in entrepreneurial abilities in line with international standards.” The company also tried to 
improve its public image regarding environment protection and industrial security. In labour 
affairs, the authorities had a peaceful, but not easy, relation with the new Union leaders, as 
was expressed by the General Director of that time in an interview. The company maintained 
that the fringe benefits of the oil workers were to be respected, but favouritism or blackmail 
by Union leaders should not bias the decisions in granting these privileges to particular 
workers.
6.3.3 Pemex’s Split
All the reorganization efforts undertaken between 1982 and 1992 had tried to transform the 
company from its original functional structure to a business-line orientation, with the 
intention of introduce the market rationale in its operations. The clash of cultures between 
the oil workers and the market-oriented white collar staff diluted the efforts of change. A top 
manager said that it was felt that something more dramatic had to be done, but the political 
viability of doing that was questioned. Then, in April 1992, there was a terrible explosion of 
the sewage system in an area near some Pemex installations in Guadalajara, the second 
biggest city of Mexico. Thousands of people died in the accident and more than 9 km of 
streets were destroyed.
The origins of the accident were extremely complex, arising from the confluence of many 
factors, including a petroleum spill, the presence of industrial waste products, human errors, 
and negligence. Pemex was identified by the media as being the major responsible agent, 
because of its publicly known inefficiency, lack of proper maintenance of the installations, 
slackness in complying with industrial safety regulations, and red tape. The government 
realized that a major response was needed to pacify the public indignation. The organic51
51 Ley Organica de Petrdleos Mexicanos y  Organzmos Subsidiarios was published July 15, 1992, officially 
creating a new corporate group and four subsidiaries.
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Law of Pemex was published in July 1992 and the newly restructured operations52 started 
functioning in January 1993.
Figure 6.3 illustrates how this reorganization split Pemex into a corporate group and four 
main subsidiaries (Secretaria de Energia 1992) (Mexicanos 1993a):
• Pemex Exploration y Production for exploration and production;
• Pemex Reflnacion for oil refining;
• Pemex Gas y  Petroquimica Basica for gas and primary petrochemicals; and
• Pemex Petroquimica Secundaria for secondary petrochemicals.
Figure 6.3: Organizational Structure of Pemex in 1992
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52 In Pemex, the new companies were called ‘organisms’.
53 As explained in Chapter 5, the Mexican Constitution established a legal framework in which all oil sectors 
involving ‘primary’ petrochemical products had to stay state owned due to their strategic nature. In terms of the 
activities of Pemex’s subsidiaries, primary petrochemicals include gas, gasoline, ethane, and sulphur; while by­
products of methane, ethane, aromathics, and propylene are examples of secondary petrochemicals.
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The political character of the manner in which Pemex was split can be seen both at national 
and organizational levels. Nationally, the neo-liberal governments that headed the public 
administration during that period had the privatization of state-owned companies as their 
major economic policy goal. Most public enterprises had been sold, except for the electricity 
and oil industries. Article No. 27 of the Constitution of Mexico stated that activities related 
to oil production were exclusively activities of the state. In 1992, the government amended 
this article to restrict this condition to basic oil activities. The new definition of the law 
allowed the participation of private investment in oil and gas distribution activities and in 
certain areas of the petrochemical industry. The split of Pemex created enterprises that could 
be legally privatized.
In the organizational dimension, the political character of change was reflected in the opinion 
expressed by a top financial manager in an interview: the aim of introducing evaluation based 
primarily on economic rationality to all activities of the company could be achieved only by 
reducing of the number of employees the enterprise. Control and supervision became 
officially the key aspects of the public management of the organization. This major 
restructuring process had the goal of changing Pemex into an organic type of company, with 
a flexible structure and the capacity to respond and adapt to changes in the environment.
A top manager involved with planning activities stated that this attempt at change had tried to 
develop a flatter organizational structures and give the power of decision making to the point 
nearest the relevant operations. The dramatic splitting of Pemex into subsidiaries sought to 
be a once-and-for-all change in the way the company operated. In its transformation into a 
global company, Pemex was meant to leave behind its bureaucratic form (Albrow 1979), 
characterized by having a large hierarchical structure with very specialized units and lots of 
red tape.
The goals of the restructuring as stated in an official document (Mexicanos. 1992a) 
(Mexicanos. 1992b) were to:
• redefine the functional aims of the company, away from focusing on volume goals, 
self-sufficiency, and vertical integration to targeting the long-term maximization of 
economic value;
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• give authority and responsibility to senior managerial levels for the economic results 
of the company, with true management autonomy for the exploitation of oil deposits;
• fulfil responsibly the commitment that the company has towards the government, its 
workers, and the society within the legal framework (keeping state ownership of 
strategic oil resources); and
• develop flexible management structures that could drive organizational change and 
take advantage of it, by modernizing Pemex in accordance to the international model 
of an integrated global oil company.
The split was announced officially to the media before most of the oil workers were directly 
informed. A ‘transition committee’ led by Adrian Lajous54 was formed by the experts of 
Pemex and a consultancy company, Mackenzie also without any consultation with the oil 
workers. This committee, which was called COLIBRI55, defined a master plan for the split 
which was carried out through nine functionally defined technical committees. These 
technical committees worked together to manage the logistics of dividing up the company, 
with their work being integrated by managers of each area of expertise and members of 
COLIBRI.
As described in interviews for this study, on the day of the official announcement of the split, 
some of the top managers of Pemex received an early-morning telephone call at their homes 
to inform them that they had been designated members of special groups to allocate the 
resources of the old Pemex. This was the first news they had about the split and their role in 
the committees charged with the allocation of Pemex’s assets among the newly created 
enterprises. The committees defined how to distribute the resources, commitments, and 
responsibilities. They dealt with a vast number of issues, such as: assets; human resources; 
financial commitments with contractors; projects under development; financial accounts; 
invoices; budget allocations; debts; fiscal duties; information technology equipment; 
corporate data; industrial production facilities; distribution infrastructure; pipelines; legal 
affairs; office space; and procedures to deal with the transfer of products and services 
between subsidiaries. This was a difficult task to perform, particularly given the huge size of 
the company and way its facilities were spread throughout the country, as illustrated in figure
54 In many of the interviews, oil workers identify Adrian Lajous as the key strategist of the process of 
organizational change at Pemex.
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6.4. To meet this widely dispersed need, medical services, telecommunications, schools, 
aircrafts, and natural gas distribution facilities were also organized as subsidiaries. These 
services were previous part of the vertically integrated enterprise.
Figure 6.4: Pemex Production and Distribution Centres
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The transition was carried out in two steps, according to a manager who participated in the
transition process:
1. De-concentration: This preparatory step before the actual physical allocation of the
resources to the subsidiary was meant to assure continuity of operations and
fulfilment of all legal requirements.
2. Decentralization: This involved the actual work of transferring the responsibility and
delivery of assets and resources to the new legal entities and their managements.
55 The word colibri means hummingbird.
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In all interviews with the personnel that participated in these committees, work meetings 
were described as open battles in which everybody tried to obtain as much as possible of the 
available physical space, human resources, and responsibilities for the areas to which they 
had been assigned in the new organizational structure. Implementing the split was 
recognized as a difficult task, but the hierarchical culture of the company encouraged the 
carrying out of orders; as one top technical manager noted: “it had to be done and so it was 
done”. It was taken for granted within the culture of the organization that any order was 
feasible as long as it was not openly rejected; as one interviewee explained, the authorities’ 
mental framework was that, “the people who do the job and know what needs to be done 
would reject only an order that they truly considered to be an absolutely impossible task”. 
Others who were interviewed for the study said that when they received difficult orders they 
did their best, concentrating on areas in which they considered they could actually obtain 
results and allowing social inertia to take care of the rest.
As the company had to become manageable quickly, no time could be wasted by hesitating to 
consider the costs involved in fulfilling this goal -  the political moment could not be 
repeated. The various attempts at reorganization that had been undertaken throughout the 
history of Pemex had demonstrated the capacity of its employees to execute orders. They 
believed chaos would be prevented as long as middle managers were not removed.
The ongoing process of the split was implemented through careful negotiations inside and 
outside the company. Some top-level managers considered that if the authorities had 
formally planned the change, it would have never been achieved due to the complexity of the 
process of allocating resources among the different groups. A senior technical manager 
considered that the specific circumstances of this historic moment helped to overcome the 
political difficulties that otherwise would have halted the process. As the restructuring had a 
paramount political dimension, the need to achieve its goals allowed no room for doubt. 
Problems were therefore solved as they appeared, through a pragmatic approach; the ultimate 
goal was to keep the operations running. Within this context, the impact and the cost of the 
split on the information systems of the company were outside the main agenda, at least in the 
short-term.
According to an official document, (Administration. 1994) the corporate office was 
responsible for the definition of general policies, regulations, operations, and technical
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standards56 for the whole group. Both financial resources and treasury management were 
kept as activities centrally controlled by the Finance Division of the corporate group, which 
was the only legal entity that could borrow and allocate financial resources. The corporate 
group remained responsible for defining human resources and information systems policies. 
It had the formal power to define regulations, but no real way to enforce them. The view 
within the subsidiaries, as expressed by several managers, was that the corporate group has 
no real function. The subsidiaries considered that if their performance was going to be 
evaluated, then they should define the policies themselves. Their position was supported by 
the principle of the restructuring process that promoted autonomy of decision making at the 
point of operations.
All the revenues generated by the subsidiaries were sent directly to the government Treasury, 
and the resources needed by the subsidiaries for their operations were allocated to them 
through the Federal Budget.57 Defining the budget is a very arduous process of negotiations 
with various periods of definitions during the year. The level of income of the government, 
which was highly dependent on oil export revenues, determined the resources available for 
Pemex’s budget. The most important variables in determining the oil revenues were the 
international oil price and the company’s oil production. The value of oil production 
depended on the budget that the Pemex Exploration y Production company allocated to its 
investment programme to develop and maintain its production facilities and to undertake 
exploration activities.
By the beginning of each fiscal year on January 1, the subsidiaries did not have precise 
definitions of the financial resources they would be receiving; planning their expenditure was 
a difficult task that had to be defined and redefined in parallel with the definition and
CO
redefinition of the national budget . Sometimes, the subsidiaries received final budget 
allocations towards the end of the fiscal year. They then had to spend those budget 
allocations before New Year’s Eve -  or else unspent funds had to be returned to the National 
Treasury Internally, the subsidiaries had to be able to accommodate these budget changes in 
their spending and investment programmes. At the same time, every project had to go
56 In Pemex, these responsibilities are described as normatividad, a noun derived from the word ‘norm’ that 
implies a high-level definition of these activities (regulations).
57 Pemex’s general budget still has to be approved by the National Congress.
58 This is the situation that all government agencies face in Mexico.
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through a very difficult process of internal approval. When the project was eventually 
approved, the contract had to be put out to public tender, which could be offered to national 
or international bidding. The bids from private companies were evaluated using technical 
and economic criteria.
A middle manager stated that the process of putting a project out to tender could, in the best 
conditions, take at least two months. In this process, scrutiny was the main concern; a 
mistake, ambiguity, or bad practice could cost the employee his job. There was a feeling of 
surveillance that arose from the actions of the Ministry of Comptrollership and the local 
auditors. When revising the rules of a public tender, the employees tried to ensure that the 
tender fulfilled legal requirements and did not represent any personal risk of liability to those 
originating it. The technical responsibility for procurement resided within the area requiring 
the goods or services. In the case of information technology, the technical requirements were 
usually defined solely in terms of equipment benchmarking59.
The procurement procedures made the decision-making process very inflexible. Once the 
resources were allocated to a project, they could not be removed -  even if changes in the 
environment made such a project inappropriate. The financial resources allocated to the 
subsidiaries and not spent within the fiscal year were returned to the National Treasury. In 
interviews for the study, managers stated that the authorities considered this meant “losing 
the financial resources”. To defend the adequacy of the procedure for launching a public 
tender for procurement or acquisition of services, the central government authorities argued 
that transparency was the first concern in public spending policy as corruption had to be 
avoided. Pemex management had striven, but failed, to gain more flexibility in decision 
making in financial matters and project development procedures, in order to leave space to 
accommodate contingencies.
After the split, each subsidiary company defined its organizational structure and management 
strategy following a predefined model, using the advice of consultants. The organizational 
structures of the new company were modelled on the ideal of rational functionality. The 
activities of planning, professional development, industrial security, and environmental 
protection were central to the new management rationale. Nevertheless, some interviewees
59 The researcher had the opportunity to witness one of these processes.
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indicated that in reality the new organizational structures were developed to accommodate the 
number of staff at senior levels -  ‘the generals’ -  that were to stay in the subsidiaries. The 
structure was also adapted to accommodate: the political commitments of the country’s 
President and Pemex’s General Director; the structure of power of the old company’s 
employees (mainly those who endorsed technical legitimacy); and the interests of the group 
leading the process of change.
The President appointed the first directors of the four subsidiaries. For Pemex Gas y  
Petroquimica Basica, an academic with a PhD in Economics who had no managerial 
experience was chosen. The General Director of Petroquimica Secundaria was a member of 
Adrian Lajous’ group who had participated in the whole process of modernization of Pemex. 
For Pemex Refinacion, an engineer identified with the reorganization was appointed. And at 
Pemex Exploracion y  Produccion, the oil professionals who kept political power through 
their technical expertise were able to negotiate the General Directorship for a member of their 
group.
The organizational structure of each subsidiary included an auditor post at a very senior level 
to supervise the operations; they were appointed by the General Director of the corporate 
Pemex group. The documents prepared for the process of transition included organizational 
charts of the subsidiaries that specified both the title of the post and the name of the person 
appointed to it. The function and responsibilities of each post were predefined. However, as 
several interviewees stated, in reality every manager fought to keep as many responsibilities 
within his function as he could, and ultimately every area tried to defend its space of power.
The new subsidiaries inherited features of the original company, even though they also 
started to develop their own specific features. The character of the original Pemex that arose 
from being a state-owned company prevailed, as did the cultural values of the oil workers. 
These new organizations did not follow the rationale of the market economy; their goals were 
different: profit could not be their raison d ’etre despite their striving for efficiency and 
following of the model of what a global company should be like. Each subsidiary defined its 
strategic business plan with the help of the same consultancy company (Mackenzie), that 
participated in the restructuring process and which had been employed by Pemex since 1982. 
These documents were considered highly confidential, and only top managers received 
personalized numbered copies of them.
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Each subsidiary undertook further restructuring. The common goal in all these efforts was to 
provide accountability for their operations through the development of cost centres. 
Collecting data for this goal came to be a major challenge in an organization with no tradition 
of this type of accountability, as it meant not only the collection of a new type of data but also 
a radical cultural transformation. The consideration of costs had always been outside the 
organization’s traditional way of operating, which had aimed only at producing the levels of 
output determined by the central government. The challenge also implied trying to train 
employees in the methods of analysis, evaluation, and use of the information.
When the legal split was completed, each subsidiary faced the enormous further challenge of 
keeping the continuity of the operations and the flow of data in the fragmented structure. The 
committee of transition made arrangements for foreseeable major discontinuities. But it was 
only when the split was officially formalized that the managers faced the need to keep 
operations and flows of information acceptable in situations where all definitions of the links 
required in the new conditions were not yet established. In the opinion of a member of the 
transition committee, invoicing was the major difficulty to overcome. This function in the 
old centralized organization had created major problems that meant it was consistently unable 
to control these operations effectively. The split made things worse at first; it was difficult to 
to agree definitions of the precise volume of products exchanged among subsidiaries.
The splitting up of Pemex resulted in the subsidiaries becoming legal owners of certain parts 
of the original company’s infrastructure; but some parts of the installations and equipment 
owned by only one subsidiary were still needed by others. The authorities had to negotiate 
the levels of the fees charged for the services provided between them and for the use of 
infrastructure. For example, the distribution facilities at the sea terminal of Pajaritos, 
Veracruz that was allocated to the infrastructure of Pemex Exploration y  Production was 
also needed by Pemex Refinacion for its operations; and a gas plant located within the 
installations of Pemex Petroquimica Secundaria was operated by Pemex Gas y  Petroquimica 
Basica. The distribution of the infrastructure among the subsidiaries was a major operational 
challenge in the new organizational structure. These economic and political negotiations 
among the subsidiaries were very sensitive in terms of determining their financial results.
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Within the new organizational structure, each subsidiary faced different conditions. In each, 
the internal power groups were accommodated differently. The challenges they faced were 
also different, depending on how the changes in the definitions of the energy policy of the 
central government affected the environment in which they had to operate.
6.3.4 The Administration since 1994
In December 1994, Ernesto Zedillo became president of Mexico. He appointed Ruiz 
Sacristan as General Director of Pemex, but shortly after the president’s first month in power 
an economic crisis undermined Mexico’s financial stability. There was a cabinet reshuffle 
and a new General Director of the corporate group of Pemex was appointed: Adrian Lajous, 
who had been the strategist since 1982 behind the organizational change efforts to modernize 
the company. The new General Directors of the subsidiaries were members of Adrian 
Lajous’ group and were totally committed to the aim of organizational change.
6.3.4.1 Pemex Exploration y Production
Lajous appointed an oil engineer totally identified with the new administration’s goals as the 
General Director of Pemex Exploracion y Produccion. Although this showed that the oil 
professionals still had technical legitimacy in this subsidiary, these professionals did not 
consider him as ‘one of them’. Pemex Exploracion y Produccion received special attention 
due to the strategic character of its business and because the government Treasury was 
heavily dependant on the revenues from its oil exports. This subsidiary is examined in detail 
here because of its importance and the way it typified the overall approach during Lajous’ 
administration and subsequent developments at Pemex.
The structure of this subsidiary (see figure 6.5) was initially organized by business lines that 
mirrored the structure of the previous company, but was aligned to the concept of creating 
cost centres and leaving just the core activities within the company. The subsidiary was 
organized into three levels: Mexico City headquarters, Regional Offices, and Districts. Three 
districts were aligned with the production areas: North, South, and Marine. The latter 
comprised more than 70% of the whole oil production of the company. The functional 
structure of the headquarters was replicated at the regional and district levels, with the 
administrative functions kept mainly at the regional level.
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Figure 6.5: Organizational Structure of Pemex Exploracion y  Produccion in 1994
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This type of organizational structure implied that the operational areas had two dependencies, 
as shown in figure 6.6: lineal by hierarchical level corresponding to the organizational chart; 
and functional by technical area. Such a situation created problems in terms of flows of 
information and the duplication of chains of command, which were not necessarily 
synchronized and consistent. Planning was done by concentrating on the operation of the 
functional area, not on specific goals of the projects. The senior levels of the organization at 
headquarters and regional levels interfered in the decision making of the operations 
performed in the districts.
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Figure 6.6: Functional Structure of Pemex Exploracion y  Produccion in 1996
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Pemex Exploracion y  Produccion undertook a major effort to decentralize its headquarters to 
the city of Villahermosa, Tabasco in the area of production in the southeast of Mexico. The 
project was initiated and the personnel were appointed for transfer without consultation, 
several interviewees noted. The President stopped the process some months later and the 
company was left with two headquarters, one in Mexico City and the other in Villahermosa. 
Top managers had to make frequent two-hour flights between them, as often as twice a week, 
to deal with their business in both headquarters.
Some interviewees suggested that the efforts to decentralize were difficult to carry out 
because being away from Mexico City was seen as losing political presence in the 
organization. There was a saying in the local political culture: “In order to be in the 
photograph, you should not move, and should be with the right group at the right moment.” 
Most of the senior managerial levels of Pemex spent their lunch and dinner times socializing 
with other members of the organization or of the public services, in a ‘restauranting’ activity 
similar to lobbying. Through such restauranting, they could sense trends and movements 
among the political groups, and make their personal alignments accordingly.
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Pemex Exploracion y  Produccion undertook other organizational restructuring and cultural 
management projects in the guise of Total Quality Management. Some of the interviewees 
said they had been in the middle of many projects that had never been completed, and 
expressed their lack of confidence in the merit of all these efforts to change the organization. 
They also mentioned a feeling of not having been considered in all the processes and that the 
authorities did not value their technical expertise or their working experience in the 
organization.
In 1995, this subsidiary defined a new Business Plan with the advice of Mackenzie an 
American consultancy company. This restructuring project had been monitored personally 
by the General Director of the corporate group. It implied a major reorganization that left in 
the core structure only the areas directly linked with its two business lines of production and 
exploration. The rest of the technical areas were organized as cost centres in separate units 
which, as indicated earlier, could allow the eventual creation of service companies that could 
be privatized. Such organizational changes also complied with the modified content of 
Article 27 of the Constitution that stated all oil resources are national assets.
The company was reorganized into three geographical levels: headquarters; region; and 
assets60, which were new organizational entities that worked through projects with 
multidisciplinary work teams. The official headquarters’ functions were: regulation; strategic 
planning; professional development and technological assimilation; corporate systems 
development; and data consolidation at national level.
The regions were split in four: north, south, marine southwest, and marine northeast (see 
figure 6.7). Marine northeast still covered around 50% of the whole production because it 
comprised the most productive offshore oil deposits. The regions’ functions were to 
consolidate data for their area and co-ordinate their own operations and resources. The 
regions were integrated by assets, as indicated in figure 6.7. and its activities were organized 
as strategic units or as service centres.
60 The rigs are considered as another asset of the company; that is why the basic unit of organizational structure 
changed from district to asset.
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Figure 6.7: Organizational Structure of Pemex Exploracion y  Produccion in 1996
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The assets were of two types: exploration and production. Their functions were the planning 
and operation of technical activity and the control and operation of administrative work. 
Figure 6.8 shows the conceptual structure that the leader of an asset had of the organization 
of the activities within it.
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Figure 6.8: Functional Diagram of an Asset in Pemex Exploracion y  Produccion
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As described by a top manager, the project of reorganizing Pemex Exploracion y  Produccion 
had been done on a pilot basis in marine northeast, as it is the most productive offshore 
production region. The importance of this region gives it a privileged position in the 
company in terms of availability of resources and information technology infrastructure. 
Some interviewees suggested that it had facilities similar to that of the standard model of a 
global company. The change process was carried out through work teams, with participation 
of both oil workers and experts from Mackenzie. The oil worker who was the leader for the 
process of change in that region was highly respected and charismatic; he was an oil 
professional with many years of experience in the company and truly believed that the 
process was feasible and worth the effort. The process was undertaken through negotiations.
The consultants who worked in this area commented that they had “learned over time that, in 
order to be effective in promoting organizational change, we had to work shoulder to 
shoulder with the oil workers”. The reorganization included moving the office location of the
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regional staff to a new part of the building. This had an open-plan layout, which aimed to 
promote co-operation at work, the free flow of information, and shared decision making. 
During meetings about the change, many of the definitions of the organizational change had 
to be ‘grounded’ because the distribution of functions as defined in the strategic plan was 
highly ambiguous when considering the actual allocation of authority and responsibility to 
the managers who were doing the job.
The oil workers interviewed said they had raised doubts about the feasibility of changing 
their hierarchical culture in a variety of ways, such as at meetings, by the new open layout 
style of the offices, and through posters with slogans. They also stated that they did not know 
if their bosses would ultimately accept the loss of power that the new arrangements implied, 
or how people trained to obey orders without challenging them would dare to give opinions 
to their bosses if that could imply contradicting them, a behaviour unacceptable to the oil 
workers’ code of conduct. The workers doubted that just taking some training courses could 
alter the authoritarian personality of some bosses, who had strong technical legitimacy and 
were accustomed to the old hierarchical managerial style. Some oil workers interviewed 
were also suspicious about the permanence of both the group that was promoting the 
organizational change and of the change itself once the consultants left the organization.
The groups of oil workers and consultants involved in the change process at Pemex 
Exploracion y  Produccion had long meetings to redefine the responsibilities of the different 
levels of the organization: Mexico City headquarters; regional offices; and the assets, the 
actual cost centres of production. The problem between the managements of the corporate 
group and the subsidiaries was replicated at this level, as personnel in the regional areas of 
operation considered that the Mexico City headquarters were not needed. For them, the 
headquarters were for managers who gave orders without understanding their effects on 
operations, and the regional staff were suspicious that this situation would prevail even in the 
new organizational structure. The only people who knew what was happening were those 
involved in the pilot project. In the rest of the organization, a considerable flow of informal 
information about the process of change was transmitted on the radio pasillo, but no official 
announcements were made -  a situation that some found quite unsettling.
The organizational change at the operational level required a very dramatic redefinition of the 
way operations were carried out. Top managers recognized, even at meetings, that a change
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of culture was needed. The whole organizational transformation was aimed at subordinating 
decision making at operational levels to a technical rationale. The idea was that all activities 
carried around the operations of an oil deposit would be organized by projects, each with a 
leader heading a multidisciplinary team. The changes all implied that workers’ remuneration 
would relate in future to their responsibilities and operational results. Some of the 
interviewees felt this change would culminate in challenging the salary and professional 
rewards policy of the company as it would not be in line with government revenue policy. 
The new organizational entity was sketched with no defined layers of hierarchy, but as a 
cluster of multidisciplinary experts.
The strategy of change for the whole subsidiary implied that once the pilot project of change 
was implemented in the first region, the process and arrangements would be replicated in the 
other three production regions of the company. The process implied a redefinition of 
responsibilities and a reallocation of resources similar to the initial split of the company, but 
on a smaller scale. The second region to start the process was marine southwest, but it did 
not wait for the completion of the pilot project. The consultants involved said that during the 
negotiations undertaken to carry out the change in this region, sometimes the most radical 
positions came from oil workers. This process was under way at the time the research 
fieldwork for this thesis was coming to an end in 1997.
6.3.4.2 Other subsidiaries
The subsidiary Pemex Gas y Petroquimica Basica had to face external competition. This 
meant a dramatic change in the conditions of this sector, which had always been a public 
monopoly. Its first General Director made a dramatic change in the communication policy of 
the company. He organized a campaign to promote open discussion of the content of the 
strategic business plan so as to gain the commitment of all employees to the implementation 
of the strategy. The subsidiary would face competition in distribution, and gas prices were to 
be determined in accordance with international markets, mainly that of the American East 
Coast.
Pemex Rejinacion is the subsidiary with the lowest profit rates. It also inherited the strong 
organizational culture of the oil workers and faced problems caused by a lack of proper 
maintenance of its installations. The fourth subsidiary, Pemex Petroquimica Secundaria, had
157
put many of its petrochemical plants out to tender, but this process provoked a political 
reaction; the privatization of these assets has not been achieved and has faced conflict from 
the opposition parties who regarded it as a loss of sovereignty.
6.3.4.3 Reactions to the Splitting Up of Pemex
There were mixed feelings from oil workers regarding all these organizational changes. 
Some considered that they had gone too far and that the benefits did not match the costs, 
including suggestions that the efforts were just irrelevant. For them, everything had changed 
to remain the same (“it is just a matter of new titles for the old practices”) and the privileges 
of one group have simply been transferred to another. There was also a sense that the 
authorities did not recognize the titanic effort they had undertaken in coping with all the 
changes. Others with a cynical attitude believe that it is just a matter of survival by tolerating 
the current regime with its fashions and fads for a time, until a new administration comes to 
power with its own programme.
In the interviews, it was suggested that the company had given too much authority and 
information to consultants, who were outsiders that could not fully understand the 
organization. Some regarded this as a loss of sovereignty. Senior management was 
concerned that the changes had affected national industries negatively, because Mexican 
companies were not prepared to respond to changes in the way contracts were now tendered. 
Some oil workers had the feeling that the changes brought in by outsiders were alien, and had 
a lack of sense of the local conditions.
Some interviewees expressed the view that managers followed orders to carry out the various 
change projects even when they were not necessarily convinced of their adequacy; but they 
had no choice if they wanted to keep their jobs. An interviewee suggested that even when the 
personnel of the organization fulfilled instructions related to the process of change in a 
passionate way, their compliance did not necessarily mean agreement with the order they 
were executing; instead, they were ‘showing off as followers of the process of change while 
actually allowing organizational inertia to continue. For them, the change process was just 
another ‘text book exercise’ of the group temporarily in power.
158
Many employees found the process of downsizing very traumatic. They were demoralized by 
a real feeling of uncertainty about the near future: “they feel they can be fired at any 
moment,” according to an interviewee. There was also concern that the company had lost its 
store of knowledge with the massive redundancies of staff, especially in the information 
technology areas where specialists with a lot of experience in the development and 
implementation of the corporate systems were laid off. It was said that this would cause an 
enormous dependency on consultants in the future.
There were problems common to all subsidiaries, such as the lack of structured flows of 
information from the operational area. All the companies had a shortage of automatic 
measuring instruments and their installation represented, in all cases, major new investments. 
None of the subsidiaries had a reliable inventory with consolidated values for its assets. This 
represented a major political problem due to its impact on assessing the level of profit, which 
was the basis for taxing revenues. A top financial manager recognized that the subsidiaries 
did not have adequate accounting standards; they had inherited a problem of the accounting 
records, and the fact that standards used in the past were not suitable for the new conditions 
of operation in the subsidiaries. In addition, the subsidiaries inherited the problems of risk 
management and insurance claims relating to the inadequacy of the records of this type of 
data. The ‘old Pemex’, as it came to be called in the subsidiaries, had negotiated global 
insurance for its equipment and infrastructure; but accidents were always related to specific 
premises, for which records were often difficult to identify accurately.
6.4 In fo r m a t io n  Sy stem s
6.4.1 Background to Information System Changes in the Second Period
An important factor in the process of reorganization was providing the company with 
integrated information systems based on the use of much information technology. 
Traditionally, the operations of Pemex were carried out mostly through disconnected flows of 
information that followed local arrangements in each work centre, as shown in Figure 6.9. 
The situation of having various styles of data collection went back to the time of the oil 
expropriation in 1938, when 17 private companies with different administrative styles were 
integrated into the state-owned enterprise that became Pemex (Garcia Hernandez 1971). As 
described by some interviewees, the first formal information systems that were developed
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were mainly for administrative purposes. The payroll started to be automated in the late 
1960s, but each production centre developed its own proprietary system using the mainframe 
technology available at that time. The rest of the information systems were primarily manual. 
These had a strong reputation for tortuous bureaucratic procedures and much red tape; they 
were managed with a high degree of discretion by local management in defining procedures 
and the meanings associated with the data collected.
Figure 6.9: Model of Information Flows at Pemex until 1992
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A top financial manager said that the flows of information in Pemex until 1992 had a 
particular feature: financial data did not reflect the conditions of the operations as there was 
no structured link between information flows of the operations and the administrative 
functions. The different financial functions, like accounting and treasury, were created as 
separate units in the organization as they were needed, along with the general development of 
the company; they were not linked to the technical functions. Each geographic area 
developed its particular way of collecting and processing data, which was changed whenever 
the local authorities demanded -  without prior notice to other areas. Control over the 
information became the main source of personal power, creating the feudal structure that was 
the main characteristic of the organization until recently. Those fiefdoms proved extremely 
difficult to break down with the development of computer-based information systems.
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To structure the description of the development of information systems in Pemex, the 
researcher identified four types of systems: administrative, technical, expert, and strategic. 
The administrative, strategic, and expert systems were heavily automated, while the technical 
systems that dealt with recording large volumes of operational data were basically manual ad 
hoc arrangements defined at the plant level. The expert systems were linked to sophisticated 
mathematical formulae required for calculations of the plants’ projects. The organization 
also had a unit that specialized in geographic information systems using state-of-the-art 
technology. The systems were for internal use with very a restrictive access policy, because 
they were considered highly confidential by the area managers. The development of these 
expert systems is not part of this research.
By the early 1980s, Pemex’s management began to view information technology as an 
enabler of modernization closely linked to the idea of strategic planning and control, as well 
as being seen as an end in itself. At this stage, certain projects looked like ‘solutions looking 
for a problem’, and information technology was being technically driven from an engineering 
perspective. The organization did not want to get left behind the ‘technological band wagon’.
The following sections examine how information technology was actually deployed in the 
information systems developed at Pemex in the second period studied, from 1982.
6.4.2 1982-1991: Introducing Open Systems and Corporate Financial Systems
Information systems development at Pemex at the start of the second period saw the 
emergence of two main policies: the definition of an ‘open systems’ technical standard 
designed to facilitate a move from mainframes to mini and microcomputers; and the creation 
of plans for corporate systems, known as sistemas institucionales, to standardize the 
company’s financial systems. These policies were developed and co-ordinated by the 
Gerencia de Informatica, which had been formed in the late 1970s to be responsible for 
computer-based systems and which went through a number of reorganizations after 1982
Another characteristic that originated in the second period was the growing participation of 
consultants in organizational and information systems developments in Pemex. According to 
a top information technology manager at Pemex, the company tried to bring in new ideas and 
styles to the organization based on the state of the art in information technology and
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management practice; but, as one oil worker remarked, these related to “the ideal world, but 
things here in Pemex do not work that way”.
In 1982, the Gerencia de Informatica was relocated from reporting to the Under-Director of 
Finance to come under the General Comptroller. It was also restructured again in 1985 
because, according to an official document (Coordination Ejecutiva de Recursos Humanos 
1985) “there is a need to re-organize the Gerencia de Informatica in order to make it capable 
of responding to the present and future informatics requirements of the organization. The 
area needs to be able to plan and to regulate the informatics resources and to control this 
activity, and its functions have to be distributed in an adequate way.” Two new departments 
were created. One was dedicated to planning the informatics activities of the whole 
company; the other had the responsibility for establishing the general regulations for the 
‘informatics function* of the whole organization. During this process of organizational 
restructuring, some posts were upgraded and some functions were relocated within the 
existing departments. According to the official document, the changes were to be 
implemented that year, but they actually happened much later. This same year 1985 the 
Gerencia de Informatica was again relocated under the Finance Under-directorate, which 
later merged with the General Comptroller’s office. The Gerencia de Informatica kept the 
same number of people, but they were upgraded in terms of salary and status.
By 1982, information systems management was strictly centralized although, as mentioned in 
chapter 5, some local areas operated some of their own systems units covertly. The Gerencia 
de Informatica provided procurement, maintenance, and information technology services 
from its head office in Mexico City. Its systems development activities were related to 
operations organized in three zones: north, central and south. There was no transmission of 
data between machines due to the incompatibility of proprietary technologies and the failure 
of the IBM data transmission project in 1975 (see section 5.1 in Chapter 5) It could have 
been technically possible to transfer data between machines of the same type, but only if they 
had used similar operating systems. However, Pemex had computers from various vendors, 
and even machines of the same type on different sites that used different operating systems. 
Data transfer was done through magnetic tapes, on which data was recorded in the ASCII 
coding standard.
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The mainframes ran batch-processing systems and information was jealously controlled by 
the different areas. In practice, the only system that had some real central supervision and 
control was the payroll; all the others had been developed independently in an ad hoc way. A 
top information technology manager described how, by the early 1980s, the efforts to plan the 
informatics activities still usually ended in meetings where Pemex managers received 
information about the latest IBM deliveries and explanations of how the equipment could be 
used in their work. The Gerencia de Informatica programming was undertaken in 
FORTRAN for technical systems and COBOL for administrative applications.
Even with the existence of computer-based systems, managers usually did not receive timely 
and reliable information for making decisions. The lack of information could not be 
explained solely by technical deficiencies. The source of power in the organizational culture 
had come from controlling the flow of information. Several interviewees agreed that each 
area of the company’s operation autonomously defined all aspects of its information systems, 
regardless of their relationships with others.
In 1982, an accountant who had worked in the National Telephone Company was appointed 
as Under-Director of Finance. He had a high reputation as an expert in telecommunications. 
The researcher interviewed people who worked with him during that period but were no 
longer part of the company. They noted that when this Under-Director of Finance assumed 
the responsibility for the informatics area he realized that the Gerencia de Informatica had 
severe problems, including information systems management and the quality of the 
information available. Accountancy data did not match budget data; they each had very 
different information structures, making the task of data matching almost impossible. Pemex 
had to provide information to the central government for the national accounts, which also 
had a totally different structure.
The financial data of the organization that came from work centres scattered throughout the 
country was centralized in three mainframes. Most of the financial areas of the work centres 
had local computer-based systems, but these did not have an accountancy perspective. There 
was also a problem with the reliability of the data from the areas of operations, particularly in 
relation to information about what was produced and then sold or channelled to other areas of 
the company. As a result, it was almost impossible to make figures match when trying to 
consolidate data among the different areas of the organization.
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The new Under-Director of Finance hired consultants to develop two main projects: the 
international Booz Allen & Hamilton company to carry out the evaluation of the informatics 
function; and Secofin a national consultancy company for the development of the linkage 
between financial (accountancy and budget) and operations data.
The project to link financial and operations data also required the definition of 
responsibilities for the different data flows and organizational entities responsible for 
providing specific data; this proved very difficult, as it required changing the oil workers’ 
mentality so they would accept the need to record data for accountability purposes. The oil 
workers considered that this data was unnecessary, and that it was a waste of time having to 
collect it. They considered such a requirement ultimately to be just red tape.
The interviewees recognized that this project also had to change local practices in regard to 
procedures to record data to achieve general corporate standards in accordance with ‘good 
management practice’. These changes faced political opposition because they broke the 
fortresses of power. Local managers now had to comply with the new rules and standards 
dictated by the central authorities; before, they had been the ones who could define the local 
practices for data collection as well as changing them when they so decided, without 
notifying other areas. The project team faced resistance during the implementation, but 
managed to get the support of the area managers by working hard to convince them that 
gathering high-quality data would help them to take better decisions.
The executive leader of the project had a very clear notion of the complexity of the challenge 
they were facing. His slogan was: “the best is the enemy of the good”; this indicated that any 
progress towards the project’s objective was positive, even if they were unable to reach the 
ideal outcome. The main unresolved problem by the time he left Pemex in 1987 was the 
matching of accountancy and budget data on time. Booz Allen’s analysis of the informatics 
function acknowledged that this could not be fulfilled centrally. It recommended giving 
official recognition to the existence of the other informatics areas that existed throughout the 
organization, as a way of co-ordinating the informatics function of the whole organization. 
As a result, the Gerencia de Informatica was restructured and given the name of Gerencia 
Institucional de Informatica; it kept responsibility for information systems management, but 
only for regulation and not for the operation of systems. The key word of the campaign to
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decentralize the informatics function was ‘regulation’. A middle manager stated that, “within 
the defined standards, every area was given the freedom to develop its own systems, in 
accordance with its needs and preferences”.
Some people involved in software development felt that the diagnosis made by the 
consultants was the same as that done previously by company staff. However, in the 
organizational culture of Pemex, insights from insiders were not taken into account unless 
somebody from outside supported it. For some oil workers, this was a manifestation of the 
national cultural feature of malinchismo that favours aliens over fellow countrymen. Also, 
outsiders’ opinions were taken into account in order to avoid responsibility if there was a 
failure of decision making.
A group of people opposing the head of the central informatics team joined forces with the 
consultants and achieved his removal in 1985. The manager who took over was an engineer 
who had worked for many years in the company, with a strong reputation for having a strong 
and autocratic personal style. This kind of personality suited the circumstances of that time 
because a strong leader with a “hard hand” was needed to put things under control and in 
order, commented a top information technology manager in an interview.
In 1983, Pemex bought a systems development methodology from Arthur Andersen. The 
procedures were described in great detail in seven large volumes of documentation, but 
people involved with software development said in interviews that it did not bring the 
expected benefits. The analysts and programmers did not follow the methodology because, 
as one said, “it was too tortuous and its philosophy did not suit Pemex’s organizational 
culture”. A typical comment from the technical staff interviewed was: “Those methodologies 
usually describe how things should be, but Pemex’s reality is something else”.
Booz Allen’s proposal suggested the creation of two entities: an Informatics Committee as a 
forum to discuss information technology issues; and an organizational unit responsible for 
ordering and regulating the informatics function of the whole organization. The proposal 
specified that the values of this unit should be based on a culture of service. The new 
responsibilities of this unit were planning and standardization. The consultants provided a 
methodology to develop the informatics corporate plan, although some of its aspects did not 
suit Pemex’s working practices. The Gerencia Institucional de Informatica developed the
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corporate informatics plan; it had very detailed technical specifications to regulate the 
procurement of information technology. A technical manager noted that the final report of 
Booz Allen pointed to Andersen’s methodology as a useful tool.
The Informatics Committee was created with representatives of each of the six under­
directorates of the company, together with the manager of the Gerencia Institucional de 
Informatica and a technical secretary, who was an engineer from this same area. The goal of 
the committee, according to an official document, was to “create synergy among the different 
groups, by sharing experiences and knowledge”. The committee ended up being perceived as 
an instrument of manipulation by the autocratic manager of the Gerencia Institucional de 
Informatica. It seemed that this manager defined 90% of the subjects discussed in the 
committee; it existed for three years, until it disappeared because none of its members were 
interested in attending.
The Gerencia Institucional de Informatica was responsible for information systems 
management systems activities, such as the definition of technological standards and the 
maintenance of information consistency. The technological standardization was enforced 
through strict procedures for information technology procurement defined by the central 
government through INEGI61, the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and 
Informatics. The national informatics policy also defined the delivery of an informatics plan 
as a requirement for all government organizations . As described in Chapter 5, the first 
effort to define a Pemex Informatics Plan was carried out by the central authorities using an 
IBM methodology that consisted mainly of standards for the technology and for acquisitions 
procedures; later, Booz Allen brought in its own methodology for the Plan’s development. 
This Plan came to be seen solely as something necessary for the fulfilment of a central 
government bureaucratic requirement, as the content was not actually related to the 
development of the systems in the company. It was during this period that the Gerencia 
Institucional de Informatica created the concept of sistemas institucionales (Institucional 
1992): projects aimed at developing corporate information systems that would standardize 
the main financial functions throughout the company. These institutional systems were
61 The Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica had the responsibility for defining and 
supervising the government’s information technology procurement policy.
62 Reglamento de la Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico (Articulo 100, Fraction 3, Inciso B), published 
September 11, 1996.
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internal to Pemex. Although they were corporate systems, they were not integrated and their 
flows of data were not linked electronically.
6.4.2.1 New informatics strategy
In the definition of technical standards for equipment, the Booz Allen proposal stated that 
Pemex should move towards IBM’s standards. Before this, a section within Gerencia 
Institucional de Informatica dedicated to monitoring the information technology market had 
recommended that Pemex should define UNIX as its technical standard, which challenged 
Booz Allen’s proposal relating to an IBM standard. According to a top information 
technology manager, this proposal was based on market trends rather than technical 
considerations. There was an intense period of discussion among the consultants and senior 
managers of the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica, at the end of which the top manager 
followed his colleagues’ suggestion and Pemex moved to a UNIX environment.
Booz Allen was re-hired to implement its overall recommendations regarding the informatics 
strategy, but using UNIX rather than its IBM proposal. However, the experts interviewed 
said this contract was not performed properly. The consultancy’s senior managers were 
highly trained, but the analysts who came to develop the recommendations did not have the 
skills required. Moreover, they were unable to understand Pemex’s culture sufficiently to 
consider the specific nature of the organization and perceive what was feasible in this 
context, rather than trying to implement an unrealistic ideal system. As a Pemex manager 
said in an interview: “The change from A to Z cannot happen abruptly; it has to be 
implemented in a systematic and incremental way through a strategy with a long 
perspective.”
The consultants’ proposal considered some other aspects of changing the organizational 
structure of the informatics area, the values of the group, and also the type of administration. 
The Gerencia Institucional de Informatica used to deal with the requirements of three 
environments: technical, linked with operations; administrative, related to payroll and other 
financial functions; and computing engineering, dedicated to research and development of 
software for areas of specialized expertise, like calculations for exploration and refining. The 
new organizational structure of the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica highlighted the 
importance that was given to the planning activities, as shown in figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10: Organizational Structure of Gerencia Institucional de Informatica
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Several times during the interviews, senior managers tried to emphasize the effort that the 
managers of the informatics function made to incorporate state-of-the-art information systems 
management into the company. In trying to make sense of their own activity they used a 
variety of concepts and ideas. For instance, they used Nolan’s (1979) ‘stages of growth’ 
model, into which they tried to locate Pemex’s situation and incorporate the activities needed 
to move forward in accordance with the linear progression outlined by the model. They also 
made visits to other organizations to compare the state of their information technology 
development with that of Pemex.
The technical staff showed a sense of deep pride in the information technology development 
of Pemex, mainly in the sophistication of the equipment and the ‘informatics solutions’ they 
were operating in the company. Some of the technical staff interviewed were very suspicious 
of the academic background of the researcher, and kept a vigilant attitude during the 
interviews to avoid failing to live up to expectations they thought “an outsider with certain 
expertise” would have of Pemex’s informatics activities. At higher levels of the hierarchy, 
the section with technical expertise in hardware had a critical view of information systems 
research activities, as if they felt such academic work saw the technology as having only
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limited benefits because this kind of research was “unable to understand things and facts from 
real life”, in the words of a technical expert.
The process of restructuring the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica led to half the staff 
leaving because they did not suit the new conditions, where new type of expertise were 
required. Those that stayed had proficiency in COBOL and FORTRAN programming, and 
new people with appropriate skills were hired. In 1985, the Gerencia Institucional de 
Informatica defined a new informatics strategy for the whole organization. This officially 
conceptualized the institutional systems that were to become the corporate systems, as shown 
in figure 6.11. The institutional financial systems, aimed at linking the flows of information 
about the financial functions throughout the whole organization (Institucional. 1990). They 
wanted to prevent the duplication of data input and reduce the likelihood of mistakes.
Figure 6.11: Conceptual diagram of Pemex’s Corporate Systems
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This strategy considered information technology as an enabler to allow the synchronization 
and integration of the financial activities. Before these systems were developed, treasury 
statements and other financial reports were prepared manually every day. This led to delays 
of up to a month in the registration of accounts. The ultimate goal of the institutional systems
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strategy was to implement an integrated network of systems. This brought about 
organizational changes because it broke the local control over accounting activities. 
Budgeting that had depended on accounting data was defined in 1988 as a separate function 
with its own organizational unit.
The implementation of the proposal for new computer-based financial systems also implied a 
process of downsizing the equipment from the previous mainly mainframe computing 
platforms, as it was based on an open-systems technical standard designed for mini and 
microcomputers using the UNIX and DOS operating systems. Relational database 
management systems that implemented SQL in an Oracle environment were also introduced. 
Until then, the programmers had experience only of batch file processing, whereas the new 
system had online terminals. In order to achieve prompt results with the new systems, all 
programmers therefore received special training, which involved five to six weeks of learning 
about UNIX and in basic and advanced Oracle. However, senior managerial levels came to 
realise that it was difficult to undertake so much training effectively in such a short time. The 
technical staff interviewed suggested they would have preferred to have taken the advanced 
Oracle courses at least six months after working with the new environment, in order to make 
sense of the more complex features.
6.4.2.2 Development of Corporate Institutional Systems
A senior technical manager stated that there were problems in the top-down approach to 
implementing the new systems and that the vendors were unable to provide adequate 
technical support for the development of UNIX-based systems. The programmers also had 
difficulties in understanding and implementing database theory and relational models, but 
they found changing their group values towards a culture of service proved to be the most 
difficult task. For the user, the implementation of the strategy represented a positive change, 
as they were now able to carry out their information processing tasks through terminals in 
their offices. This meant they could stop having to take the data to the computer centre to be 
processed in batches by the technical staff, who were themselves liberated from the burden of 
these operations and thus had more time to dedicate to other activities. The benefits of the 
strategy generated a demand for new services. The negotiation and definition of 
requirements for the systems were done at an operational level, without concerted managerial 
action.
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The development of corporate institutional systems was carried out with a lot of political 
negotiation. The teams that developed the projects were integrated by specialists who came 
from the informatics offices of all the company’s work centres, and there was a committee 
that co-ordinated the work of the various project teams. The heads of the projects were top 
managers and the leaders of the teams were technical informatics specialists and users; 
interviews were conducted with a representative sample from both projects and teams.
Existing systems were maintained in parallel as new ones were developed. The strategy 
included corporate systems encompassing the following applications:
• Contracts
• Budget
• Human Resources
• Treasury
• Costs
• Accounting
• Acquisitions & Procurements
• Warehouses
The change was very dramatic. As the company had no previous experience in database 
practices, internal experts recommended that these systems should be developed gradually. A 
middle manager noted: “The company did not actually have a real methodology, nor tools to 
support software development, nor a technical culture”. But the ‘Informatics Tsar’, as the 
head of the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica was known, decided to start with four 
systems at the same time. The Andersen methodology was used for these, but an analyst 
complained in an interview for this study that it comprised filling at least a thousand different 
forms, which meant it was not used for practical reasons. The technological platform for the 
open systems did not arrive on time, so the project team started developing the systems in 
COBOL with the methods they had used in the past. Technical staff from all the regional 
areas of the company were brought in to help. All the people working for these systems were 
concentrated in Pemex’s Mexico City headquarters, according to a middle manager involved 
in this process.
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The Costs system was the first to be developed, because of political pressures. Pemex had no 
tradition of recording cost data; the technical staff therefore defined the system’s requirement 
specifications with no participation from the users. When the system was presented to the 
users, they rejected it, noted the middle manager interviewed. When the open systems 
arrived, an attempt was made migrate the development to this new environment. In the 
middle manager’s opinion, the system never worked because of all these factors.
Human Resources Management was the second corporate system to be developed. After the 
first experience with the Costs system, the group in charge of the new development bought 
the Information Engineering Methodology and a computer-based tool to help draw the 
diagrams for the requirements analysis. The developers made changes to the old Human 
Resources Management system that worked on a Burroughs machine to enable it to operate in 
an open systems environment. The new system was tried out first at the company’s 
operations in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, as the developers understood that they needed to 
“make the system softer” to meet local needs. They realized that each area interpreted the 
regulations in its own way, even when standards of procedures were defined through the 
properly documented corporate regulations (known as the normatividad64). The middle 
manager noted that the developers used to joke about the interpretations of the regulations 
with the question: “How do I know that what you understood is what I understand?”
The implementation of the Human Resources Management system was difficult because of 
the complexity of the payroll due to the variability of payment definitions 65. Staff involved 
in this process said the implementation of the system in the whole organization was like 
trench warfare, with a battle fought in every work centre. The developers adjusted the 
systems to the users’ requirements, having negotiated with them and evaluated the 
practicality of the changes. Additions and upgrades of the system were documented and 
distributed to all the other areas that were already operating the system, in order to keep a
63 Developed by James Martin Consultants.
64 Pemex used the Spanish noun normatividad to refer to the technical and information standardization and 
regulation of administrative procedures; it includes the connotation of control and regulation. The phrase strictly 
means: relating to, or dealing with, norms, discipline, or regulation; creating, prescribing, or imposing a norm 
governing rules.
5 Each of the more than thirty sections of the Union had its own labour terms of employment. In addition, there 
is variability in labour conditions due to the specificity of certain types of work; for example, divers working on
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unique version operating throughout the company. The rule was that the local informatics 
teams at the work centres could not modify the programs’ source code.
The activity for which the next system was developed represented one third of the total 
budget of the company: purchasing aspects of Acquisitions & Procurements, without 
materials management. The vested interests in this area were also very strong. The users 
kept asking for changes, which eventually succeeded in making the project fail. The next 
system was Warehouse Management; for that, each procedure was analysed and documented. 
Taking into account the previous experiences, the project team implemented it gradually, 
including initiatives such as: presentations to users; identification of local sponsors; clear 
definitions of responsibilities negotiated among the different parts involved; and cascade 
training66. This was also not an easy experience, noted a middle technical manager. The 
system had bad precedents, as other information technology groups in Pemex had tried to 
implement similar ones before and had failed. This created an attitude of the users 
summarized as: “The informatics people are trying once more.”
Later, the project leader tried to redo the development of the system for Acquisitions & 
Procurements using a strategy of incremental implementation through the different work 
centres. The project tried to link the acquisitions and warehouse systems, but their product 
catalogues were different. It worked eventually at the fifth attempt. Next, the Budget system 
was developed. This faced enormous problems because the analysis of requirements was 
done on the basis of corporate regulations which described a system that worked on the 
principle of allowing the areas to spend only if they had proved that they had enough 
resources available for a transaction. In real life, things worked differently; the areas were 
not used to this restrictive measure on their spending procedures.
For the Accounting system, all users from various levels of the hierarchy were involved. It 
took almost two years to develop, and the implementation was done gradually. It turned out 
to be a very expensive system, but it was the first one that really worked, in the opinion of 
some of the technical staff interviewed. The project team learned through trial and error, 
trying several times until they were successful in implementing the system.
underwater drilling forom offshore rigs are paid at an hourly rate in pesos and workers on the offshore platforms 
are paid a salary every two weeks in dollars.
66 Training future trainers.
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A senior financial manager noted that the institutional systems did not necessarily work in an 
identical way throughout the organization; different information technology infrastructure 
and technical skills were available in each area. In the areas outside Mexico City, the 
implementation of the systems was initially carried out with the authority of the head of the 
financial and administrative activities who was responsible for the accountancy function. 
With the evolution of the systems, the organizational structure of the regions changed to 
mirror that of the Mexico City headquarters, and in some cases new sections were created to 
split the different financial activities.
During the development of the corporate systems, a group of specialists in the Gerencia 
Institucional de Informatica started to work on a self-training programme for software 
development and project management, and studied thoroughly the Information Engineering 
Methodology. They held meetings among themselves to share ideas and experiences, calling 
their group Centro de Evolution Normativa en Tecnologla de la Information (Information 
Technology Evolutionary Regulations Centre). The technical experts that were interviewed 
saw Pemex as a laboratory where they could try any product, tool, or methodology they 
wanted. This group of experts clashed with the Booz Allen consultants, who were interested 
in the exclusive use of its own methods.
Pemex bought a new methodology from Booz Allen and hired their services to help with its 
implementation. The consultants were good technically but lacked communication skills. 
They tended to impose their choices, points of views, and decisions, and did not compromise 
in order to build a consensus with the Pemex technical staff. In the end, Booz Allen 
dissolved the Centro de Evolution Normativa en Tecnologla de la Information because, 
according to this centre’s members who were interviewed, the consultants felt threatened by 
them.
During the interviews, the technical staff stated that Pemex had no overall systems 
architecture; as a result, the corporate systems were developed as separate systems, isolated 
from one another. Later, interfaces were developed to allow the transmission of data between 
them, like the first one between the accountancy and budget systems. The financial 
operations at each work centre were undertaken according to standards defined centrally by
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the head office, but the problem of the interpretation of regulations and product catalogues 
remained even with the new systems.
The technical staff interviewed suggested that, with hindsight, the authorities were unable to 
predict the size and complexity of the project to develop the new corporate systems. This 
development encountered problems due to both the relationship of the technical analysts with 
the users and the aggressive attitude of vendors and consultants who wanted to take 
advantage of the situation. The change from batch processing to online relational databases 
was also difficult to implement for both users and the technical personnel. The managers of 
the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica were not able to foresee that the corporate systems 
strategy involved the risk of becoming too restrictive about the operations of the organization.
The technical staff advised, in the words of one, that: “the strategy of open systems came to 
be anything but open” because hardware was not homogenous and every machine had its own 
standard. However, the technical staff considered that Pemex was able to evolve very rapidly 
to an open systems environment compared to what had happened in other organizations 
across the world. They regarded strong project leadership as a decisive factor in this 
achievement. Due to the culture of the organization, changes had to be defined top down and 
needed strong political support to push them forward. Nevertheless, they felt the benefits 
brought by the corporate systems were never recognized. For these technical experts, the 
corporate systems were the glue that integrated Pemex as an organization for the first time in 
its history, at least in terms of the flows of financial data.
The accountancy area kept control over all the legal documentation of the financial 
transactions involved in the corporate systems. Before the systems were linked 
electronically, data was input at least three times into different systems, noted the technical 
staff interviewed. With the development of the new interfaces, the data was entered only 
once: in the acquisitions section at the start of the financial process. The implementation of 
the systems did not bring about the expected reduction in paperwork, although the systems 
did cause staff redundancies -  mainly because of the elimination of the duplication of data 
entry. The corporate systems faced opposition from the Union because of these redundancies 
and the redefinition of posts. In particular, the new data input jobs were not easily accepted. 
Technical staff saw this as a resistance to change, because these users “came every day with 
new complaints about the system”. Even though Pemex started to develop the systems by the
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mid 1980s, their impact on the organization was felt later. By 1986, the structure of the 
accountancy function was redefined, as were most of the financial procedures subsequently in 
most working areas as part of their standardization process.
Technological innovation made new technologies continuously available, but an analyst 
pointed out: “The possibility of evolving these systems to incorporate the potential offered by 
the new technologies, such as a client-server environment, never crossed the minds of the 
authorities.” The corporate information systems applications mostly remained as they were 
initially built, although there was an ongoing demand to make changes to meet new 
requirements and some interfaces were developed to avoid duplication of data input. 
However, the maintenance practices degenerated because the changes made were not 
documented, as the urgency to have the changes on time and to keep operations running 
prevailed over “good software development practices”; and the needs for changes “just kept 
on coming”. The Gerencia Institucional de Informatica retained the centralized operation of 
the corporate systems.
The opinion of technical experts was that the company lost its software knowledge because of 
top managers’ lack of understanding of systems development activities. Most of the people 
who were involved in the development of the systems left the central offices and returned to 
their local areas. The typical systems analyst’s career evolved to be more of a programmer 
than an ‘information analyst’ specialist in software development who can understand both the 
business and technical aspects of the system. When the technical experts expressed these 
views to the researcher, there was an evident sense of frustration about what they considered 
was a historical loss of their personal and professional efforts, at the cost of the lost 
opportunities that this loss of knowledge represented for the organization.
In the informatics area, there was a division in attitudes towards information systems between 
those dedicated to hardware procurement and those specializing in software development. 
The hardware-oriented group, who had politically dominated the central informatics area of 
Pemex, had the engineering perspective that prevailed throughout the organization. The 
software developers were ‘softer’ in their orientation: they were conscious of the need to take 
into account social and human aspects when developing information systems.
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Despite the concentration of power of the informatics activity in the Gerencia Institucional 
de Informatica, other informatics areas from the under-directorates of exploration, primary 
production, and industrial transformation also became very powerful. The latter area was 
headed by a chemical engineer who was a strong leader with a ‘hard’ engineering-oriented 
systems perspective. He engaged in a perpetual struggle for power with the informatics 
central authority, mainly on the grounds that his local technical standards were better than 
those defined at the centre. He even developed his own version of the corporate financial 
systems to demonstrate the superiority of his developments and technical choices. He built a 
budget systems using Informix, his technical platform, that was later ported to Oracle and 
implemented throughout the organization. In this case, the development was done through 
prototyping in order to develop it faster than the accountancy system, which had taken 
several years.
This local information technology manager had a personal rivalry with the head of Gerencia 
Institucional de Informatica. He believed the corporate systems “were too big and heavy, 
with complicated flows of information and too many computing problems”. For him, 
“politics are a part of life and things just have to be done, as they are required”; but he did not 
clarify who is to determine what is required. He tested his systems against those of the 
Gerencia Institucional de Informatica in terms what he called “benchmarking performance”. 
In his view, the results favoured his systems, both in terms of the quality of the data and the 
technical performance of the systems. He considered that corporate standards should not be 
defined “top down, they only have to be interpreted as they emerge from the daily use and the 
market”. At the same time, he accepted that it was up to the Gerencia Institucional de 
Informatica, as an authoritative body, to define the rules because they had the power. He was 
later named head of the information technology area of one of the subsidiaries.
The implementation of the corporate systems strategy was not homogeneous throughout the 
whole organization. Each area had its own particular level of achievement, depending on its 
access to financial and human resources. Later, the responsibility for the operation of the 
corporate systems was given to the users. The result of this change was very different in 
different areas of the company. Some users became very sophisticated in their information 
technology expertise, but in other cases they did not even verify the data.
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Technical staff considered that one of the problems of the corporate systems affecting the 
whole organization has been that the input of data is done by personnel who do not care about 
the quality of the data and had no understanding of the repercussions of their mistakes. The 
data recorded by the systems was therefore of poor quality and the information in the 
different systems did not match. The impact of this poor-quality input had become more 
significant with the development of the interfaces between the systems. In certain cases, the 
correction of a mistake could take many hours of work by technical experts in tracing the 
origin of the error.
The strategy of open systems also included the development of telecommunications 
infrastructure, based on a nationwide X.25 data communications network, called Pemex 
PAQ. The LAN standard was Ethernet and Novell, with integrated services facilities such as 
the network file system.
In 1991, the company undertook an organizational restructuring program that changed the 
traditional way of operating, from one in which directorates were responsible for activities 
defined by functions to a structure of divisions whose responsibilities were defined by 
business lines. The Gerencia Institucional de Informatica kept the same name, but it was 
decentralized: its equipment and human resources were split among the informatics areas of 
the different work centres across the country. The head of the Gerencia Institucional de 
Informatica was unable to cope with this change, which represented a loss of power in the 
opinion of some of the interviewees. Its new head was an accountant from outside Pemex 
with experience in the financial sector.
The technical staff interviewed suggested that this new manager invested a lot of effort in 
projects to promote his personal image, and neglected the real needs of the informatics 
function. For example, he twice organized the oil industry’s information technology national 
seminar. The technical staff interviewed generally felt that the style of the new manager 
caused a lot of problems with the users of information systems. He had difficulties coping 
with the attitude of the oil workers, and the negative consequences of his disagreements had 
long-lasting effects. His most positive contribution was that he carried on the project to 
install an optical fibre wide area network. During his period in office (1991-92), he 
transferred 80% of all the resources of the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica to the 
informatics centres of the divisions and to those of the production centres.
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The people who had worked in the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica readily understood 
the reasons for the organizational change from under-directorates and functions to divisions 
and products. They also welcomed the new structure because they knew that Pemex had an 
excess of human resources, even if its accounting balance didn’t show red numbers. In 1991, 
the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (1991) ranked Pemex among the 50 largest oil companies 
in the world, based on a number of indicators that clearly showed the organization’s over- 
staffing (see table 6.2).
Table 6.2: Pemex’s Ranking Against the World’s 50 Largest Oil Companies, 1991
Indicator Rank
Liquid reserves 7
Liquid output 3
Revenues 14
Employees 1
Source: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (1991)
The staff who had been responsible for the corporate systems knew that the organization had 
been unable to determine the costs of its technical and administrative processes. Whenever 
there was an audit, it was impossible to identify the lines of responsibility. Every manager 
was responsible for many things and, at the same time, for none. “No organization can be 
efficient if the responsibilities are not properly defined,” was the view expressed by one of 
the senior managers interviewed.
The Gerencia Institucional de Informatica officially kept responsibility for the corporate 
information systems; it also controlled information technology procurements and information 
consolidation. However, the results actually achieved by these systems were nobody’s 
responsibility, neither the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica's nor the users’. The 
personnel of the different departments who co-ordinated activities within the Gerencia 
Institucional de Informatica considered that their work was based upon the dictum that they 
were providing service to the users. In reality, however, it was the informatics specialists 
who defined everything.
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In 1992, the head of the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica hired Arthur D. Little to define 
the internal normatividad regulations for the “informatics function”. The consultancy’s 
proposal outlined the need for a broader “internal regulation framework”, which had to be 
defined by the participation of, and negotiation with, all parties involved. It developed a 
‘Model of Internal Regulations’ whose key principle was that all the informatics activities 
should be co-ordinated by an informatics plan. Arthur D. Little also developed such a plan 
and intended it to become a master strategic document, but it seemed to some of the staff 
interviewed that it ended up being yet another a bureaucratic document needed just to fulfil 
central government requirements, as had the previous plan.
6.4.3 1992-1997: Pemex’s Split and the Emergence of Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas 
Financieros
When Pemex was split into a corporate group and four subsidiaries in 1992, the 
organizational restructuring process did not involve a study of either the impact of this 
change on the information systems of the corporation or of the feasibility of the split in terms 
of information systems functionality. It was a political decision that had to be carried out, 
stated a senior information technology manager. However, consideration was given to how 
the integrity of the data could be assured during the period of transition. The personnel of the 
Gerencia Institucional de Informatica were not called on to participate in the process of 
planning the restructuring; they were told only to implement the plan, which they did by 
working with personnel from other areas of the organization in “transition groups”.
The split of the information systems resources was carried out by an information technology 
transition group. One information technology senior manager who participated in this group 
was interviewed. He noted that the group was responsible for the informatics function in 
terms of defining the outcome, not for how it was going to be achieved. The group had to 
divide up the assets and human resources through a process that was meant to be negotiated. 
In reality, however, all the decisions about those allocations had already been broadly defined 
by the staff of the Planning Under-directorate who were leading the whole process of 
restructuring, through the group called COLIBRI. Managers of the Gerencia Institucional de 
Informatica received orders about what to do, as was the case for the other areas. One of the 
outcomes of this process was that the Gerencia de Telecomunicaciones became an
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independent company with the task of providing telecommunications services for the Pemex 
group (Mexicanos. 1992b).
The process of transition was difficult in terms of negotiating the detailed distribution of 
resources between the subsidiaries and the corporate group. The technical staff did not have 
clear guidance as to the objectives of the restructuring processes. There was no marketing of 
the change project, the information technology staff did not display any confidence in the 
organizational split, and there was no consensus about it. Nobody wanted to give up 
resources. When the decision was finally taken, the resources were given to the new 
informatics centres of the subsidiaries, and 90 staff of the Gerencia Institucional de 
Informatica were made redundant. Many of them were rehired by the new subsidiaries after 
having received their statutory compensation from the ‘old Pemex’. The transition group 
included staff from the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica, the Ministry of 
Comptrollership, and the subsidiaries; all the processes were carried out with strict 
compliance to legal and formal requirements.
As explained by technical staff, the transition group gave a copy of the corporate systems to 
each subsidiary. The six corporate systems did not hamper the process of change because 
their structure allowed portability. They were designed to operate at various organizational 
levels, from headquarters to regional offices and local work centres. The new subsidiaries 
were autonomous and each informatics unit went its own way, which led to the corporate 
standards being lost. In practice, the systems continued to operate as usual, but the 
informatics units of each subsidiary became responsible for their management, and the levels 
of consolidation of the accounts were modified. The personnel who had previously worked 
for the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica and later became part of the informatics units of 
the subsidiaries adopted a very aggressive attitude towards the corporate systems and the 
authority of the centre.
After the transition, an old enemy of the corporate systems -  the chemical engineer who had 
headed the industrial transformation informatics centre -  became a defender of these systems. 
His opinion was that the adoption of standardized systems by the subsidiaries was the only 
way to prevent chaos and that “not having the possibility of developing new solutions, it is 
better to use the one at hand”. Nevertheless, his personal differences with the central 
authorities remained when he was appointed head of the informatics unit of the subsidiary
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Pemex Refinacion. During the period of transition, he recalled during an interview that, “I 
used the corporate systems with discipline but later worked to improve them.”
With the split of Pemex, the Gerencia Institucional de Informatica became the Unidad 
Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros (Financial Systems Corporate Unit), located in the 
Corporate Finance Division. This change represented a loss of status for the informatics unit; 
its new name meant to indicate that its function had become exclusively related to the 
financial information systems operations of the corporate group, implying a loss of 
hierarchical power within the organizational structure.
An engineer with a long professional career in the company was appointed as head of the 
Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros. Officially, (Mexicanos 1993b) its main 
responsibilities came to be the planning and definition of regulations and technical standards. 
The corporate information technology policy was aligned with the national information 
technology policy and required the development of an information technology plan from each 
of the subsidiaries. Pre-eminence was given to the definition of equipment procurement 
rather than to systems development. The subsidiaries were given the freedom to choose the 
methodology or tools with which they want to develop their own systems. In summary, the 
key responsibilities of Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros were to:
• maintain the institutional financial systems (this was meant to be a transitional 
responsibility);
• consolidate the accounts of the subsidiaries;
• process the financial information of the corporate group;
• provide company information to the central government; and
• regulate the informatics function of the whole organization, a responsibility split 
between the Finance Corporate Division and the Administration Corporate Division.
The corporate systems were kept in operation by each subsidiary and would continue to be in 
use until both the subsidiaries and the corporate group implemented new corporate systems, 
which they started to develop some years later. On paper, the computer equipment was 
allocated officially to the new companies. Physically, the mainframes stayed in the same 
premises as before, but each belonged to the owner of the corporate system operated on that
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computer. For example, the corporate payroll system was under the jurisdiction of the 
Administration Corporate Division but ran on Burroughs equipment located in the 
information technology centre belonging to the Finance Corporate Division.
Some of the technical staff interviewed suggested that the reduction of information 
technology personnel was done without a proper evaluation of the needs of each subsidiary 
and the resources available. The informatics groups of the subsidiaries were unable to cope 
with their users’ demands. Technical staff from the corporate group noted during the 
interviews that the technical staff of the subsidiaries initially refused to ask for help from 
their colleagues in the Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros, but they frequently 
ended up taking their advice because these colleagues had experience in operating the 
systems and fulfilling the central authorities’ requirements.
Later, the Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros defined a corporate strategy for the 
development of the corporate financial systems that they called Sistema Institucional Integral 
de Finanzas (Integrated Institutional Financial System). This strategy aimed at developing a 
holistic information system for all the financial functions of the whole organization, with 
integrated connections between the different corporate systems. The strategy was redefined 
several times in trying to prevent it becoming too restrictive. The two basic principles of this 
strategy, as stated by a manager from the Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros 
during an interview, were: firstly, that information should be input directly at the place where 
it was generated; and, secondly, that every system should work as an island connected by 
flows of information. The quality of the data would be assured by validation procedures at 
the interfaces. The aim was also to provide access to data that was, synchronized to be 
simultaneously available (almost online). In addition, a long-term goal was to create a new 
standardized and regulated corporate database using data coming directly from the 
operations. This strategy represented an evolution of the old corporate systems, but it was 
not carried out because, as explained later in this section, Pemex chose to buy a commercial 
software package instead of developing its new corporate systems in-house.
The technical people of the Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros who were 
interviewed said they did not want to throw away all their past work, so would have preferred 
to have built the new systems in-house as this would have represented a process of 
developing expertise in the organization. They accepted that the corporate systems needed to
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be redefined to respond to the new conditions and to take advantage of the potential offered 
by state-of-the-art technology. The corporate systems were designed to match requirements 
analyses undertaken many years before, in very different circumstances to those faced at that 
time. “In some cases, the corporate systems became white elephants with many parts that 
were never used,” was one comment. These technical staff pointed out that even if the 
strategy of the Sistema Institucional Integral de Finanzas prevailed, the new systems would 
be very difficult to manage and maintain because of the interconnections between them -  
although it might become possible to develop new systems very rapidly.
After the split of the company, the Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros continued to 
develop systems as they had in the past, using the state-of-the-art technology and trying to 
make the operations of the organization more efficient. Among these systems was a ‘one- 
stop front desk’ project for third-party suppliers and contractors, which aimed to use touch­
screen interfaces to provide information to the companies that supplied products or services 
to Pemex, and thus to facilitate the relations with these third parties. From the first contact 
with this system, a supplier would be able to find out the necessary legal and administrative 
requirements and the financial feasibility of a transaction. The system would provide a 
reference number for the transaction to allow the company to track the state of the deal. The 
system was intended to put an end to the chaotic situation that third-party companies had to 
face when selling services to Pemex. Managers from companies dealing with Pemex 
explained in interviews that the contractors usually had to follow as best they could the 
complex progress of their business through all the departments of Pemex. This tortuous 
procedure sometimes delayed payments for months and was linked to vested interests. When 
the ‘one-stop’ system was made operational, some third-party companies were impressed but 
many still complained of problems with their payments. The representative of a contractor 
said, in a corridor chat, that their relations with Pemex were too complex to be solved by such 
a system.
One of the main political statements made by the central authorities during the process of 
organizational restructuring was that it was a corporate group priority to develop reliable 
information systems. Each subsidiary started to develop its own, mostly autonomous, 
computer-based information systems, although certain corporate systems were kept in 
operation with centralized version control. Most of subsidiaries contracted the services of
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consultants for the development of systems. For instance, Pemex Petroquimica Secundaria 
bought an Oracle financial package that was implemented with the help of consultants.
With the transition, many functions and responsibilities were moved out of the hands of the 
organizational entities that used to have them. The Administration Corporate Division fought 
to keep control over the definition of corporate informatics policy, against the Finance 
Corporate Division that had previously had responsibility for it. According to the goals of the 
restructuring process stated in an official document (Mexicanos. 1992b) (Mexicanos. 1992a), 
the informatics policy of the new organization had to be decentralized. Each corporate 
division and subsidiary company therefore had its own information technology unit. The new 
role of a corporate informatics policy was not clear. In the end, the Finance Corporate 
Division kept this responsibility because of its traditional reputation for tight control and its 
engineering perspective. Changing this image had not been an easy task, because the same 
people held the leading posts. The introduction of new practices and ways of thinking 
towards systems was not something that could be done just by a change of the official 
rhetoric.
The Corporate Group had aimed at regulating the activities of the four independent 
subsidiaries, but one of the official aims of the restructuring was to provide autonomy of 
decision making at the level of operations, as stated in the official document that describes 
the organizational restructuring strategy (Mexicanos. 1992a). The Unidad Corporativa de 
Sistemas Financieros tried to define corporate informatics policy using a participative 
approach, according to the head of this unit. It tried several times to organize meetings with 
people from the subsidiaries to define a common informatics policy, but staff of the 
subsidiaries did not attend the meetings. They did not trust the Unidad Corporativa de 
Sistemas Financieros, according to technical staff interviewed, because of its tradition of 
control and centralization.
The subsidiaries acquired freedom and, in the new operating conditions, nothing forced them 
to compromise with the corporate authority. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, when the 
subsidiaries faced problems they contacted staff of the Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas 
Financieros for help. The technical staff noted during interviews that even with the fruitless 
meetings to promote the participation of the subsidiaries, the Unidad Corporativa de 
Sistemas Financieros continued to lobby to keep its role of defining the central policy
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because this was considered to be important in ensuring harmonious development of the 
information systems of the corporate group. The Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas 
Financieros had three departments, as shown in figure 6.12.
Figure 6.12: Organizational Structure of Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros
Head of the Unit
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Planning and Financial 
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Source: Pemex
Until 1994, the Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas Financieros officially held the responsibility 
for defining the organizational informatics policy, endorsed by a letter signed by the General 
Director of the corporate group. The unit’s name was changed in 1993 to Unidad 
Corporativa de Informatica y  Sistemas Financieros (Informatics and Financial Systems 
Corporate Unit) to indicate that it had kept the responsibility of the informatics policy and to 
reflect its organizational status.
In 1993, the Unidad Corporativa de Informatica y  Sistemas Financieros readopted the 
strategy of developing an integrated corporate financial information system, but with the new 
name Sistema Integral de Informacion Financiera (Integrated Financial Information System). 
Its conceptual plan as defined by the head of the Unit is shown in figure 6.13. By this time, 
the unit’s leader recognized that the effort of such a project should be centred in the 
negotiation of flows of information and not in information systems development regulations. 
Such a system still worked on the basis of interconnecting the various independent financial 
systems. The Unidad Corporativa de Informatica y  Sistemas Financieros faced opposition 
from other informatics areas, both those of the subsidiaries and those of the other Corporate 
Divisions; it was not clear to them what strategy was demanded from them.
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F igure 6.13: C on ceptu a l D iagram  o f  the F inancia l In tegrated  In form ation  System
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Source: Pem ex
6.4.4 Information Systems at Pemex Subsidiaries
When the subsidiary companies were created out of the splitting up of Pemex, the 
organizational structure of each included an informatics unit. This created a problem of 
‘reinventing the wheel’ because each subsidiary had to learn about the needs of information 
systems developments in its own way, and paid the cost of this learning process. They also 
went through an experience similar to that of the informatics unit of the old Pemex: the 
struggle between centralization and decentralization of information systems management and 
the need to understand a culture of service towards the users. A technical expert expressed 
this by saying that, with the split, “it was as if  Pemex had lost its memory of all the 
organizational informatics knowledge accumulated in the past”. These aspects can be seen as 
a cost that had to be paid for the organizational restructuring of the company.
From the point of view of the corporate group, the informatics areas of the subsidiaries lacked 
leadership and knowledge of methodologies. The corporate systems were kept operating, but 
each subsidiary had to solve its specific needs as best it could. Some kept the versions 
developed by the Unidad Corporativa de Informatica y  Sistemas Financieros; some did their 
own maintenance; and, in some cases, the whole system was redeveloped following the
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structure of the original corporate system. In addition, there were instances where 
subsidiaries solved their needs with a totally different system.
From the point of view of the technical staff of the subsidiaries, the corporate group was 
trying to defend its raison d'etre and its area of power, because the new style of management 
introduced with the split entitled the subsidiaries to define their own internal information 
technology practices and policies. Some of the heads of the informatics units of the 
subsidiaries gained considerable power. In others, such as Pemex Gas y  Petroquimica Basica, 
the informatics unit underwent a period of continuous changes of top manager.
Pemex Refinacion adopted the corporate systems for the transition period, then developed 
new systems with an engineering perspective using a top down approach. The leader, as 
described in section 6.4.2, was a key player in the informatics world of the old Pemex who 
wanted to exhibit the supremacy of the technical quality of his systems. One of the methods 
he employed to implement his systems was to threaten users with an audit of their areas if 
they did not use them. He maintained his personal rivalry with the Unidad Corporativa de 
Informatica y  Sistemas Financieros as he believed that the corporate function of co­
ordination was the “corporate bottleneck”. His rhetoric kept emphasizing that his areas had 
no other goal but that of satisfying users needs, through the slogan: “We provide services to 
those who we serve.” In an interview, he said he had a marketing perspective in promoting 
the use of computer-based information systems and also mentioned his bad experiences with 
consultants. He saw consultants as being needed, but they had to be managed properly. He 
tried to establish quality control over consultancy companies by requiring specific 
professional qualifications for the personnel of the consultancy who participate in particular 
projects.
The last stage in the process of organizational change was the plan to modernize the 
information systems. The General Director of the corporate group, with the advice of internal 
technical experts and international consultants, looked for solutions for the development of 
integrated corporate systems and visited various international companies. This group decided 
to buy a package and evaluated the major integrated system products available in the market; 
that basically meant either SAP R/3 or Oracle Financial, which was already being 
implemented in Pemex Petroquimica Secundaria.
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The process of implementation of the selected package was headed by consultants and faced 
many problems. Personnel who had been involved in this process said in interviews that the 
system had not been able to operate, although most of the deliverables specified in the work 
programme had been completed. One noted that the top managers of the corporate group 
“did not want to get hooked up with this package, just because one of the subsidiaries had it”. 
It is important to note that this subsidiary, Pemex Petroquimica Secundaria, would eventually 
be privatized.
The top leader of the corporate group discarded the alternative of developing the institutional 
systems in-house on the grounds that this “would be too time consuming”. It made more 
sense to the group to modify the mechanics of the organization to make it work according to 
the logic of proven efficient ‘best business processes’, rather than trying to modify the old 
inefficient corporate systems. They did not consider whether these ‘best business practices’ 
might not necessarily fulfil government regulations, or the cost of adapting the systems to 
comply with them.
The process of evaluating the two possible software packages was carried out with the 
participation of technical experts and users from the whole corporate group. There was a 
presentation of the packages in a conference room with three computers for hands-on 
demonstrations. Some technical experts and users said they had very little opportunity to 
appreciate the functional capabilities of the software. The experts and users had to complete 
a questionnaire to record, in a structured way, their personal evaluations of the packages. The 
survey results “massively favoured” recalled the head of the Unidad Corporativa de Sistemas 
Financieros SAP R/367, an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software package with an 
integrated perspective of business processes and a good reputation for being used 
successfully by many of the largest organizations in the world, among them the major world 
oil companies.
67 The R/3 package was developed by the German company SAP AG. It is an integrated system that automates 
within one database the flows of information of a company, using processes that cross functional divisions. The 
package comprises different modules to manage the various functions of the organization. The implementation 
of such a package generally requires organizational changes to accommodate the flow structures defined in the 
software. The package has been widely used by major organizations throughout the world, and much has been 
written about both its successes and the difficulties involved in its implementation (Davenport 1998).
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A technical expert with long professional experience in Pemex suggested that the SAP R/3 
project came as a “solution looking for a problem”. The organization did not undertake an 
analysis of the condition of its information systems; in his opinion, such an analysis would 
have allowed Pemex to organize its investment in information systems to give priority to the 
areas that lacked computer-based information systems and where there was a desperate 
needed for them.
The corporate group gave the formal right of choice to the subsidiaries, but emphasized the 
convenience of SAP R/3 because the exchange of information among them could be 
facilitated by having standard packages. Pemex Rejinacion, Pemex Exploration y  
Production, and Pemex Gas y  Petroquimica Basica agreed to adopt SAP R/3. The licence 
negotiations carried out by the corporate group became a very tortuous process that almost 
failed because the local SAP representatives did not want to accept Pemex’s conditions. In 
the end, they were able to strike a deal thanks to the intervention of SAP’s international head 
office. The corporate group and each subsidiary followed ‘their own way’ of implementing 
the package. SAP Mexico advised Pemex that the implementation of the package should 
preferably be carried out by international consultancies certified by them. The corporate 
group and the subsidiaries of Pemex followed this advice and chose companies through 
public tender: IBM for the corporate level; Arthur Andersen for Pemex Exploration y  
Produccio; Ernst & Young for Pemex Gas y  Petroquimica Basica; and KPMG for Pemex 
Rejinacion..
The financial module of SAP R/3 was eventually implemented by all subsidiaries; according 
to a technical expert this was paradoxical because the financial area was where “good, bad or 
with problems, at least there was a corporate systems in operation”. He noted that the choice 
of this module for implementation throughout the company could be explained because the 
sponsors of the systems came from the financial area of each of the subsidiaries.
The head of the Unidad Corporativa de Informatica y Sistemas was the project leader who 
started the implementation in the corporate group of SAP R/3 with only the financial module. 
He carried out this project with an internal group of senior technical experts. The project had 
many difficulties with the consultancy company that was chosen through public tender, as 
there was a high turnover of consultants -  including even the leader of the project. The 
Pemex team started the implementation with an almost exclusively engineering perspective
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based on process analysis. This technical perspective soon proved inadequate because it did 
not manage the social aspects of the project. The corporate group hired another international 
consultancy to carry out the management of change in the corporate group associated with the 
implementation of SAP R/3. This new project worked with almost no co-ordination with the 
consultants implementing the package. It was a separate project addressing communication, 
cultural management, and training. During the SAP implementation project, the participating 
Pemex experts complained that the consultancy company sent very young analysts with no 
work experience to do the actual work. Thus, it was the Pemex experts who finished the job, 
including having to check the spelling of the documentation.
The implementation of the financial module very soon showed signs of falling behind 
schedule. The module was officially put into operation in January 1997, more than six 
months late. The first financial closing results generated by the systems were issued on 
February 12, 1997. Some of the personnel interviewed suggested, in a critical tone, that SAP 
R/3 had been reshaped to become the Sistema Integral de Informacion Financiera. The 
remark meant that the organization failed to take the opportunity to restructure its operations 
in line with the ‘best international business practices’; instead, it modified the software to 
adapt it to the Pemex style of operations. After the implementation of SAP R/3, the corporate 
group launched a new project to match budget and accountancy data, a task that the SAP R/3 
project was not able to fulfil. Further research, utilizing the benefits of hindsight, will need to 
be carried out to be able to identify the features of the new organizational system created by 
the implementation of SAP R/3.
In relation to the organizational impact of SAP R/3, the leader of the Pemex corporate group 
insisted that the personnel made redundant by the implementation of the package would be 
redirected to analysis activities. There was neither a clear definition of this new 
responsibility and the skills required, nor whether those made redundant were qualified for 
these new tasks.
A senior corporate manager suggested that, with the passage of time, it could now be seen 
that it would have been better if they had first carried out a reorganization, and only then 
undertook the implementation of SAP R/3. But it was not done that way, so they had to 
adjust the organization to the architectural logic of the package. In his view, the most 
difficult aspect of the implementation was human resources. The workers had no belief in the
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project because of their previous bad experiences of information system implementations. 
There was also the fear that SAP R/3 would cause massive redundancy. The oil workers 
shared with the researcher in informal chats the new definition that they had created for the 
acronym ‘SAP’: Salida Automatica de Petroleros, which means the automatic sacking of oil 
workers. This reflected their belief that the use of the package in the organization would 
bring immediate redundancies. The authorities tried to send the message that SAP R/3 was a 
corporate project “with no way back and which, in the end, will prove to be useful to 
everybody”, according to one executive. He also noted that some managers from the 
operations areas had already started to use the information provided by the system for their 
decision making. During the interview, he stated: “We have won many battles although we 
cannot say that we have won the war.”
The Pemex Exploration y  Production, Pemex Gas y  Petroquimica Basica, and Pemex 
Rejinacion subsidiaries each implemented different SAP R/3 modules, but all included at 
least the finance module. The sponsors of the projects in these three companies also all came 
from financial areas. They started the process of implementation in the early months of 1997 
and were to be finished by the middle of 1998.. Every subsidiary made its own choice of 
how to implement SAP R/3 and decided which modules to adopt, which geographical areas 
to include, and the strategy for carrying out the project.
In the three subsidiaries, the selection of the consultancy companies was undertaken through 
public tenders, but taking into account the experience of the corporate group. The tender 
specifications were very detailed as to what was expected from the consultants selected. 
These specifications included profiles of the required previous experience, work programmes, 
commitment to avoid changing project managers and technical experts, and methodologies of 
process analysis. The first months of implementation proved that, while most of the 
consultancy companies were professional at presenting all the requirements asked for in the 
tender documents, when the work was actually carried out they used their own methods and 
style of implementation. They were carried out almost exclusively from an engineering 
perspective, even though the tender specified the need to address the social and political 
aspects of the systems. The definition of the parametrization requirements was done through 
the use of standard templates, not by an analysis of Pemex’s processes.
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The corporate authorities established a committee that met monthly to bring together the 
leaders of all the projects implementing SAP R/3, to share their experiences. The technical 
staff considered that the leaders could not disclose problems freely in these meetings because 
of the political impact it would have on their careers. Senior staff from the corporate group 
had the view that the best implementation process had been that of Pemex Gas y  
Petroquimica because of the relatively small size of the company 68. The leader of this 
project also had a good reputation among the technical experts as somebody with systems 
implementation experience in the old organization.
A corporate executive considered that if the Pemex group were to have reliable information 
systems, the company would be in a better position to strike a credible deal with the central 
government authorities. The control of operations would then be made possible by the 
capacity to measure and evaluate activities through reliable data. It would break the vicious 
cycle of the budget negotiation in which authorities always gave less than Pemex demanded, 
while the company always asked for more resources that it needed -  because Pemex knew 
that the government would give it less as the central authorities realized these needs were 
based on unreliable information.
The availability of more reliable data would also allow Pemex to define an investment plan 
through a robust financial analysis of profitability and well-documented feasibility studies 
and comprehensive engineering studies. Achievements were made in this process of change; 
for example, a corporate executive considered that Pemex was able by 1996 to negotiate the 
budget with the central government within an “acceptable economic logic”.
The above description followed the development of the financial administrative information 
systems in Pemex. Chapter 7, which deals with the content of change, also includes a 
description of the use of information systems in other areas of the organization because this is 
relevant to the overall analysis of the outcome of the process of change of the organization.
68By 1993, according to data provided during an interview by an engineer who worked in the informatics unit of 
one of the subsidiaries Pemex Exploration y  Production had around 120,000 employees and Pemex Gas y  
Petroquimica Basica only 13,000.
193
7 N on-m ainstream  inform ation  systems developm ent  efforts in  
Pem ex
This chapter describes the company’s development of information systems other than the 
mainstream ones discussed in earlier chapters. Three streams of information systems 
development at Pemex other than its mainstream ones were identified by the research for this 
thesis as being relevant to the analysis of the case study because they provide important 
information for understanding the content of change that has taken place in Pemex:
• technical systems related to data collection from the operational areas;
• strategic information systems; and
• various efforts to develop strategic executive information systems for 
the General Directors.
7.1 T e c h n ic a l  In fo r m a t io n  System s
Pemex’s technical information systems are related to the operations in its various plants. 
Previously, these tasks were mostly carried out manually by oil workers who used ad hoc 
procedures to check the data required, such as the levels of substances in tanks. During 
interviews for this study, workers described how they could employ simple methods for 
measurements, for instance using a stick or even hitting the tanks to calculate the level by 
sound and then enter the data onto paper forms. Later, such data was given by telephone to 
the offices where it was processed, in order to calculate the quantities of the different 
substances.
Until early 1990s, tanks and pipelines did not include proper measuring devices. Calculating 
these volumes was complex because the tanks held varying substances and the pipes could be 
used for different types of liquids. The large number of possible variables meant that these 
calculations involved mathematical functions with indefinite solutions. The balance of 
volumes for the different substances were figured out by expert analysts, called balancer os, 
who provided a type of human ‘intelligent interface’; when they identified inconsistencies in 
the data, they would call back the work centre to ask the operators to check the data they had 
sent. A technical middle manager explained that they usually ended up “cuchareando”69 
(‘adding and subtracting as needed’) to make the data match.
69 The literal translation is putting and taking spoons.
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The data processed by the balanceros was given by telephone to the administrative office, 
where it was usually validated by other analysts. These analysts were typically engineers 
with many years of working experience in the company. They performed the role of a second 
human ‘intelligent interface’. The data that was processed was then input into the financial 
systems. The practice of adding and subtracting as needed to achieve the desired figures was 
also related to the fulfilment of the goals defined by the central government. It was the 
responsibility of the managers to achieve these production goals, which they did to safeguard 
their political image -  even when that required modifying figures when necessary.
The posts of the balanceros began to disappear with the introduction of proper instruments to 
measure tanks and pipe flows, which made their expertise unnecessary. The introduction of 
these instruments had not been an easy process. It had needed strong political support from 
managers because, as explained by a technical middle manager, it required: major 
investments; the definition of organizational responsibilities at the different points of the 
operations; and a specification of the unique catalogue of substances and product equivalents. 
The instruments were introduced gradually, as the installation of any new measuring 
devices70 reduced the degree of discretion of, and the scope for, any intervention by the 
balanceros. However, in this middle manager’s opinion, there is still more work to be done 
to achieve proper control of the operations.
7.2 St r a teg ic  In fo r m a t io n  Sy ste m
One major computer-based information system not related to the mainstream informatics 
function was the institutional database created in 1980, during Jorge Diaz Serrano’s 
administration. This is of particular relevance because it came to be a key strategic system 
for the organizational change of the company. It was first developed to solve Pemex’s public 
image problem caused, in part, from the inconsistency of the data provided to the central 
government and the media by the different areas of Pemex. The incompatibility of the 
figures was exacerbated by the chaotic situation brought about by the oil boom, and by the 
lack of appropriate definitions and standards of the information in the organization at that 
time.
70 The first measurement devices were pneumatic the automatic distributed control systems were introduced 
after the split of the company in the 1990s.
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In 1980, the General Director created the Basic Information Unit with the responsibility for 
compiling and presenting a single credible version of Pemex's operations (see table 5.1 to 
locate this event in the context of other developments at the time). This Unit started to 
develop a database and to publish a monthly Basic Information Report which contained 
information from the different work centres and organizational functional entities. A middle 
manager involved in the operation of the database said these reports were produced from the 
daily flows of information delivered by phone. The figures were processed to provide 
monthly statements of operations for the General Director. However, a number of problems 
arose with this system, such as: data was inconsistent; figures related mainly to levels of 
production, with no financial evaluation of the processes and operations; the database resided 
on a mainframe, but due to technical restrictions it was difficult to access the data; the system 
had a very tortuous interface; and the users depended on technical staff to access data.
Years later, under the administration of Francisco Rojas who was appointed in 1987, the 
Basic Information Unit was located within the Under-directorate of Planning and Co­
ordination, where it was given broader functions and renamed the Evaluation and Information 
Office. Rojas’ administration had a strong commitment to financial control of the operations 
of the company, which generated new information demands in terms of both the quantity and 
quality of data. The General Director gave the Evaluation and Information Office the power 
and responsibility for the institutional database, which stored and processed information 
from:
• technical operations;
n i
• budgets ;
• sales; and
• production.
The mission of the Evaluation and Information Office continued to be the integration of a 
single overview of the operations of the company and the provision of data for evaluation and 
analysis. This Office kept the responsibility of publishing the monthly Institutional Report, 
which contained detailed indicators of the levels of production. It also dealt with the
71 It includes information from the Programa Operativo Annual.
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information that had to be delivered to five ministries of the central government: Energy, 
Treasury, Budget, Commerce, and Comptrollership.
By 1988, the database had to provide reliable data that would enable an in-depth economic 
analysis of operations. The new activities of financial evaluation provoked the need to 
improve the accessibility, quality, and quantity of information in the database. However, this 
new analysis was impeded by the inconsistency and inadequacy of the data. A middle 
manager interviewed stated that more detailed data was needed for the preparation of the 
company’s profit-and-loss statements and to analyse the performance of the different 
organizational units. Figure 7.1, based on an explanation by the former head of the 
Evaluation and Information Office, shows a functional diagram of the strategic information 
system at Pemex which highlights the nature of the problem about a lack of accurate and 
timely data that prevented a proper analysis and evaluation of Pemex’s operations.
Figure 7.1: Functional Diagram of Strategic Information System at Pemex in 1993
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Source: Interview for this study with a former head of Pemex’s Evaluation and Information Office
To meet the new financial evaluation needs, the database had to meet new information 
requirements related to: levels of production; expenditure; distribution of production; asset 
depreciation; and the introduction of costing in line with international oil market pricing. To 
facilitate access, the database was migrated to a networked microcomputer. Validation of the 
data became a priority because the fundamental goal of the database managers was data 
quality assurance. In the organizational context of Pemex, this was a very difficult task to
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achieve in the short-term (see table 5.1 to locate this event in the context o f other 
developments at the time).
A new manager appointed as head of the Evaluation and Information Office had 
qualifications in engineering and operational research, as well as a long professional career in 
Pemex. He had a clear understanding of information technology as a tool and appreciated the 
importance of the quality of information in supporting planning, evaluation, and reporting 
activities. He solved the problem of data validation by defining another human ‘intelligent 
interface’ between the provider of the data and the recipient who input it into the database. 
Each flow of information was politically negotiated with each area at an individual level, so 
the rules of the flow of data and the responsibilities of the parties were clearly defined. The 
new manager used to his advantage the organizational feature of tight control of local areas 
over information. Figure 7.2 shows the way the data flows and validation were structured, 
based on description provided to the researcher by the manager who once headed this unit. 
Figure 7.2: Institutional Database: Data Flows and Validation Processes
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The Evaluation and Information Office regarded the structure of the existing corporate 
systems as too restrictive and inflexible. The new manager emphasized that, as in any 
organization, goals have to be fulfilled at Pemex; but trying to build a reliable database 
through the development of an integrated system would have been an impossible task within 
the organizational context that prevailed in the company at the time. The manager was an oil 
worker with long experience in the company. This gave him a good knowledge of Pemex’s 
organizational culture and power structures, which were based on the local control of the 
flows of information. This explains why his strategy focused on the negotiation of flows of 
information, not on developing a new system. He also migrated the database to an end-user 
computer platform to facilitate both data access and the ability to manipulate its information 
for analysis and evaluation purposes. (Subdireccion de Planeacion y Coordination 1992).
The information provided by the database was a key element in the organizational 
restructuring. It was the main source of data for evaluation and analysis which could support 
and justify the changes proposed. From this perspective, the institutional database could be 
seen as a strategic system. The analysis of reliable data clearly highlighted the actual 
inefficiencies in the company that confirmed previous speculations. This information 
provided a source of power for the authorities in the negotiations to move forward with the 
process of restructuring the company.
7.3 E x ec u t iv e  In fo r m a tio n  Sy st e m s : th e  G e n e r a l  D ir e c t o r s’ Per spe c t iv e
As highlighted in section 4.3, the post of General Director in Pemex has had a political 
character. Presidents of Mexico have made the appointments, and General Directors have 
usually been replaced every six years following the change of public administration. The 
General Director has to fulfil the mandate given to him by the President; to do so, he needs 
specific information to take decisions to reach this goal. During the field work for this thesis, 
the researcher had the opportunity to interview four ex-General Directors to understand how 
they met their information needs and their view of the changes the organization underwent 
during their periods in office.
Earlier chapters described the company’s lack of formal information systems providing 
timely and reliable data on its operations. As each General Director came into the company, 
he had to find his own way to obtain the information he needed. The review of how each of
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them made the necessary arrangements to build their executive information systems is done 
in this section by reconstructing information each of the General Directors provided in the 
interviews. This description of the events therefore reflect their points of view and the direct 
quotations in each section are from the General director for that period.
7.3.1 Jorge Diaz Serrano, 1976-1981
Jorge Diaz Serrano came into office as General Director without being a political figure; he 
had a reputation as a very successful oil sector entrepreneur and close friend of the President. 
He was given the mission to expand the company’s oil production capabilities in order to take 
advantage of the extremely favourable conditions of the international oil market at the time. 
When he joined the organization, he felt he was an alien although he did have some friends in 
senior managerial posts in Pemex. He soon realized that, “the workers were conscious that 
they were the owners of the business”. He discovered serious deficiencies in the flows of 
information about the operations of the company and its administrative functions, for 
example with delays of months and even years in closing financial statements. Pemex’s 
administrative procedures were a mixture of the managerial styles of the two biggest foreign 
companies that had been nationalized in forming Pemex: El Aguila (Shell, Anglo-Dutch with 
a diplomatic style) and La Huasteca (Standard Oil, American with a direct style).
In order to understand the lack of information, it is necessary to consider the role of workers’ 
resistance and the Union’s power. Any attempt at trying to improve the recording of data, 
such as in the accountancy system, faced severe problems because of the extent of the power 
of the Union. Promotion was based on seniority and, naturally, the employees were getting 
older as the company developed and time passed. In the 1960s, the average age of the 
employees was over 40. Diaz Serrano believes this could explain the degree of opposition to 
the introduction of the IBM machines in those years. Even though the people responsible for 
computers took enormous efforts to modernize the information systems of the company, the 
problem of lack of reliable information persisted.
He had came into an organization where communications and the flows of information were 
between fiefdoms, and the General Director was not provided with adequate information. 
Clear clashes of power existed between: geologists and oil engineers; geophysicists and 
geologists; and the refinery engineers and petrochemical engineers. “Their fight, ultimately,
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was to grasp as much as they could of the budget allocations.” They all told the General 
Director that their area was the most important for the future of the company and that it had 
to be considered as a priority. “Not being an expert in all the areas, it was difficult for me to 
make the right decisions for the company,” Diaz Serrano noted.
He was able to appoint people he wanted to the top managerial levels of his administration, 
and he picked older oil workers with a lot of experience as well as some friends with 
management experience. Even though they were all part of this team, they kept their 
information jealously within their individual domains. The informal flows of information 
were very powerful: they moved the organization. He considered that any person appointed 
as General Director of Pemex without the understanding of the oil business that he had would 
have faced a more difficult situation than he did, because the oil workers could easily play 
tricks and distort the facts of how the organization was operating. In order to produce and 
sell oil, he needed information. He said that he did not care how he obtained it, as long as he 
had it to do his job.
Diaz Serrano solved his needs for information by organizing daily early-morning meetings 
with his work team. During his period of administration, he never had breakfast at his home. 
The early-morning meetings he had with his senior managers discussed problems, settled 
arguments, identified information discrepancies between the operational areas, and co­
ordinated activities and communication between the different units. They did not use memos, 
but made telephone calls to sort out any differences, there and then, by contacting work 
centres as necessary. After the meetings, they sent notes confirming the settlements.
He considered he had a privileged position as somebody who knew the business without 
being an expert in any particular area. He said this allowed him “to face, without emotion, 
the needs of all the areas of the business and motivate the organization towards a common 
goal: to achieve a massive development of the production facilities in a very short time”. The 
formal information systems were not performing well at the time he was appointed General 
Director, but they fell even further behind in efficiency during his period in charge. Despite 
the availability of enormous resources and company investment in computers, the use of the 
technology encountered many problems and severe resistance.
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Diaz Serrano needed very detailed information, without delay, to take advantage of the oil 
boom. He needed to have reliable information every day to answer questions like: “How 
much drilling equipment does the company have?”, “What progress is being made by the 
exploration projects?”, and “What was the level of oil production?”. Every day at 7a.m., he 
phoned each of the main areas of operation to receive the information directly from the local 
managers, except for two areas: refining was controlled by programmed schedules of work; 
and activities in petrochemicals moved relatively slowly due to their complexity.
He evaluated the degree of progress by comparing the data he received by telephone with the 
milestones defined in the investment programmes. In the area of trading, clients had three 
months contracts, so he needed to know what the competitors were doing and the prices of 
the deals. He was also in frequent telephone communication with the governors of the estates 
where the oil activity was being developed, in order to settle problems. He received 
information about the political and economic events at national and international levels 
related to the oil industry. This was the “world of information” that he said he needed as 
General Director of Pemex at that time, and without which he could not negotiate. He 
commented that he obtained information from wherever he could, and if he could not get it 
then he invented it, “but the primary aim was to carry on the oil boom”.
To assure the reliability of information, every Monday he travelled to the different regions in 
which construction or drilling projects were being developed. He chatted with the people 
doing the job and observed how things were going. His knowledge of the business meant the 
chats were meaningful and his observations pertinent. It was the way he checked that things 
were actually progressing. He said it was difficult to manage Pemex without going out of the 
office because that would have represented taking too high a risk. This implicitly accepted 
that he did not trust the information that was given to him.
As an oil expert, he realized that the known oil reserves of the country were low -  so he 
focused on exploration projects. The rest of the cabinet wanted to receive detailed 
information about the investment programmes although “it was impossible that they could 
know everything”. He could not divert the effort of experts towards fulfilling the central 
government information requirements. He therefore organized a group of technical and 
financial experts whose responsibility was to provide information to the central government; 
this information later came to form the Institutional Database. These experts did everything
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manually; they had no computers, not even a fax machine. They used their expertise to 
evaluate the data they received from all areas of the company. It was a difficult task because 
they had to understand the business and how it was changing.
For example, previously a land-based well had cost $50,000 to drill, but drilling an offshore 
well could cost up to $500,000. Only an expert could understand and evaluate this 
information; the people from the central government found it extremely difficult to cope with 
such discrepancies. When Pemex asked for money for its investment programmes, the 
central authorities used to grant them half of the amount requested because they assumed that 
Pemex always asked for far more than what was needed. Knowing this, Pemex always asked 
for more than was needed so as to receive as much as possible; this became an embedded 
practice. It was a time of abundant resources and so, for him, there was a way out: if the 
central authorities did not give him the requested finances, he asked the President directly.
In Diaz Serrano’s view, the company’s results were impacted negatively when investment 
programmes were held back. This effect was dramatic in the case of the oil industry, where 
drilling a well with 24-hour-a-day operation involves enormous resources. The sooner the oil 
is extracted the better; delaying the start of operation of a well usually results in extremely 
high opportunity costs. Taking too much time in making decisions to allocate financial 
resources for operation, development, and maintenance in this context therefore had a serious 
negative impact on the capacity of the company to generate income.
The pressure on the General Director to push forward exploration and drilling projects was 
even greater because the market conditions then favoured the seller, and it was also known 
that such conditions would not last long. Pemex needed results in less than five years to 
profit from such a situation, so decisions couldn’t wait and had to be taken in time to achieve 
the desired outcomes. For example, the shipping problem for which years later, the 
government prosecuted him and he was put in jail for several years (see section 6.2.1).
During the oil boom, Diaz Serrano was able to increase prices without consulting the 
President. When the market conditions changed, he still acted as he had done previously and 
adjusted the price of oil, decreasing it by $4 per barrel. By so doing, he ensured that Pemex’s 
customers renewed their contracts. The cabinet criticized this change to the oil price on the 
grounds that he had taken an autocratic decision. He resigned and immediately the Ministry
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of Energy increased the price by $2. Overnight, Pemex lost contracts for 1 million barrels per 
day. The company had to close the production of some oil wells and lost $10 billion in eight 
months. The members of the cabinet could not understand the change in the balance of 
supply and demand in the international oil market. It was the privileged position he had in 
handling all the relevant information about the national oil industry and the international 
energy sector that made him understand the need to reduce the oil price. He stated, to end the 
interview, that modem information systems are good and necessary as a tool, but only if 
people know how to use them and have the ability to understand information.
7.3.2 Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid, 1981-1982
Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid came into the top post at Pemex as a political figure, a close 
and loyal friend of the President, a man of “all his trust”. He was given the mission to 
maximize oil sales because Pemex had started to lose its main clients rapidly. Other aspects 
of the business took lower priority. To fulfil his mission, he had to travel abroad endlessly 
throughout his administration. Mexican oil was difficult to sell in a glutted market because 
Pemex’s main product was ‘heavy’ crude oil produced offshore and not suitable for the 
production of gasoline in standard refineries.
When he took office, Moctezuma Cid came to realize that the previous administration had 
developed an enormous oil production capacity, but not the necessary infrastructure of 
distribution, pipelines, and storage. The programme of investment to capitalize on the oil 
boom had been so ambitious that many drilling projects were developed simultaneously and 
all had to be finished. The central authorities believed that oil wells could be operated simply 
by closing and opening valves, which was not the case for Pemex. The physical pressure of 
the oil in the Mexican wells made it very difficult to shut them down or control them flexibly.
Under the previous administration Pemex, had changed in a few years from being a local oil 
company to one of the most important oil corporations in the world. The traditional 
information systems at Pemex, most of which were in-house developments, had not been able 
to cope with the new operating conditions. The main goal of the previous administration was 
producing oil, so the development of trading facilities and other administrative structures was 
left behind. The company did have computer-based information systems, but not the devices 
for inputting data, and the centres of operation did not have enough measuring instruments.
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The data, opinions, and recommendations given to him by the oil experts were contradictory, 
including both pessimistic and optimistic views. There was an over-abundance of external 
information about the oil market, “information that was good and bad”.
To handle this situation, he acted on two fronts. The first one had both a medium- and a 
long-term perspective. He created a project called ‘control board’ that aimed to present in 
one room all the relevant information, both internal and external, that the General Director 
needed to carry out his work. For that project, Pemex started to develop computer-based 
information systems. As he stayed in post only for about a year, this project was never 
finished.
In the short term, he needed to obtain the prompt and accurate information required for 
decision making. To get this, he created a committee of operations in which all the main 
managers of the company met weekly to harmonize the information they each provided. 
Before this mechanism was put into practice, some managers did not even bother to check the 
information they provided. By sitting together at the meeting, they were able to compare data 
from the different areas of the organization. For example, the volume of products claimed to 
have been delivered by one area was compared with the data on the volume the recipient area 
had recorded as being received. The area mangers were therefore forced to reconcile their 
information. This was a very difficult task because the senior managerial levels of the
79operational areas had enormous power, and usually acted as “families of power ” to protect 
their own interests.
The oil engineers with long experience in the company and with strong personalities were 
accustomed to controlling their areas like field marshals. Gaining access to information was 
very difficult and the only way out of this situation was to make the managers responsible for 
the data from their own area. The General Director made the managers work together, acting 
as a facilitator in the negotiations between them. A key aspect at that moment was assuring 
the accuracy of the American Petroleum Institute (API) index73 for its oil. The API was
72 Groups of power with fraternal bounds.
73 The API is an index used to measure the density of the composition of different types of hydrocarbons in a 
specific mixture of oil. A high number means that it is classified a Tight crude’ oil, i.e. one with a 
predominance of short chains of hydrocarbons. This type of oil is in high demand for the production of gasoline 
because of its high productivity. ‘Heavy’ oils have a low API, like most of the Mexican production, and are 
used in the generation of electricity or for producing asphalt for motorway construction.
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needed to settle contracts with the clients who were demanding the maintenance of the 
quality of the oil they were buying. The only way to ensure the quality of the oil exported 
was by making the each manager responsible for his information. Moctezuma Cid observed: 
“The information system I developed could respond, even if it had shortcomings.”
The company had an enormous amount of data. Each department kept its own registers, lists, 
and reports, but that type of data was not of much value for decision making. The company 
also had a large hardware infrastructure; however, “having the computers did not mean the 
authorities had the information they needed”. Although the General Director tried to develop 
new information systems in various administrative areas during his administration, he faced 
severe resistance and even open sabotage. In some cases, the oil workers filled the computers 
with paperclips. The areas that had good results in the use of computers were those with 
substantial technical expertise in the calculations that need to be made for the company’s 
operations. A project with the Mexican Institute of Petroleum for the seismic detection of oil 
deposits gained particularly large benefits from computer use.
7.3.3 Mario Ramon Beteta, 1982-1985
When Mario Ramon Beteta became General Director in 1982, he had a reputation as a 
political figure and financial expert and industrial manager. Before then, his contact with 
Pemex in his public career had been from the outside: he was previously General Director of 
a state-owned industrial and financial holding group, after being the Minister of Finance. At 
the time he became General Director of Pemex, the post was of extraordinary importance to 
the country. Of Mexico’s total exports of $24 billion, $16 billion came from oil exports; 50% 
of the government’s tax revenues came from Pemex, which also provided 95% of the energy 
used by the national economy.
His main mission was to sell oil. He was not an oil expert; so, he realised he would not be 
telling the technical experts how to do things in the operational areas. His background was in 
finance and management, and those were the areas where he concentrated his efforts to 
reorganize Pemex in accordance with economic rationality. When he took office, he soon 
found out that the organization had inflexible and inadequate information systems that had to 
contend with impenetrable power structures which controlled the information flows. From 
his perspective, “legitimate and illegitimate interests had put these systems in place”.
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The legitimate interests arose from those employees who felt that their personal assets lay in 
the routine official procedures they performed daily. This type of employee did not welcome 
changes that would affect their work procedures because they had always done things in the 
traditional way, and had a vested interest in continuing to do that. It is difficult to be 
innovative in transforming or remodelling the administrative machinery of any organization 
characterized by this type of environment.
The illegitimate interests74 who resisted the introduction of changes also saw the introduction 
of new information systems or procedures leading to the collapse of the status quo that 
brought their personal benefits, but in ways that were not part of legitimate formal 
organizational processes. For example, it was very difficult to introduce a system that 
allowed Pemex to pay its contractors within thirty days; under the existing arrangements, 
Pemex took up to six months to pay for goods or services. In the operational areas, the 
workers created problems so they could later charge for their solution. These inefficiencies 
caused further costs to Pemex because the contractors, knowing that their payments would be 
delayed, added extra to their invoices. It proved a difficult task fighting both types of 
interests, which were both very powerful. In addition, it was impossible to deny that 
questionable deals were being carried out between different sections of the organization.
Pemex needed financial resources to pay for the efforts of reorganization and investments in 
state-of-the-art technology because the government took almost all its income. As General 
Director, Beteta tried to negotiate a reduction of this financial burden with the central 
government. His aim was to transform Pemex into an efficient company with an appropriate 
relation between the costs of operations and the income generated. To support his arguments 
in these negotiations, he used as a reference the standard of operations of other international 
oil producers, such as those of OPEC.
Pemex had 260,000 workers at that time. When he tried to reduce the cost of labour, the 
powerful Union leader known as La Quina75 opposed all the plans. The Union leaders 
exploited the transitorios, the group of senior administrators who came into office
74 They are illegitimate because the foundations of these benefits were not ethical.
75 See section 4.3 for a discussion on La Quina, the role of the Union, and the position of the transitorios.
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temporarily with each change of public administration, by employing their unconditional 
political commitment to the Union to get them to fight against the company. The Union 
issued death threats to the top managers involved in the reorganization of the company. It 
was also very difficult to promote productivity among the middle managers who had a 
reputation for technical expertise and were not willing to listen to newcomers telling them 
how to do things. The General Director was therefore in a very difficult political position 
when he undertook these changes. He had to try to foster productivity by challenging the 
status quo at the same time as guaranteeing the country’s energy supply, which was 
effectively in the hands of those oil workers identified with the status quo.
Limited options were available for developing for the top management level the type of 
information systems that could be of direct value to the General Director. When the areas 
provided information, it was not possible to know if it was reliable or how to verify it. The 
only way out of this trap was to work in co-operation with the managers responsible for each 
area, so Beteta created teams of senior managers to conduct the operations of Pemex jointly. 
They met together on what came to be called the ‘oil Friday’, when the area managers 
negotiated in front of him any necessary reconciliations of differences in the information they 
provided. They established a strict system for following up agreements. In some cases, it 
was difficult to clear up problematic arrangements, mostly relating to technical aspects. 
During his administration, he travelled to all the work centres of Pemex to be near the 
operations, so he could see for himself how things were carried out and cross-check 
information with the personnel in the different areas.
After the experience of the way Diaz Serrano determined oil prices without consultation, the 
central government fixed the company’s oil prices through a newly created committee in 
which Pemex’s top management and members of the cabinet participated. The pressure on 
the balance of payments was so strong that the company had to guarantee oil revenues; any 
change could have threatened the stability of the national economy. The government 
therefore tried to make the company continue to perform its operations while also introducing 
measures to foster productivity. It created a “committee of efficiency’ in which they asked 
for suggestions from the company’s computer experts to improve the information systems. 
The committee was aware that information technology by itself would not provide solutions 
to the problems faced by the company because of the lack of reliable information. Beteta
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pointed out that if the input to the computer is rubbish, the output would be rubbish -  but 
delivered at a higher speed.
In his view, the real conditions in which Pemex operated had enormous problems to 
overcome to achieve an ideal situation. In particular, the human resources available to the 
company limited the possibility of achieving the desired efficiency goals. So he brought into 
Pemex people whom he trusted, and who had work experience in the public sector or in 
private companies. Most of them had completed postgraduate studies abroad. He said that his 
team did their best given the historical circumstances in which they were working. No 
management techniques or technologies were then available that could have solved the type 
of problems they faced, but they established the foundations for further progress.
The Union was very upset with this team, who were nicknamed ‘Smurfs’ (see section 6.3.1). 
In order to have peaceful relations with the oil workers, Beteta decided to leave the technical 
aspects of the company to the oil industry professionals and had his team heading up the 
administrative and financial functions. The Union opposed all his changes, especially the 
redundancy plans; they carried out acts of sabotage in many cases. They also opposed the 
development of information systems, because reliable information could expose the 
inefficiencies and the consequent opportunities to reduce expenses and costs. “The Union 
had real power and used it.”
The ability of Pemex managers to make decisions on key aspects of the company’s operations 
was limited by the participation of the central government’s representatives on the board of 
governors of the company. The Union could also interfere in the operations of the company. 
In addition, the management’s room to manoeuvre was restricted because of the importance 
of the company to the national economy. The information Pemex had to provide to the 
national accounting office, and the many public policies that regulated its operations, further 
restricted the company’s capacity to define new managerial practices. Beteta faced difficult 
negotiations with some members of the cabinet who wanted to impose a heavier fiscal burden 
on Pemex. The accountancy and financial procedures were very complex because the Pemex 
budget had to comply with national budgetary arrangements.
Nevertheless, he was able to carry out some changes. He established the use of public 
tendering for contracting goods and services; even if this was not always the cheapest option,
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he believed it would helped to open up the process. By opening the tenders to international 
contractors they were able to reduce costs and delivery times. With the development of 
internal systems, Pemex was able to pay its contractors in less than six months, and 
eventually within one month.
7.3.4 Francisco Rojas, 1985-1994
Francisco Rojas was appointed General Director of Pemex in 1985, before the end of one 
presidential period and he stayed in the post for the period of the next public administration. 
When he was appointed, the company had more than 200,000 workers and a very powerful 
Union with entrenched areas of power. The managers of the operational centres had to heed 
the will of the local Union leader. All the actions undertaken to improve Pemex’s 
performance had to be analysed with regard to the historical conditions in which they took 
place. Trying to control the human resources of the company through the use of information 
technology would not have worked, because the proper procedures and industrial relations 
were not in place.
On taking office, Rojas realized that the Under-directorates worked independently, as if they 
were different businesses each safeguarding their own interests. It was very difficult to get 
reliable information. He created an executive committee including all the under-directors and 
his personal advisors. This meant the ten most important managers in the organization were 
among those who attended the weekly meeting of this committee, which exchanged 
information and shared responsibility for the management decisions taken by the committee. 
“This shared responsibility was for good and bad; in the best conditions, it achieved the co­
operation of the parties in carrying out the decisions taken in the group, and even in the worst 
situations the parties at least did not hamper the implementation of decisions.” The meetings 
always involved negotiations to settle differences between the participants. “These under­
directors knew they had real power. They had the operations of the company in their hands, 
and so did the Union leaders who controlled most of the projects to develop the infrastructure 
of Pemex.”
A main goal of Rojas’s administration was to implement an industrial relations policy, 
specifically trying to reclaim the company from the Union. He also focused on: the 
technology of the operations; drilling and oil production; and the definition of responsibilities
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of each organizational entity. In Pemex “nobody was responsible for anything”, a feature 
inherited historically from the time of the expropriation when the workers controlled the 
operations and anything was acceptable as long as the oil kept flowing. He tried to develop 
information systems in parallel to those that were in place to support his management. He 
had a clear understanding that information technology had a fundamental role in 
management, but in his opinion the organization had to be prepared in terms of culture to 
receive the technology; if it was not ready for this, then those investments would have ended 
up being wasted.
During his administration, Rojas introduced an entrepreneurial culture in which people had to 
be responsible for their decisions and, in consequence, would care for the economic aspects 
of the business. This represented a change of organizational ideology towards one in which 
operational decision making was carried out by middle-level managers with a focus on: 
productivity; costs and benefits; and transfer costs. The process of change of the organization 
started with the introduction of the economic rationale. This process later brought the 
restructuring of the organization into divisions, and later still its split into subsidiaries.
Rojas said that the company had about 100,000 too many workers in comparison with 
international standards. The first restructuring efforts started by redefining the relations 
between management and the Union and the modification of the collective labour contract, in 
line with his basic goal of reclaiming control of the company from the Union. The labour 
contracts were revised every two years; in the meantime, he tried to make progress in other 
areas such as information systems. The introduction of the concept of evaluation represented 
a dramatic change for the workers, who had never before been obliged to inform management 
of their performance. Evaluation came as a cultural shock to those who considered 
themselves proprietors of the company. Rojas’ team had to introduce the idea of maximizing 
value and economic rationality, which were principles that were not part of the social 
arrangements within which oil workers had been accustomed to perform their work. The 
team had to make the middle managers and workers understand what was now needed for the 
company. “The mental change was fundamental, the rest of the transformation could be done 
afterwards.”
Rojas frequently travelled to the different work centres of Pemex to motivate people as part 
of his leadership role. Negotiations with the Union were based on the idea that Pemex could
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remain as a state-owned company only if it became more efficient. The Union had to 
compromise in order to reduce costs to make the operations more productive. The 
management looked to consultants for advice. The proposal for reorganization was to keep 
Pemex as an integrated oil company within the structure of a corporate group. The 
transformation project had to deal with the legal aspects of defining a new organic law and an 
organizational structure that would suit the new definition.
At that particular time, information systems were not a priority even though the company had 
a multiplicity of incompatible systems. During Rojas’ administration, Pemex had developed 
an executive information system utilizing touch-screen technology. He suggested that 
although it was a good system, the information he needed as General Director was related to 
strategic aspects of decision making and negotiations, not detailed data in real time. 
Corporate information systems were an important development in his period in office, but the 
problem of data reliability remained. However, the institutional database helped to provide a 
means to follow up the performance of the group, to co-ordinate the operations, and to get 
budget spending under control.
The need to settle differences through negotiations during the meetings of the executive 
committee persisted, but with fewer discrepancies than when the committee was first created. 
The problem that Pemex would continue to face was that it had to cope with two different 
accounting systems: the traditional Pemex accountancy system and that of the budget and 
national accounts. Translating the performance of the operations from one to the other 
requires an enormous effort due to the complexity of such a transition, because one was based 
on income and expenditure and the other on cash flows.
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8 C o n t en t  o f  c h a n g e
It has been recognized that information technology enables organizational change, but the 
precise nature of that change depends on the type of information system and its impact in the 
specific context where it is implemented (Hammer and Champy 1993) (Davenport and Short 
1990).
8.1 T y pes  o f  C o n t en t  of  C h a n g e  a t  Pe m ex
So far, this thesis has examined in detail the context and the process of change at Pemex, both 
at the organizational level and in relation to its use of information systems. Here, the content 
of change is analysed in terms of the actual outcome of these processes and the desired 
outcome that the authorities had sought.
The impact that information systems development efforts had on Pemex as an organization 
resulted in changes that are mostly related to the introduction of a technical and economic 
rationale into operations. These can be catalogued into three types, depending on the nature 
of the activity and the benefits that the use of this technology enabled; this research’s analysis 
characterizes these types by the terms ‘automate’, ‘systemize’, and ‘informate’
• To ‘automate’ implies the introduction of electronic processing to 
manual procedures, and the immediate benefit is efficiency -  the same 
activities being performed faster. The risk of this is that the speeding up 
might be of an unnecessarily tortuous procedure, which would hide 
organizational inefficiency. Automation is usually applied to vertical 
functions within isolated systems that process specific data related to that 
function. For this, requirement analysis is done separately by function. 
The implementation of this type of system usually represents a challenge 
to the status quo in terms of layout, job redesign, and the structure of 
control over the information. It also usually implies that information is 
controlled by the organizational unit in charge of data processing. This 
kind of use typically reduces data errors because it decreases the need for 
human intervention in the input procedures and avoids duplication within 
this procedure. The quality of data would depend on the process used for 
validating data and having it verified by users. To be effective, this should 
take place within a framework of goodwill, where the data entry personnel 
understand the data and the repercussions of their work.
• To ‘systemize’ involves the analysis and redefinition of processes 
utilizing the potential for integrated systems offered by new technology.
76 ‘Informate’ is a term coined by Zuboff (1988).
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This type of use is usually linked to business process re-engineering. The 
actual procedures of the organization are analysed with the aim of 
simplifying them, and even defining new ways of operating enabled by the 
technology, using processes that cut across the different functions of an 
organization by processes . It introduces an economic rationale by 
reducing costs through eliminating procedures duplicated between 
functions. This process implies rationalizing the operations of the 
company with a holistic perspective, as well as the development of 
integrated systems using a single corporate database. In most cases, the 
development of such systems has implied following arrangements 
common to firms in the same industrial sector. With this type of 
information system, the organization can achieve the goal of obtaining 
properly validated data on time: data that accurately reflects the 
organization’s current actual conditions of operations. This arrangement 
usually implies the homogenization of procedures in accordance with the 
prescriptions of experts.
• To ‘informate’ implies the use of the data available for informed 
decision-making regarding the operations of the company. This type of 
use requires the availability of good data, together with the ability to use it 
and make sense of it as information. The validated data is analysed to 
evaluate operations and provide the basis for decision making. This use 
also implies understanding the potentialities and limits of the technology 
as an entity that deals with abstract data, not with reality. It is in this style 
of use that the true strategic nature of technology is manifested, by its 
ability to link up the relationship between knowledge and understanding 
(Tricker 1992) and ground decision making. This use does not necessarily 
imply standard arrangements of information systems or systematization. 
The prerequisite is having high-quality data, then learning and 
understanding how to use it to make more effective decisions through 
evaluation and analysis of all aspects that affect the organization. Data 
availability is a requirement, but it does not mean that by just having data 
the organization actually has this type of use of information systems; 
informatization cannot be achieved just by undertaking the systematization 
of an organization through the development of an integrated corporate 
information system. In many cases, processing more data through a 
computer-based information system can lead to information overload and 
the incompetent use of information (Ciborra 1996).
These three types of use of computer-based information systems are context dependent. The 
specific conditions of every organization give meaning to the use of information systems. 
The state-of-the-art of technology and the characteristics of the context define the 
potentialities of, and limits to, the use of information systems. Specifically, the development 
of corporate integrated online systems requires the development of telecommunications and 
database technologies.
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Applying this typology in Pemex shows that the content of change introduced by its 
mainstream computer-based information system efforts is closely linked to the development 
of the technologies and to organizational change. For the first period studied, starting with 
the introduction of the first computers until the early 1980s (see Chapter 5), the diffusion of 
information technology into the administrative function implied the automation of manual 
procedures. The benefits brought by the use of computer-based information systems came 
not only from the increased speed brought to the procedures, where data was processed 
promptly, but also from the reduction of personal discretion in manipulating the data.
The problem of data reliability persisted when data input to computer systems was done by 
unqualified personnel. In this period, the systems were organized according to the 
geographic location of the different working centres of the organization and the technology 
was based on mainframes. Even if the official policy for information systems was heavily 
centralized, each working centre applied its own local rules to the automation; and each 
information technology centre, even if it was not recognized officially, worked autonomously 
in the determination of the local computer architecture and software requirements. Systems 
were developed with ad hoc styles to produce prompt benefits from the automation of manual 
procedures.
The second period that started in the early 1980s (see Chapter 6) comprised a different type 
of content in the change brought about by computer-based information systems. In 1985, 
with the formulation of the official policy of open systems and the creation of the core 
corporate systems, the organization underwent a new process of automation that involved a 
certain level of systematization. The technical professionals responsible for these 
information systems analysed processes in order to refine and standardize them across the 
organization; however, these were functional rather than process oriented. The new systems 
allowed for the integration of the financial functions of the company through the exchange of 
information between them, using electronic interfaces developed to avoid the duplication of 
data input.
The corporate systems did bring horizontal integration of the organization across each 
financial function. The different working centres of the organization scattered throughout the 
country mainly used these corporate systems to carry out their major financial operations. 
For the first time in its history, the organization, was able to standardize to a great extent its
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financial procedures and data. In terms of the organizational change, this allowed the 
integration of a single company rather than having a conglomerate of companies as it had 
been in the past.
During this second period, the institutional database was restructured. By 1988, the reliable 
data about the general operations of the organization that this system began providing was 
used to analyse and evaluate the operation of the organization. This system enabled the 
computer-based information systems to be used for informatization, but that was limited to 
the planning area where technical experts knew and understand how to use data. This change 
implied the institutionalization of the economic rationale, as explained in the analysis in 
Chapter 9.
Systematization characterized the last project undertaken by the corporate group as part of the 
mainstream efforts on the development of an integrated corporate information system through 
the implementation of the SAP/3 enterprise resource planning package. While it is too soon 
to be able to evaluate the impact of the redesign of processes this involved, what can be said 
with some certainty is that such a system in itself will not necessarily bring the 
informatization of the organization. The information that can be made available might still 
not be used by workers or employees for a variety of reasons, perhaps because they consider 
that they do not need it or that they do not have the competences to carry out the necessary 
analysis or evaluations.
This explains why the relocation of people from operational areas to analysis activities is not 
a simple process and will be difficult to implement Such a change would, out of necessity, 
require training in: the use of techniques of analysis; a process of learning to understand the 
data and its use; and the transformation of the organizational environment into one that would 
allow decision making based on data analysis. This would lead to a change of culture to one 
that would value: structured information as an important foundation for decision making 
processes; making sense of information; and having a clear purpose for its use, including 
economic and financial evaluation. What seems clear is that the aim of Pemex’s authorities 
was to informatize the organization, but they held the belief that systematization would be 
sufficient on its own to bring that about. The redefinition of processes and the fulfilment of 
regulations implied an enormous risk for the project, but greater complexity is needed to 
achieve the informatization of the organization.
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As for the other non-mainstream information systems efforts, it appears that the use of 
computer-based information systems has resulted in informatization in the specialized 
technical areas. Since the 1970s, these areas have been using computers to facilitate the 
calculation of sophisticated mathematical functions to guide project decision making in the 
construction of installations and drilling of wells.
The description of Pemex’s information systems allows a longitudinal analysis of the process 
of changing the organization and, as Pettigrew (1983) points out, a longer time perspective 
allows an analysis to understand the permanence of organizations. Even with the enormous 
amount of resources allocated at Pemex to develop computer-based information systems 
since the 1960s, the four General Directors interviewed faced a similar problem: lack of 
reliable information. This does not imply that the company’s information systems efforts did 
not have benefits, but it does highlight the complex challenge that is inherent to the process 
of changing an organization. The aim of the change was to introduce a technical and 
economic rationale, but this was seen as alien and even a threat to the status quo and the very 
raison d ’etre of the organization because it was in conflict with the ethos of a state-owned 
company whose goal was service, not profits.
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9 A n a l y sis
The description of the case study given in earlier chapters highlighted both the complexity 
and specificity of the social setting being examined. It showed how social circumstances form 
a web that interconnects the daily acts of people as they try to make sense of their 
circumstances, while also fulfilling their work commitments according to their own 
understanding and to the interests of the group (Orlikowski 1992). These aspects are, in turn, 
shown to relate to the actors’ mental frameworks as structured by their institutionalized 
values. In this way, the people involved enact the process of changing the organization 
within its cultural environment, where the institutionalized values shape their acts and 
decisions -  and these acts enforce the institutionalization of those values (Zucker 1987). The 
clash of political groups arose from two main sources: the people who came from within the 
organization with specific institutionalized values; and the ‘others’, the group who came from 
the ‘aliens’ outside the organization and had different institutionalized values. Each strove to 
assert their own order as being the best one for the needs of the organization and the well 
being of the country.
The analysis in this chapter of the Pemex case study is carried out at the macro level in terms 
of the explanation of the social order. It focuses specifically on the character of the prevalent 
institutionalized environments that were identified in the organization, with the recognition 
this is just one possible interpretation, constructed upon the theoretical basis of the research 
and its objectives (Pettigrew 1983). Account is taken of how the process of change is in a 
continuous flux, so that an interpretation at one point in time and from a certain perspective 
does not mean to represent the ultimate outcome of the change process as a definite result, 
but as an insight into the prevailing trends of the process of dialectic forces that interact in a 
social setting.
This analysis interprets the case using the theoretical bases of institutional theory and the 
specific framework of the prevailing institutional orders of modernity identified by Berger, 
Berger, and Kellner (1973). The explanation of the case emphasizes the dichotomy between 
the economic/technical rationale and the political rationale as the contrasting central 
principles of the two key institutionalized environments that were identified in the social 
setting in which Pemex operates, both at national and organizational levels.
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This dichotomy is also manifested in the interpretation of the case study in terms of two 
divergent forces that shape information systems. One force drives organizational change and 
the use of information technology towards so-called ‘best international practices’, which have 
a homogenizing character founded in a economic/technical rationale. The other force 
recognizes the imperative of the political rationale of local conditions and sees the 
development of information systems in the context of arrangements that are appropriate for 
contingent conditions. These include influences that tend to move events and relationships 
towards a diversity of outcomes, each with its own specificity reflecting the characteristics of 
local conditions.
As the data from the case study illustrates, the so-called ‘soft’ aspects of information systems 
-  related not solely to human aspects but also to the social, cultural, and political factors -  are 
predominant factors in the development of both Pemex as an organization and its information 
systems. The changes in these that have been described in this thesis arose strongly as a 
result of the particular character of Pemex as a state-owned organization. Its social and 
cultural setting is distinct from that of private companies in industrialized countries, which 
operate in accordance with a market rationale and have been the object of most studies in 
information systems research.
As a state-owned oil company in Mexico, Pemex has been linked since its origins to very 
strong nationalistic feelings in a country that has striven to develop through the path of 
modernization. Until recently, it held a public monopoly in almost all activities of the oil 
sector. Its agenda as a monopolistic state-owned company has not followed a market 
rationale and a profit orientation; instead, its mission has been determined by the social and 
political role it has had in the life of the country. The social, cultural, and political features of 
its environment have deeply permeated the social arrangements of operations, which do not 
necessary follow a economic/technical rationale. The company’s administrations in recent 
years have tried to adjust its operations to the economic/technical rationale with the aim of 
making its operations efficient, but without modifying its character as a state-owned 
company. The analysis in this chapter seeks to understand the major influences that have 
made the fulfilment of this objective very complex. These forces operate at the level of 
institutional values of the social setting that shapes people’s behaviour and decisions. The 
analysis is structured around the prevailing characteristics of the two historical periods
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identified in chapters 5 and 6, at national and organizational levels as well as in relation to 
efforts to develop Pemex’s information systems.
9.1 L in k s  bet w e e n  Pem ex  and  th e  N a tio n a l  C o n tex t
The close interconnection between the economic policy of the central government and the 
style of Pemex’s various administrations has been one of the clearest themes of this case 
study. Changes of central government policy implied direct changes in the administration of 
the organization, as expressed explicitly through changes in the mission of the company and 
in the characteristics of the General Directors selected by the Mexican President of the time. 
These changes had further implications for the company’s organizational structure and its 
information systems. Both the central government and the organization had been immersed 
in a process of modernization in two distinctive stages: the earlier period (see chapter 5), 
dating mainly from the end of the 1930s until the early 1980s, was predominantly 
bureaucratic; from the end of that period until today (see chapter 6), a second phase has seen 
the economic rationale becoming dominant.
The economic policies of the central government can be understood in relation to the 
prevailing political stance of each President towards the process of modernization. The 
Mexican government has regarded the achievement of the ideal goal of modernization as a 
process led by experts, and its strong intolerance of dissent has also prevented any critical 
analysis of its policies until recently. The legitimacy of the political position in the first stage 
was underpinned by the political structure inherited from the nationalistic character of the 
Mexican Revolution. In the second stage, particularly since the middle of the 1980s, 
legitimacy has been grounded in the professional qualifications of the people in power who 
have defined the policies, most of whom have held postgraduate qualifications from outside 
Mexico.
The elite of foreign-trained professionals is visualized in the local culture as being the carrier 
of formal knowledge. It is taken for granted that they are the ones who ‘know best’ because 
of their qualifications. The malinchismo characteristic of the local culture, which privileges 
what arises from abroad over what comes from local sources (see section 4.2), has also 
enforced the position of power the professional elite and the institutionalization of values 
coming from abroad. That elite is seen as the personification of science that carries the
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unchallengeable values of progress and modernization, which are perceived as superior to the 
local culture and possessing a universal and objective character that is value free.
9.2  Two M a in  H ist o r ic a l  Per io d s
The two distinctive historical periods in the twentieth century identified by this research 
correspond with the predominance of two main economic strategies followed by the central 
Mexican government in its process of modernization. In the first period to the early 1980s, 
the government followed a welfare policy in which the state took responsibility for the 
creation and distribution of social wealth through its central economic role as a generator of 
demand. Since then, the neo-liberal paradigm has become dominant and the size of the state 
has been reduced, but the government has kept the role of regulation and policy formulation. 
Direct state intervention in the economy has continued only in ‘strategic areas’, mainly in the 
oil and power industries.
During the first period, the development of Mexico was subordinate to three main influences: 
the political life of the country built on the spirit of nationalism aroused by the privatization 
of the oil industry; the socialist-oriented rhetoric of the post-revolutionary governments; and 
state control over the labour movement. State participation in the oil industry is an 
institutional value identified with national sovereignty and sealed as law in the National 
Constitution of the country. The economic conditions of that period allowed the development 
of Pemex as an organization that was not required to comply with the dominant economic 
rationale. Production costs did not matter as operations were financed through public debt in 
the early part of this period, and since the late 1970s and early 1980s by foreign resources 
borrowed in the expectation that the oil boom would result in high petrodollar incomes. The 
predominant institutional environment was of a bureaucracy coexisting with local cultural 
and political features. During this period, Pemex was an agent of the government which 
distributed wealth through the creation of employment and generated demand by providing 
contracts to local companies for services and goods. The operations of the company were 
subordinated to its political role. They followed a political rationale which was dysfunctional 
from the perspective of the economic/technical rationale.
By the early 1980s, the second period emerged with the central government’s adoption neo­
liberal economic policies. Government intervention in economic activities was then greatly
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reduced to permit the operation of regulatory market forces. The style of administration of 
Pemex also shifted to one that sought to follow this economic rationale; this could be seen in 
its attempts to control and evaluate the operations of the company and to shape the decision- 
taking processes in its operational areas. Supporters of the economic/technical rationale 
undertook a struggle against the traditional political groups to make their technical values the 
predominant institutionalized environment in the organization. During this period, Pemex 
has struggled to detach itself ffonj: its role of government agent in order to become a global 
company whose operations are regulated by the same economic/technical rationale as a 
global market-oriented enterprise.
9.3 Two Ke y  In stitu t io n a l  D im en sio n s
The analysis of the data from the case study shows that the social factors affecting Pemex’s 
organizational change and information systems development appear as two main
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institutionalized dimensions, the ‘economic/technical’ and ‘bureaucratic’ ; these are 
identified with the two main political groups who endeavoured to reshape the company’s 
strategy. The ‘plurality of worlds’ is identified as another important institutional dimension, 
which this thesis considers as being within the bureaucratic dimension because the values of 
these two dimensions appeared to be intrinsically linked. In Pemex, local values, such as that 
of malinchismo, were embedded within the bureaucratic order. However, the way in which 
Pemex has many different premises scattered throughout the country makes it difficult to 
identify specific characteristics arising from local features. When taking into consideration 
of the plurality of worlds within the bureaucratic order, these local characteristics are not 
explicitly highlighted and only the prevailing organizational values are considered for the 
analysis.
Each of the two main institutional dimensions -  the technical/rational and the bureaucratic -  
is built on different fundamental principles or rationales. The institutional orders and their 
basic principles build the perceptions of what is ‘the right way to do things’, reflecting an 
implicit social order that is taken for granted.
77Berger, Berger, and Kellner (1973) and Scott and Meyer (1983) identify economic/technical and bureaucratic 
as the two main institutional dimensions present in modem society.
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The identification of these institutional orders is just one possible way of analyzing the case 
study. The researcher recognizes that this interpretation helps to illuminate the understanding 
of the social setting because it helps to trace the relationships between the social context, the 
process of change of the organization, and Pemex’s information systems development. Even 
though this can hide the complexity of the social and political dimensions, a structured 
approach is used to disentangle these relations.
The economic/technical and bureaucratic political dimensions appear to have been present in 
the organization throughout its history, in varying degrees of strength. The process of change 
of the organization is built on the dialectical interaction and tension between them, and their 
basic principles ground their power and legitimacy in the social context. The bureaucratic 
rationale is built from the influences of local conditions as shown, for example, in the way 
Pemex has been shaped by the circumstances in which it originated as a company.
The economic/technical dimension, on the other hand, has rationality as its central principle 
that is presented as a pressure to conform to universal prescriptions dictated by scientific 
knowledge. This rationale is institutionalized in formal knowledge and in technology. 
During the first period of the Pemex study, it was expressed through engineering techniques. 
The company’s local culture has taken for granted that the carriers of such knowledge are the 
professionals; in the second period, this knowledge was identified with professionals holding 
postgraduate qualifications from outside Mexico. Such knowledge appears to have an 
objective character and acts as a universal homogenizing force because modernization and 
progress promote the imitation of organizations of Western industrialized economies. This 
has been the ideological force that has shaped the industrialization of Western society in a 
common pattern of development, with globalization being its latest stage. It has been 
expressed in Pemex in recent years through the efforts undertaken to transform it into a 
global company.
The technical rationale is identified with engineering normative prescriptions based on 
scientific explanations of how operations are to be carried out. The institutionalization of this 
rationality is presented as free of politics and as the only valid social option. In Pemex, the 
legitimacy of the economic rationale has been backed by the elite of foreign-educated public 
administrators who have controlled a majority of the highest posts of country’s political
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structure since the early 1980s. The legitimacy of the engineering perspective arises from the 
social recognition of the professionalism of the company’s engineers.
9.3.1 Dialectic Interaction of the Two Institutional Dimensions
The economic/technical and bureaucratic dimensions in Pemex do not exclude each other; as 
the case study shows, their influences are built by the tension of their mutual interaction. 
Both dimensions are present at any given moment, with each offering its own ‘correct way of 
doing things’. At certain times, one prevails over the other in shaping operational 
arrangements and information systems in accordance with its values. This tension between 
the dimensions is not necessarily homogenous throughout the organization.
9.3.2 What Occurred when a Bureaucratic Rationale Prevailed
During the first period to the early 1980s, the economic/technical and bureaucratic 
dimensions coexisted in a ‘working relationship’. At that time, the bureaucratic dimension 
was dominant and the economic rationale was presented only from the technical perspective 
of the engineering discipline. This was not the case during the second period, in which the 
basic principles of the institutionalized dimensions became contradictory and strong tensions 
arose between groups holding different values. The different groups supported their 
decisions and vested interests by using as their sources of power the core principles and 
rationales of the values of the institutionalized dimensions with which they identified 
themselves. They did not do this consciously, but as a set of taken-for-granted underlying 
assumptions.
Ultimately, the dominant legitimacy and prevalence of one of the institutionalized dimensions 
comes from the cultural and political support given to it by the social environment at a 
particular time. The use of information technology embeds the values of the technical 
rationale and is applied by engineers in a company as their taken-for-granted way of acting. 
This institutionalization has enforced the trend of using this technology as an end in itself.
During the first period, the economic/technical dimension was present through the technical 
rationale of the engineers who helped to build Pemex as a vertically integrated oil company. 
The engineers’ legitimacy was grounded in their vocational training and was frequently based 
on stories of their performance in difficult technical situations; some stories, like stopping a
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dangerous oil leak, became myths and legends which were enhanced by the local cultural 
facet of the macho que no se raja (male that does not give up). The legitimacy from myths 
gave the engineers political power within the values of the bureaucratic dimension. These 
leaders were treated with high respect -  almost like knights -  and their authority was never 
challenged.
The prime mission of the organization was to produce oil to keep the national economy 
running, so processes carried out in field operations had priority over any administrative 
functions. It should also be pointed out that, generally, companies all over the world at that 
time were production-driven as an institutionalized value. The information systems at the 
different premises of Pemex were organized manually at the discretion of the local leaders, 
usually following the style of the systems instituted by the previous owners, the foreign 
companies that had been nationalized. A multiplicity of diverse manual systems existed 
across the company. The only data that mattered was the volume of production, regardless of 
costs. The unique style of each site, the interest of local groups, and the personal preferences 
of the local leaders made the operation of the data flows discretionary. This led to the data 
being inconsistent.
The influence of indigenous cultural features of the local social settings can be seen in the ad 
hoc arrangement of information flows, which was representative of the values of the different 
‘life worlds’ embedded within the bureaucratic dimension. The structure of the organization 
as a public company represented the bureaucratic order of this dimension, through which the 
political rationale of the country permeated the operations of the entire organization. At a 
low hierarchical level, this political rationale was expressed in the tortuous bureaucratic 
procedures and over-abundance of inconsistent data, which was not only often redundant but 
also frequently collected for no specific purpose. Historically, activities were structured in a 
way that led to data collection being carried out in a certain way ‘because it has always been 
done that way before’. At higher levels, the strength of the political rationale was clearly 
seen in a situation where making a decision about technical operations was viewed as 
subordinate to political considerations. An example of this dynamic was when the 
organization was importing gasoline although it had spare capacity in its refinery to process 
crude oil; this was because importing oil represented a loss of sovereignty, whereas importing 
gasoline did not.
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The organization also showed evidence of the power of local managers and union leaders as 
caciques, the ‘owners of lands and lives’ who had been the country’s prevalent political 
structure. This feature was expressed through the power of the local managers to shape the 
procedures used in the premises they controlled, in order to suit their specific interests and 
personal styles. They changed the procedures whenever they considered it convenient, with 
no notice or advice to central authorities. The local managers also controlled the data to be 
collected, who received it, and who could provide it; this usually ensured that they 
themselves were the channels of communication with other authorities, using informal means 
like telephone calls. This characteristic would have been outrageous in another social setting, 
but in Mexico at that time it was the taken-for-granted local political style. In this specific 
context, the values of the political rationale embedded in the bureaucratic dimension served 
as a force of cohesion to provide identity to Pemex as a unified national organization and as a 
symbol of national sovereignty.
During this first historical period, the strength of the political rationale allowed the 
development of a network of informal flows of information built upon personal relations, 
which meant that the provision of information was negotiated among leaders in the company. 
The automation of procedures through the introduction of information technology followed 
the same rationale, arguably reinforced by the type of technology available at that time; this 
was limited to mainframes, so worked only with centralized structures. The implementation 
of mainframe-based information systems was structured as ‘islands of automation’, allowing 
the continuation of the controlled flow of information to other areas of the organization. The 
automation was carried out mainly in administrative functions or for calculations in high- 
expertise engineering activities. The information flows in the areas of operations remained 
under the political rationale of the bureaucratic dimension described above.
During the development of these information systems, the power struggle between central 
control and the local power bases in which local caciquismo prevailed found expression 
throughout the organization, for example in the development of computer-based systems as 
islands of automation with ad hoc methodologies and styles of operations. There was also 
practically no previous experience in the organization or the country of these new types of 
activities. The social features of caciquismo were enforced by the technology available at 
that time, as the mainframes with different and incompatible operating systems encouraged 
the development of isolated systems. Technical standardization could have been possible to a
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certain degree, as was tried with the IBM ‘integral system’ communication project (see 
section 5.4.2), but events at Pemex demonstrated that political considerations always 
prevailed over technical arguments.
The information systems of the organization developed with a strong local orientation that 
avoided central control from the organization’s authorities. This feature was enforced by the 
central government’s procurement procedures. All government information technology 
procurement had to be authorized by the national institution responsible for the information 
technology policy. This policy tried to subordinate information technology procurement 
(including Pemex’s) to an economic rationale, in order to protect the development of
78indigenous hardware production capabilities . Later, when information technology imports 
were liberalized, Pemex’s procurement policy tried to restrict local leaders’ political power. 
In many cases, these procedures ended up restricting the flexibility of the technical rationale.
The influence of the Trade Union in the bureaucratic dimension was considerable. The 
political power of the Union’s leaders and the managers of the areas of operation arose from 
the political situation formed by the expropriation of private oil assets in Mexico. The 
workers and technical managers had a monopoly on both the ability to understand and the 
capacity to undertake the technical processes of production. They used this legitimacy and 
power, both at the local level and with the central authorities, to keep control over the 
company’s operations. The organization had a predominantly masculine character, arising 
from both the engineering orientation of the industry and the need for hard manual labour in 
the operational areas, re-enforced by the national macho culture in which men are expected to 
display social power and professional development.
The technical operations of the organization were carried out in accordance with a drive 
towards excellence of engineering techniques: in the words of one manager, “professionalism 
was embedded in our practices due to our vocational training, we tried to do things using our 
best understanding of the situation”. This was an expression of the subordinate 
technical/rationale dimension. Pemex achieved international recognition for some of its 
engineering practices, even though the technical values of the engineering profession were
78 The policy was based on recommendations grounded in the theory of development based on import 
substitution.
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subordinate to the political rationale. Whenever a manager’s political capital was at risk, 
orders from superiors had to be followed up, even if that meant contravening engineering- 
based recommendations.
Relations with the Union went through a number of stages. The first relevant incident for the 
case study happen during the administration of Reyes Heroles (1964-1969), who had a 
difficult relationship with the Union. He attempted a reorganization of the company’s 
operations and managed to introduce some computer-based systems that challenged the 
power of local leaders. For instance, systems that introduced the economic/technical 
rationale to payroll and warehouse management challenged the political rationale of the 
bureaucratic dimension which supported Pemex’s historical arrangements. They brought 
clear-cut benefits in terms of efficiency by reducing the cost of stocks and labour overtime 
worked, as well as starting the process of standardizing procedures for activities in some 
areas of the organization.
Pemex’s early computer-based systems were modified to suit the local conditions at the work 
centres, as their developers had recognized how different systems requirements arose both for 
technical reasons and because of the particular styles of local operations. The political power 
of the various local leaders was addressed in negotiations during the process of information 
systems development. The developers tried, when possible, to choose areas for 
computerization where managers were friendly to the team implementing the system. If the 
situation became critical, as a last resort the developers would declare open hostilities on the 
users’ resistance; in an extreme case, they even used military force against the users to protect 
the computer infrastructure.
The current employees of the organization have almost forgotten these first efforts of 
automation, which were the first steps towards integrating Pemex as a single unified 
company. Central authorities tried to introduce control over the local operations, which led to 
a new order arising. From the economic/technical rationale, this was evident in terms of 
engineering and managerial considerations; from the bureaucratic perspective, it was seen in 
the creation of a new identity for Pemex as a single national company. These first systems 
were able to introduce a certain degree of rationality to the operations because they took into 
account the political rationale in both the redefinition of the software and in the negotiations 
they undertook with local managers in the implementation.
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In the first experiences of automation at Pemex, the institutionalized values of the 
economic/technical order clashed with the political order of the bureaucratic dimension, 
leading to openly-organized sabotage of the system by the staff who measured the amount of 
overtime worked. Despite such resistance, in this case the economic/technical values 
prevailed over the vested interest of the group whose legitimacy arose from the political 
sphere and indigenous culture. However, the systems were eventually made to operate, and 
the benefits gained from them were achieved primarily through the way in which the people 
developing the systems took into account the existence of the bureaucratic institutionalized 
dimension and managed that successfully. They did not do this consciously; instead, the use 
of common sense guided them to negotiate and compromise -  although they also had to use 
military force to address open sabotage from the workers.
The oil boom of the early 1970s saw the rationale of the bureaucratic dimension gaining new 
power. The organization’s goal of achieving the expansion of oil exports regardless of any 
other consideration boosted the political power of the bureaucratic dimension to its furthest
7 0point. This situation was enforced by the local political institution, the presidencialismo , 
and the lack of a democratic culture. Fulfilling the goals of the investment programme for 
the infrastructure expansion had paramount political importance. No one would have risked 
the political cost of failing to meet deadlines. ‘Just do it’ was the feeling that dominated the 
atmosphere in the organization.
The activities of the infrastructure expansion were carried out with enormous buffers to avoid 
putting at risk the political capital of managers. The economic rationale was displaced during 
the oil boom, and the events of that period are full of outrageous excesses when viewed from 
an economic/technical perspective. Within the political rationale that then prevailed, the 
operations were managed without any regard to financial considerations: the taken-for- 
granted way of carrying out operations was to do ‘anything but stop the expansion’. The 
political discourse of the President at the time was based on the idea that “we have to manage 
wealth, we are a rich country”. His personal power saturated the political rationale of that 
period, with the power of the presidencialismo stridently enforced. Taking into account costs 
or any other consideration on the grounds of economic rationale was seen as being out of
79 Concentration of power in a sole political figure, the President.
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place. Nevertheless, Jorge Diaz Serrano, Pemex’s General Director of that period, explained 
that the events of those days were subordinate to the economic rationale. In his view, the 
main goal was to carry out the expansion of the infrastructure at full speed, in order to allow 
the country to take advantage of the high oil prices prevailing at that time in the international 
oil market. The expansion of oil export capabilities was seen as the way to maximize the 
value of the oil reserves in terms of national income.
As the administrative functions and the information systems in this period were basically 
dominated by the political rationale, the bureaucratic apparatus of the organization went 
through a great expansion; as a result, the past successes of some of the automated systems, 
such as the one for warehouse control, were lost because their use was stopped. The 
expansion of the production activities was developed in an ad hoc way suited to the historic 
conditions, thereby re-enforcing the power of local groups whose vested interests sometimes 
overshadowed the organization’s well being as seen from the economic rationale.
During the oil boom, Pemex’s information systems continued to mirror the local political 
arrangements of caciquismo, but the local leaders were greatly empowered by the paramount 
economic importance that the oil industry for the government and the Union. The local 
caciques were both managers of the organization and leaders of the Union. Their control 
over information was their main source of power in negotiating favourable conditions to suit 
their personal political capital and vested interests. Managers portrayed themselves as 
indispensable because nobody else understood how the expansion and operations could be 
carried out; they had made sure they were the only one who knew how things were actually 
done locally. The Union leaders presented themselves as essential because they were the 
ones who could manage labour relations and avoid conflict. The central authorities could 
therefore not control operations for two interrelated reasons: the power of the local leaders 
and the inconsistency of the data flows. It was in this way that the different groups in the 
organization with their own vested interests were able to free themselves from any control by 
the rest of the organization.
In the bureaucratic dimension, leaders founded their political power on their social prestige. 
The political structure was perpetuated because people built up their leader’s image to 
enhance their own personal capital and influence by belonging to a powerful leader’s group. 
In a society where family bonds are predominant, those groups became like families of
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patriarchs; in their own words, “benefits splashed” and “it could not be otherwise”. Within 
this cultural setting, an economic rationale was totally out of place -  it felt like something 
alien, unnecessary or, more extremely, as an enemy of the national interests.
The absolute lack of economic rationale during this period faced its own limit because of the 
flood of inconsistent data provided to the media, which caused problems to the image of the 
General Director. To solve this problem, the authorities opted to build an institutional 
database with the aim of centralizing all the data from the organization. They also sought to 
regulate public relations policy by decreeing that all information given to the media should be 
based on data coming from this institutional database.
The database was first built on a mainframe. It was structured centrally and access to 
information was extremely tortuous and tightly controlled by the database manager. The 
system was clearly developed in accordance to the bureaucratic rationale of tight control of 
information in order to provide its manager with power. The centralized structure of the 
database was also enforced by the mainframe technology on which it was built. Later, the 
responsibility of managing the database was given to an oil worker with an engineering 
background. He was very familiar with the oil culture and the political structure of the 
organization, which gave him a clear understanding of the values that prevailed in the 
company due to the bureaucratic order. He also had working experience in other 
organizations and had studied a postgraduate course abroad.
This new database manager redeveloped the database with the central goal of providing 
reliable data to the executive and managerial levels of the organization. However, he 
consciously took into account the bureaucratic dimension of the organization in order to build 
an information system appropriate to its environment. He was able to use the feuds over the 
control of information to build arrangements that could assure the consistency and validity of 
the data. His understanding of the local conditions then allowed him to build an information 
system that brought tangible benefits to the organization. The validated data provided by this 
system was a necessary base for providing legitimacy to the economic/technical dimension, 
which would gain a dominant position in the second historic period. Such data was the 
necessary input to the analysis and evaluation activities, but to obtain this he had to manage 
the flows of information that came from areas where the values of the bureaucratic dimension 
prevailed.
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Both institutionalized dimensions in this first historical period were able to coexist because, 
ultimately, they had the common goal of producing oil in a context where economic 
considerations were not being primary and technical considerations were subservient to the 
political dictum. Although the bureaucratic dimension was dominant in the first period, its 
tension with the technical rationale arose from values that came from engineering disciplines. 
There was a clear, but not explicitly articulated, definition of the spaces of power that were 
accepted as ‘the way things work’. Engineers and technical experts controlled operations 
mainly with local manual information systems structured in an ad hoc manner to fulfil their 
needs.
The goal of the managers in the operations centres was to show results only in terms of 
volumes of the production of oil or refined products that provided the national economy with 
the fuel it needed. The administrative functions of the company were in the hands of the 
political apparatus whose main objective was to negotiate with the labour Union and the rest 
of the government in a way that avoided problems. These management and administrative 
factors hampered the production of oil for the national market; later, during the boom, they 
also constrained the expansion of the oil export platform. The relation between the 
organization and the government was one of ‘you make as if you supervise me and I act as if 
you control me”. The real power behind the organization was the Union, and the 
administration was forced to keep giving it concessions in order to avoid labour conflicts that 
could disrupt Pemex’s operations. Some of these concessions subsequently proved to be too 
onerous when the economic/technical rationale became the prevalent institutionalized 
dimension in the government and the organization. During the time when the bureaucratic 
dimension was prevalent, having reliable data was not an important aspect because the 
organizational culture did not value structured information as a resource needed for decision 
making.
Efficiency was not a concern during the oil boom, when the only consideration was the 
political role of Pemex in ensuring the effective expansion of its oil exporting capabilities. 
The company was essentially a government agency whose task was to generate the resources 
needed to finance the development of the country. At this time, Pemex undertook various 
efforts to develop computer-based systems, but the speed of the expansion overwhelmed its 
capacity to develop new systems; the central authorities were therefore unable to supervise
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and control the operations. The financial control that the government had over the 
company’s budget allocations was also lost due to the General Director’s personal 
relationship with the President. He was able to by-passed the official procedures by asking 
financial resources directly from the President.
Officially, information systems management at Pemex was totally centralized. This policy 
was explicitly seen from the technical rationale as ‘the best way to organize’. In practice, 
unofficial informatics centres developed throughout the organization to fulfil local needs, 
following the orders of local leaders. The centralized activities of the official information 
systems management were dominated by the values of the bureaucratic dimension. The 
accepted way of arranging matters in the organization was through detailed classifications 
covering every aspect of an activity to ensure everything was directed harmoniously by the 
central control processes. This feature is expressed clearly in Pemex’s normatividad, the 
technical and information standardization and regulation of administrative procedures (see 
section 6.4.2). The normatividad was specified in various documents from different periods 
of time, which included extremely detailed specifications of all types and categories of 
equipment and software, for example to determine organizational hardware and software 
standards.
At the same time, the use of information technology in the organization grew relatively 
smoothly in some respects because it was dealt with in the same way as any other technology 
in a technology-intensive organization: within the technical dimensions and its 
institutionalized values. Information technology was new but oil workers did not feel 
threatened by it, as indicated in typical comments such as: “The only thing we needed to be 
able to use the new technology was good methodologies to guide us in the application and 
operation of computers”. Throughout the history of Pemex, the technical institutionalized 
value has remained prevalent in shaping the use of information technology and systems 
development in the organization.
The breakdown in the relationship between Pemex and IBM in the mid 1970s (see section 
5.4.2) shows how events are built from negotiations between individuals who try, to the best 
of their understanding, to succeed in their daily operations in accordance their mental 
frameworks. The reorientation of Pemex’s computer-based information systems towards 
open systems platforms illustrates the kind of situated change that is built by daily decisions
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regarding operations, in contexts within which many forces interact. The decision to follow 
open systems as the organizational standard brought in a economic/technical rationale as a 
key factor in the negotiations for choosing the favoured bid. Nevertheless, the political 
dimension was also present in the purchasing power of Pemex over suppliers.
The technical rationale was embodied in the intervention of consultants, who were portrayed 
as providing an ‘external objective knowhow with a value-free perspective’ that would define 
the best way to carry out the information systems activities in the organization. The 
consultants’ opinion as an expression of the technical rationale was given preference over the 
suggestions coming from internal staff, even if they had earlier made the same proposal as the 
consultants. The cultural feature of malinchismo enhanced this ‘foreign is best’ 
predominance over local expertise. The proposal to follow an open systems strategy was 
based on an economic argument because, in the opinion of the manager responsible for 
technology monitoring, the trends in the market showed the decline of IBM; for him, 
standards were defined by the market.
9.3.3 The Emerging Strength of the Economic/Technical Rationale
During the second historic period, from the early 1980s, the predominant institutional 
dimension of Pemex’s central authorities and administration came to reflect the 
economic/technical dimension, which was aligned with the political stance of the central 
government. Driven by the values of the technological rationale, the process of change in 
this period headed towards the goal of preventing technical decisions being subordinated to 
the political goals of the central government. For instance, this was the aim behind the 
introduction of the concept of cost centres, which allowed the evaluation and control of 
operations and guided production decisions by technical considerations.
The development of the corporate financial systems was initially dominated by the 
engineering perspective. However, the imperative to take local conditions into account was 
soon identified by the staff carrying out the implementation in the various geographically- 
distributed centres. These developers took into account the political rationale in order to 
undertake what they described as “trench warfare”: implementing corporate systems by 
“conquering” each site, and “fighting the implementation in each locality”.
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The corporate financial systems have been severely criticized by those Pemex authorities 
whose yardstick for information systems development is a rational model that prescribes a 
universal recipe of how to achieve so-called ‘best international practices’, based on values 
that are regarded as being outside of any particular time and place. However, such models 
cannot value many of the benefits achieved that were meaningful to the specific conditions of 
the company and the technology available at that time, such as the important contribution 
made by these financial systems in helping to integrate Pemex into a single organization 
through the standardization of financial procedures and data. This represented a 
breakthrough in transforming some of the main features of the bureaucratic dimension of the 
‘old Pemex’. For example, it was moving to becoming a company with standardized 
financial procedures from having been an organization that acted as a cluster of different 
feuding parts, each with a particular way of carrying out the company’s administrative 
function. These corporate systems provided the foundations for the restructuring of key 
operations of Pemex into subsidiaries during the process of organizational change undertaken 
by the authorities in order to introduce an economic rationale into its operations. The 
existence of these corporate systems made possible the creation and operation of the new 
subsidiaries.
The bureaucratic dimension which prevailed in the organization until then could be countered 
only by explicitly showing the dysfimctionality of the operation in terms of quantitative 
analyses that provided ‘value free’ arguments derived from economic rationale. Reliable data 
was a pre-requisite for that purpose; the institutional database provided this, thereby laying 
the grounds of legitimacy to back politically the proposal to split the company. The database 
system evolved to integrate information from all areas of the organization and to respond to 
the increasing demand from the new administration for information. The legitimacy of the 
organizational restructuring process was reinforced and validated through the information 
that this database was able to provide. The reliable data allowed meaningful analysis and 
evaluation of the operations and backed politically the decisions that were later taken to 
continue the alignment of the company’s operations to the economic/technical rationale.
During this evolution of the database system, its development did not follow the prescription 
of how to build standard executive information systems or a corporate integrated database. 
To fulfil the new requirements for information, the new database manager continued to take 
advantage of the peculiarities of the organization to make a system suited to the tight network
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of controlled flows of information. The data validation process took into account the political 
structure of the organization and the need to develop it using suitable persons who had 
technical legitimacy and the ability to communicate, even in the operational areas where 
feuds existed over information. The volume of data grew incrementally by carefully 
negotiating each flow of information at an individual level. In these negotiations, the 
database operators took into account the mental framework of the workers, with whom they 
established personal contact and clear definitions of the data flows.
9.3.4 Economic/Technical Rationale Enforced by Information Systems Development
The prevalence of the economic/technical dimension in Pemex in the second period studied 
implied the massive introduction of information technology as an enabler of modernization. 
The institutionalization of the use of information technology as the route that has to be 
followed to introduce ‘best practices’ is clearly expressed in the pervasive nature that 
information technology has achieved. It became taken for granted in the organization that the 
way to modernize its operations is by introducing information technology. The legitimacy of 
such an option, including the related actions of consultancy companies, is grounded in 
prescriptions from the rational stream of research that addresses information systems 
development from an analytical perspective in which human aspects are managed just like 
any other variable, with little regard to social, political, and cultural aspects of local 
conditions. Internal staff can personally disagree with the consultants’ perspective, but they 
still have to conform to the outsiders’ prescription due to the bureaucratic rationale, which 
dictates that the political capital of the people in the organization will be safeguarded if they 
do not contradict managers and the consultants they bring in.
Contracts for consultancy services for information systems development generally contain 
milestones and payments that are determined by ‘deliverables’, which are typically reports 
documenting each stage of the life cycle in accordance with the technical rationale. Such a 
process can become a game of producing deliverables that have no actual impact on the 
organization because they do not address the other institutionalized aspects. In fact, the 
decision to bring in the consultants could be interpreted as the dominance of the technical 
rationale in seeking to inhibit the operation of the bureaucratic dimension.
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The decision to choose SAP R/3 as the enterprise resource planning system was made on the 
technical grounds of following market trends, based on the advice the General Director had 
received, but it was actually also a political decision. The bureaucratic dimension was 
considered by allowing the users to ‘evaluate’ different packages, using the technical 
rationale that advocates allowing users to choose the most appropriate package to fulfil their 
organization’s particular needs; for SAP R/3 at Pemex, this user involvement came only after 
the decision had been taken.
The task of implementation was awarded to foreign companies through bidding that followed 
both technical and economic rationales, but the organization’s previous experiences with 
consultants led to the bid including technical specifications and restrictions to avoid the 
shortcoming of such consultancies. The strategy of implementing SAP R/3 was defined in 
accordance to the rationalist perspective of information systems implementation and 
organizational change. Some oil workers regretted that the corporate systems were not given 
more of a chance to evolve. In their view, these systems could have then enabled the 
organization to develop new internal capabilities and knowledge.
Political considerations made Pemex’s staff carry on with its information system 
implementations even though they recognized these developments were faced by risks of 
severe problems, or even failure. They were well aware that such efforts would imply large 
costs to the organization and would probably not bring the expected benefits. The strategy 
took for granted that the development of computer-based information systems would provide 
structured, reliable, and timely data which would automatically bring a cultural change as it 
would promote the use of structured information for decision taking. This deterministic view 
of the use of technology was embedded within the economic/technical rationale. The 
economic rationale, which sought to institutionalize the value of the use of structured 
information for decision taking, could not visualize how the bureaucratic rationale that still 
prevailed in the operational areas saw this type of information as alien and unnecessary.
This indicates why implementing information technology in a social setting needs to consider 
local conditions in order to make feasible those projects aiming to automate or systemize. On 
the other hand, the projects whose goal is to informate require a change of the 
institutionalized values to ensure workers appreciate the value of having structured 
information as the foundation for decision taking. The institutionalization of the economic
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rationale is a necessary implication if informatization is to be the outcome from information 
systems development. This form of institutionalized rationale regulates most private 
organizations worldwide, but does not always apply to state-owned companies such as 
Pemex.
9.3.5 The Economic/Technical Rationale Basis of Consultancy Operations
The power of the economic/technical dimension in the use of information systems that 
prevailed from the early 1980s within Pemex and Mexican society generally was enforced by 
the marketing approach of the consultancy firms involved, which emphasized universal 
solutions. The international character of these firms provided them with a strong image of 
legitimacy. Information technology, still seen as something alien and technical, was left to 
guidance “from those who know better in the form of so-called best practices,” as an ex- 
General Director of Pemex commented.
The explanations provided by consultants to the authorities during the process of bidding 
were usually founded in a rational perspective which is easy to understand. The consultants 
emphasized how implementation could be controlled by following the steps and activities of 
a prescribed methodology. The explanations also usually gave the sense that computer-based 
information systems would bring specific changes to allow better control over operational 
areas. The national malinchismo culture, which allows outsiders to prescribe the correct 
solutions because they know best, is also advantageous in the political culture because it 
reduces risk by avoiding the responsibility of decision taking.
The power of consultants is also aided by another institutionalized local cultural value: the 
promotion of scapegoating and risk avoidance, as summarized in the saying ‘people should 
not move if they want to appear in the picture’ (see section 4.2). The tradition in Mexican 
national culture of blaming mistakes on scapegoats prevents learning from mistakes, which 
means people prefer to take the safe path by avoiding the taking of decisions and, therefore, 
the risk of making a mistake. This attitude was institutionalized at Pemex by auditing 
practices introduced by the central government which reinforced the view that workers could 
minimize the risk of losing their jobs by never challenging the content of the projects and 
sticking strictly to prescribed procedures to avoid being accused of bad practices.
238
The precedent of British Petroleum was used strongly to underpin support of the restructuring 
process, although by then the British company had begun to encounter problems in becoming 
a global company based on a corporate group model. The malinchismo also prevented 
Pemex from taking sufficient account of local experience to make sense of new practices. 
This situation was enforced by the ‘conquest syndrome’ which sees everything coming from 
the past as inferior, implying a total intolerance of those who attempt to persist with the old 
methods. Instead, new practices defined by external consultancy companies were favoured. 
Pemex followed the international trend of outsourcing and use of packages without 
challenging this policy’s suitability for local conditions. The company’s authorities took for 
granted that an external solution would be better than a local one, as it was seen as value free. 
They did not consider evolving the corporate systems, which would have represented an 
opportunity to take advantage of local knowledge and experience at the same time as 
addressing the specific needs of Pemex as a state-owned company.
The introduction of SAP R/3 emphasized the predominance of the technical dimension. In 
the corporate group, the implementation was carried out initially mainly by considering 
technical aspects. The technical perspective that was predominant in Pemex project leaders 
and the consultants permeated the definition of the strategy. When the social elements of the 
systems started to hamper progress on the project, Pemex hired new consultants to try to 
address these problems; there was an acceptance that it had been a mistake not to have dealt 
initially with an issue as important as the human aspects. However, the managers’ choice in 
the selection of the new consultancy company to carry out this change management project 
was limited because the company’s procurement procedures were an expression of the 
economic dimension.
The new consultants started an independent project for managing the changes and impacts 
provoked by the implementation of SAP R/3. This was carried out in parallel with the main 
project, in order to manage separately the variables they had failed to consider previously. 
Nevertheless, this project tackled these human issues from the same technical perspective that 
had been used to implement the SAP project because this was their taken-for-granted way of 
doing things. For them, it was essentially a matter of having a new methodology directed to 
handling human issues, through training and communication.
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It is too soon to have the results of the SAP project, but it should be noted that the model 
implicit in the package corresponds to the economic/technical dimension that promotes the 
so-called ‘best international practices’. This represents a clash with the features of the 
bureaucratic dimension that is also a part of the social setting of Pemex. This does not mean 
to imply a moral judgement on the values of the different institutionalized dimensions, but 
seeks to highlight the need to understand that both dimensions are active in the social setting 
and need to be addressed carefully.
Pemex is a state-owned company. It has to provide specific data to the government and to 
consider these requirements as part of its information systems, even if they do not fit with 
best business practices. Although it is premature to draw conclusions from the SAP project, 
comments from people not belonging to the mainstream of the managers implementing it 
suggest that SAP is working but they have expressed doubts over the permanence and 
robustness of the project. One middle manager noted: “For political reasons, they had to 
show that SAP works but the real transformation of the organization has not yet happened. 
People may have the data, but they still do not know how to use information nor value it.” 
To achieve this, change will necessarily imply a cultural change: a change of institutionalized 
values in people’s minds. The authorities of the corporate group have tried to promote this 
change primarily through the training addressed by the change management project. 
However, no significant signs of such changes were visible at the early stages of the 
implementation of SAP.
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10 C o n c l u sio n s
This chapter highlights the main conclusions of the above analysis and the overall findings of 
this research.
10.1 K e y  Fa c t o r s  t o  C o n sid e r  in  A ssessing  the  U se  o f  In fo r m a t io n  T ech no lo g y  
in  O r g a n iz a tio n s
The influence of the central principles of the two prevalent institutionalized dimensions of the 
economic/technical and bureaucratic would be present in any instance of a modem society, so 
they always have to be considered and managed to be able to obtain the expected benefits 
from the use of information technology -  or even to recognize the technology’s limits. 
Information technology embeds social structures that are usually linked to an economic 
rationale. Its introduction therefore usually implies challenging the indigenous order given 
by the bureaucratic dimension and the plurality of worlds considered in this analysis. The 
economic rationale would be represented by the potentiality offered by the technology to 
allow new ways of operations; this is usually described as ‘best practices’ and the ‘model of a 
global company’ that has ‘maximization’ as its core value. This economic rationale is an 
extraordinarily strong force in challenging the status quo. It has been said it is the foundation 
of the industrialization of the world with its enormous material wealth. However, it should 
not be regarded as the only force to be taken into account.
Another important consideration when using information technology is that humans are 
social beings, whose social needs have to be addressed. It is the overall social setting, the 
indigenous conditions, that determines the specific ways in which these needs are translated 
into social, cultural, and political practices. Every social setting incorporates a plurality of 
institutionalized environments, as shown by the co-existence of the economic/technical and 
bureaucratic dimensions in modem society. The specific conditions of each organization will 
necessarily permeate information systems development, even if they are not considered 
explicitly. Understanding the cultural, political, and social features of the local setting is 
therefore necessary in order to illuminate how information technology is ultimately 
incorporated into the practices of the organizations following a drive towards diversity. To 
achieve the development of information systems suited to the specific conditions to be 
addressed, it is therefore necessary to build an understanding of the specificity of the social
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setting and how these characteristics can have an impact on an information system’s 
implementation.
The consideration of local conditions implies addressing the specific needs of each social 
setting. When trying to mirror the so-called ‘best practices’ for the use of information 
technology, consideration should be given to whether the practices are appropriate for the 
local conditions, or what type of change they imply for the prevailing institutional values. 
This process of innovation has to be carried out for each particular social setting when 
introducing information technology, which has its own enabling and restricting social 
structures. It is not necessary to start from scratch or reinvent the wheel on each occasion, 
but rather it is a matter of making sense of practices and arrangements by considering the 
potential of information technology in relation to local conditions.
This consideration of each local setting implies the consideration of the bureaucratic 
dimension. However, the economic/technical dimension must also be taken into account 
because it is one of the predominant institutionalized dimensions of Western societies and its 
application defines the new standards to which organizations are forced to adhere in order to 
retain their market. The two forces interact, so they must both be considered.
The limits of universal prescriptions for implementing information technology are 
demonstrated by this recognition of the specificity of each social setting according to the 
local conditions, as expressed in the plural institutionalized dimensions. However, general 
guidance on the development of information technology that highlights its potential can prove 
to be useful if those practices are then translated to the specific conditions of each case, 
taking into account the characteristics of the other institutionalized dimensions of the 
organization.
Addressing the social, political, and cultural aspects of system development projects is not a 
simple task. The recognition of an organization’s institutionalized values is very difficult for 
a member of that organization, whose perception is shaped by those same institutionalized 
values. The taken-for-granted character of these values does not allow, or makes it difficult, 
for somebody immersed in a particular social setting to visualize alternatives. The 
intervention of consultants as third parties who can recognize the organization’s values 
because of their outsider status can facilitate this kind of analysis. Their expertise will be of
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value as long as it is reinterpreted in relation to the local conditions of the organization and is 
not seen as a universal prescription that can be applied unproblematically. These 
prescriptions usefully highlight the potential of information technology, but not the 
importance of considering local conditions.
The identification of institutionalized values can be undertaken by recognizing differences 
between various situations, for example by considering the perspective of other organizations 
through a qualitative analysis. For such purposes, the development of detailed case studies 
can prove beneficial if they apply structured theoretical models and are undertaken with a 
qualitative methodology. Case studies can illuminate alternatives and provide benchmarks 
for different situations, but these alternatives do not have to be followed as prescriptions. 
Instead, understanding a case study through a rich description of its social environment, as 
provided in this thesis, opens opportunities to interpret other local conditions from different 
perspectives. A case study could reveal that the organization’s practices are only one among 
many ways of doing things. The analysis of local conditions from such a perspective helps to 
identify local practices by revealing their taken-for-granted character, emphasized through 
comparative analysis.
Consultants, as outsiders, can have a privileged position for understanding the political 
rationale because they are not immersed in the closed ideological system of the organization. 
However, they have to be aware of the rational values that are institutionalized in each 
specific case. Local conditions should not be addressed with a judgmental attitude, but 
should seek to understand the values, practices, social dynamics, and political positions of 
people in their social setting and how this can influence the development of a project. The 
central principles of the institutionalized environments should also be taken into account 
because they can be used as sources of power in the negotiations needed for the development 
of a specific system. In the process of building integrated systems, information technology 
has been recognized as much more than just a tool for automation, but rather as an 
organizational tool. Recognition of the institutionalized dimensions within the organization 
in question would also provide feasibility studies of projects with short-, medium- and long­
term perspectives on both information systems development and organizational change.
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10.2  M a in  F in d in g s  o f  t h e  P e m e x  C a s e  S t u d y
The Pemex case study described in this thesis highlights the impact of local conditions on the 
development of the organization and its information systems. Pemex is the most important 
company in Mexico because of its position as the state-owned oil company gives it a vital 
strategic role in the national economy. This study has focused on Pemex’s strenuous efforts 
to modernize its operations through the heavy use of information technology. The local 
national and organizational conditions in which this has taken place have been analysed in 
terms of the institutions that shaped people’s perceptions and behaviour. This has shown that 
in Mexico nationally and within the Pemex organization -  as in modem society generally -  
the prevailing technological mode of production and bureaucratic mode of administration 
combined with other specific local features to constitute the social and cultural background of 
the case study. The social setting of the case study has therefore been conceived of as a 
plurality of institutionalized environments, each identified with specific core principles and 
sets of values. In this sense, information technology carries the values of the technological 
mode of production; but the potential of the use of information technology and its enabling 
capacity to promote new ways of operation can be cemented only if the institutionalized 
environment of the social setting is taken into account.
The study of the use of information systems in organizations has been developed with the aim 
of understanding this new phenomenon, which is itself changing. Information systems 
research builds this understanding by employing different perspectives, which are 
complementary in the sense that they enlighten different aspects of this phenomenon. The 
research for this thesis was carried out with an interpretivist approach on the basis of 
considering knowledge as a social construction that seeks to make sense of the world 
(Walsham 1993). It explores the interaction between the organizational change process and 
the use of information systems within a developing country, using institutional theory as a 
way to structure the understanding of the specificity of local conditions. This has been done 
by identifying the prevailing economic/technical and bureaucratic institutional dimensions 
and the impact they have on the process of changing the organization and its information 
systems and how the information systems development efforts had an impact the process of 
change of the organization. These dimensions represent the taken-for-granted values that 
determine people’s actions.
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The contribution of this research can be outlined at several levels. Firstly, it has applied a 
theoretical framework by using institutional theory to establish a structured understanding of 
the interaction between the social environment, the organizational change process, and 
information systems development in Pemex. Using (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973) and 
Scott and Meyer (1983) typology of the prevalent institutions of modem society, the research 
has been able to address the cultural impact of the social setting by recognizing the two main 
forces acting in the process that produces changes of the organization and its information 
systems development:
1. homogenization as the pervasive forces driving modernity, expressed in the trend 
towards a global organizational model shaped by the economic and technical 
rationale; and
2. local conditions that drive towards diversification, expressed in the values embedded 
in the bureaucratic institutional order of the local, contingent, and specific conditions 
of each particular environment.
An understanding of both these forces has enabled the research to address the difficult 
concept of ‘culture’, understood as shared values and norms that identify people as a group, 
(Mowshowitz 1980) (Wallerstein 1990) (Anthony 1994) (Korpela 1996) as well as the 
influence of that culture on both the organizational change process and information systems 
development. The research therefore understands institutions as the shared values and norms 
that are the taken-for-granted way of doing things within a specific social context. These 
institutions shape people’s actions, at the same time as these actions reinforce the 
institutionalization of those values (Zucker 1983).
The research was able to identify at Pemex the institutionalized values embedded in 
information technology that shaped the company’s development of automation and its 
organizational impact. This identification reinforces Lind’s (1991) view that information 
technology is not value free. Without adopting the extreme position of technology 
determinism, this research throws light on the complexity implied in the implementation of 
software packages developed in industrialized countries that encompass models of reality 
which are different from the social contexts in which they are implemented (Lind 1991). For 
example, the implementation of SAP R/3 implies the transmission of institutionalized values 
that will not always suit local prevalent values; this is particularly important in the case of
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Pemex because it has the institutionalized values of a state-owned company , for instance in 
terms of the lack of value placed within the company on structured quantitative data as a 
strategic source for decision taking. This understanding has been developed by taking an 
integrated perspective on the social setting, which differs from Hoefstede’s model 
(Steinwachs 1999) that considers cultural aspects as variables.
This aspect of the research also offers insights into the content of change and its implications 
for understanding the impact of information technology use in a social environment. 
Automation implies the introduction of electronic processing to the organization’s data flows, 
and systemization implies the redefinition of organizations processes’ using the potential 
offered by information technology for integrating internal and external data flows. 
Automation and systemization imply social changes for the organization in terms of the 
power structure that controls information flows and job redesign (Avgerou and Comford 
1998). The implementation of such systems allows the organization to change its information 
flows with the outer world and to redefine its processes and types of links with economic 
partners (Henderson and Venkatraman 1993) (Bradley, Hausman, and Nolan 1993) (Drucker 
1988) (Hammer and Champy 1993).
The type of content of change identified as informate (Zuboff 1988) implies the 
empowerment of workers by the provision of structured data as a strategic resource for 
decision taking and embeds institutional values arising from the economic/technical rationale. 
The automation and, more specifically, systemization types of change content provide the 
structured data, but do not necessarily imply that it will be used (Avgerou 1991) -  and even if 
that data is used, it may not necessarily be employed in the way it was meant to within a 
modernization project. Information systems are usually developed to provide structured data 
for decision taking as well as to align the organization’s operations according to an economic 
rationale and the need for economic maximization and technical optimization.
There is the need for further research to guide the practice of information systems 
development and organizational change in a way that takes account of changes in cultural and 
institutionalized values. Further understanding of information system projects that strive to
80 Financial control of a market-driven organization is achieved through its income and cash flow, but in Pemex 
it is done through its budget allocations.
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informate organizations is needed, especially in public organizations in which the use of 
structured data for decision taking is not necessarily an institutionalized practice (Madon 
1994) (Avgerou 1991).
The research at Pemex brings to the particular context of developing countries immersed in 
the process of modernization an understanding of the vital role played by the forces of 
homogenization and local conditions in changing an organization and its information systems 
development. The pervasive homogenizing force of the economic and technical rationale is 
the raison d'etre of market-oriented companies and is always embedded in any 
modernization effort. In other types of organization, like state-owned companies, this is not 
necessarily the case as their raison d'etre is driven by other forces; at the same time, there are 
social pressures, in part perhaps promoted by information technology vendors, that oblige 
these organizations to strive for efficiency and effectiveness through the use of information 
technology. The bureaucratic force originating from the social context is the one driving the 
organization and its information systems towards the diversity that arises from the 
institutionalized values embedded in the local setting. The social settings of developing 
countries operate in accordance with different rationales that do not necessarily follow the 
values of the economic rationale (Avgerou 2000) (Lind 1991) (Korpela 1996).
The research also contributes guidance on practice. Markus (1983) has pointed out that the 
best prescription for an information system implementation strategy is through a diagnosis of 
the organizational setting in which the systems will be used. In this respect, the use of 
institutional theory has offered a way of diagnosing the social setting through the 
identification of the prevailing institutions of modem society and their interaction with the 
cultural specificity of local conditions, grounded on the understanding that this is a social 
construction of the observer (Walsham 1993). Such a structured understanding of the social 
setting can help to identify problems or specific needs that have to be addressed in 
implementing information systems development.
This aspect of the research also indicates the potential contributions and limitations that 
consultants can have, as outsiders, in identifying the institutional values of the organization in 
which they carry out their professional practice. In addition, the consultants should be 
conscious that specific institutionalized values embedded in their professional practices can 
be in conflict with those of the organization hosting them. This theoretical framework
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enables research practitioners to identify conflicting values and, in the best conditions, ways 
of resolving them -  or of at least recognizing, as some Pemex oil workers did, the limitations 
of their standard practices for achieving certain goals in a specific context.
Another practical guideline contributed by this research is the recognition of the interaction 
of the homogenization and local forces. This can help to identify the limits of implementing 
particular models, for example in the way Pemex has tried to apply the universal model of a 
global company to the specific social setting of a state-owned company in a developing 
country. The pressure to implement information systems will be there due to the pervasive 
character of information technology, but practitioners should be aware of the need to interpret 
the project implementation according to the specific conditions of the organization and to 
draw appropriate projects goals based on this contextualized understanding.
From a general perspective, the historical reconstruction of the use of information systems in 
Pemex is another contribution of this research. This has emphasized the value of local 
knowledge and the need to evaluate events within their context, both as social setting and in 
its historical period of time. This recognition strives for the elimination of the ‘conquest 
syndrome’ that belittles everything coming from the past by highlighting the need to consider 
past experience as an important source of knowledge in understanding current and future 
situations. As a leading-edge user of information technology in Mexico, Pemex’s 
experiences reflect the way information systems have been developed more generally in this 
country. The findings of this research can therefore be extrapolated especially to other 
Mexican organizations to guide their future efforts in modernizing their operations through 
the use of information technology.
The research has built further understanding of how the process of change of an organization 
and its use of information technology is actually constructed by people acting in their daily 
lives (Orlikowski 1996). The application of this theoretical approach has special significance 
because the case study deals with the change process of an organization in a developing 
country. In the most recent period studied, from the early 1980s, Pemex undertook a process 
of expert-oriented planned change to transform itself into a global company. Even in this 
circumstance, the case study clearly shows how both the organizational change process and 
its information systems were constructed by the people acting in their social setting. It is in
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this way that the research brings further understanding in illustrating how this construction 
has been built within the specific social setting at Pemex.
The empirical phase of this thesis ended in 1996, when Pemex was starting its 
implementation of SAP R/3 as part of a strategic organizational restructuring efforts aimed at 
transforming the company into a global enterprise whose operations would be controlled by 
an economic and technical rationale. In the six years since then, SAP R/3 is said to have 
begun operating, but research is needed to understand the true implications of its 
implementation. Further longitudinal research can also provide insights into the content of 
change in terms of: how the data and systems are being used. A comparative analysis of the 
implementation process of SAP R/3 in the four units of Pemex using different consultants 
companies could help to understand the impact of the different strategies used for the 
implementation. In addition, recent changes of administration nationally and within Pemex81 
create a rich new setting in which further research could valuably study the interaction of the 
social context, the process of organizational change, and information systems development.
In conclusion, the researcher would like to highlight the coexistence in modem societies of 
the homogenizing economic/technical force and the locally-situated bureaucratic force that 
drives towards diversity in organizational and information systems arrangements. This does 
not imply that a choice needs to be made to favour one or the other, but it does assert that 
both will be present and so there is a need to understand the balance between them. The 
research recognized that the values embedded in the technical and economic rationale 
encompass the pervasive character of information technology, which has generated what 
seems to be an unstoppable industrialization of modem society that has brought enormous 
benefits in terms of material well being -  but not without costs. Local institutionalized values 
are also always present, and are the ones that provide identity to human beings. As both 
institutional dimensions are found in all societies and organizations, ultimately the outcomes 
of implementing information systems depend on how the balance is drawn between them to 
obtain benefits from the use of information technology.
81 In December 1999, the administration in Pemex was changed when the strategist behind the process of change 
of the previous period was sacked on the grounds of misuse of discretionary power in the allocation of a large 
contract. The new General Director was Dr. Rogelio Montemayor, who came from the old tradition of 
politicians. By the end of 2000, a new public administration was formed by the right wing PAN party, after 
almost 70 years of hegemony by the PRI party. A senior executive of a private petrochemical company, Raul 
Munoz Leos, was appointed as the new General Director of Pemex.
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